

They govern through a โspin dictatorship.โ

By Dr. Daniel Treisman
Professor of Political Science
University of California, Los Angeles
Introduction
President Donald Trumpโsย critics oftenย accuse him of harboring authoritarian ambitions. Journalists and scholars haveย drawn parallelsย between his leadership style and that of strongmen abroad. Some Democrats warn that the U.S. isย sliding toward autocracyย โ a system in which one leader holds unchecked power.
Othersย counter that labeling Trump an autocrat isย alarmist. After all, he hasnโtย suspendedย the Constitution, forced school children toย memorizeย his sayings orย executedย his rivals, as dictators such as Augusto Pinochet, Mao Zedong and Saddam Hussein once did.
But modern autocrats donโt always resemble their 20th-century predecessors.
Instead, they project a polished image, avoid overt violence and speak the language of democracy. They wear suits, hold elections and talk about the will of the people. Rather than terrorizing citizens, many use media control and messaging toย shape public opinionย and promote nationalist narratives. Many gain power not through military coups but at the ballot box.
The Soft Power of Today’s Autocrats

In the early 2000s, political scientist Andreas Schedler coined the term โelectoral authoritarianismโ to describe regimes that hold elections without real competition. Scholars Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way use another phrase, โcompetitive authoritarianism,โ for systems in which opposition parties exist but leaders undermine them through censorship, electoral fraud or legal manipulation.
In myย own workย with economist Sergei Guriev, we explore a broader strategy that modern autocrats use to gain and maintain power. We call this โinformational autocracyโ or โspin dictatorship.โ
These leaders donโt rely on violent repression. Instead, they craft the illusion that they are competent, democratic defenders of the nation โ protecting it from foreign threats or internal enemies who seek to undermine its culture or steal its wealth.
Hungary’s Democratic Facade
Hungarian Prime Ministerย Viktor Orbรกnย exemplifies this approach. He first served from 1998 to 2002, returned to power in 2010 and has since won three more elections โ in 2014, 2018 and 2022 โ after campaigns that international observers criticized as โintimidating and xenophobic.โ
Orbรกn has preserved the formal structures of democracy โ courts, a parliament and regular elections โ but has systematically hollowed them out.
In his first two years he packed Hungaryโsย constitutional court, which reviewsย lawsย for constitutionality, with loyalists, forced judges off the bench by mandating aย lower retirement ageย andย rewrote the constitutionย to limit judicial review of his actions. He also tightened government control overย independent media.
To boost his image, Orbรกn funneled state advertising funds to friendly news outlets. In 2016, an ally bought Hungaryโs largest opposition newspaper โ then shut it down.

Orbรกn has also targetedย advocacy groupsย and universities. Theย Central European University, which was registered in both Budapest and the U.S., was once a symbol of the new democratic Hungary. But a law penalizing foreign-accredited institutions forced it to relocate to Vienna in 2020.
Yet Orbรกn has mostly avoided violence. Journalists areย harassedย rather than jailed or killed. Critics areย discreditedย for their beliefs but not abducted. His appeal rests on a narrative that Hungary is under siege โย by immigrants, liberal elites and foreign influences โ and that only he can defend its sovereignty and Christian identity. Thatย message resonatesย with older, rural, conservative voters, evenย as it alienatesย younger, urban populations.
A Global Shift in Autocrats
In recent decades, variants of spin dictatorship have appeared inย Singapore,ย Malaysia,ย Kazakhstan,ย Russia,ย Ecuadorย andย Venezuela. Leaders such as Hugo Chรกvez and the early Vladimir Putin consolidated power and marginalized opposition with minimal violence.
Data confirm this trend. Drawing from human rights reports, historical records and local media, my colleague Sergei Guriev and I found that the global incidence of political killings and imprisonments by autocratsย dropped significantlyย from the 1980s to the 2010s.
Why? In an interconnected world, overt repression has costs. Attacking journalists and dissidents can prompt foreign governments to impose economic sanctions and discourage international companies from investing. Curbing free expression risks stifling scientific and technological innovation โ something even autocrats need in modern, knowledge-based economies.
Still, when crises erupt, even spin dictators often revert to more traditional tactics. Russiaโsย Putinย has cracked down violently onย protestersย and jailedย opposition leaders. Meanwhile, more brutal regimes such as those in North Korea and China continue to rule by spreading fear, combining massย incarcerationย with advancedย surveillanceย technologies.
But overall, spin is replacing terror.
America Too?
Most experts, myself included, agree that the U.S. remains a democracy.
Yet some of Trumpโs tactics resemble those of informational autocrats. He hasย attacked the press,ย defied courtย rulings and pressured universities to curtailย academic independenceย and limitย international admissions. His admiration for strongmen such asย Putin, Chinaโsย Xi Jinpingย and El Salvadorโs Nayibย Bukeleย alarms observers. At the same time, Trump routinely denigratesย democratic alliesย and international institutions such as the United Nationsย and NATO.
Some expertsย say democracy depends on politiciansโ self restraint. But a system that survives only if leaders choose to respect its limits is not much of a system at all. What matters more is whether the press, judiciary, nonprofit organizations, professional associations, churches, unions, universities and citizens have the power โ and the will โ to hold leaders accountable.
Preserving Democracy in the U.S.
Wealthy democracies such as the U.S., Canada and many Western European countries benefit from robust institutions such as newspapers, universities, courts and advocacy groups that act as checks on government.
Such institutions help explain why populists such as Italyโs Silvio Berlusconi or Israelโs Benjamin Netanyahu, although accused ofย bendingย electoral rules andย threateningย judicial independence, have not dismantled democracy outright in their countries.
In the U.S., the Constitution provides another layer of protection.ย Amendingย it requires a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress and ratification by three-quarters of the states โ a far steeper hurdle than in Hungary, where Orbรกnย neededย only a two-thirds parliamentary majority to rewrite the constitution.
Of course, even the U.S. Constitution can be undermined if a president defies the Supreme Court. But doing so risks igniting aย constitutional crisisย and alienating key supporters.
That doesnโt mean American democracy is safe from erosion. But its institutional foundations are older, deeper and more decentralized than those of many newer democracies. Its federal structure, with overlapping jurisdictions and multiple veto points, makes it harder for any one leader to dominate.
Still, the global rise of spin dictatorships should sharpen awareness of what is happening in the U.S. Around the world, autocrats have learned to control their citizens by faking democracy. Understanding their techniques may help Americans to preserve the real thing.
Originally published by The Conversation, 06.03.2025, under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution/No derivatives license.


