How Democracies Defend Themselves against Authoritarianism

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Democracies facing authoritarian threats from within have found ways to push back.

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By Dr. Robert Benson
Associate Director
National Security and International Policy
The Center for American Progress

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Introduction and Summary

President Donald Trump’s return to office represents a defining moment for American democracy, underscoring the enduring appeal of authoritarian rhetoric and exposing deep fractures within an electorate increasingly distrustful of traditional institutions.¹ Things that once seemed unthinkable—brazen loyalty tests, the dismantling of oversight mechanisms, and the wielding of state power as a political weapon—have now become defining features of his new administration.²

Democracy does not collapse overnight. It erodes gradually––and then suddenly––with the normalization of undemocratic practices that are cloaked in legality yet corrosive to constitutional governance. As this report outlines, authoritarian actors exploit institutional vulnerabilities to consolidate power, obstruct legislative processes, weaken judicial independence, and erode electoral integrity. The United States is not immune to these tactics. President Trump’s return to power has been accompanied by an immediate purge of independent oversight officials, the systematic politicization of federal law enforcement, and a renewed effort to undermine the integrity of future elections.³

The Trump administration has stacked the U.S. Department of Justice with loyalists, replacing career prosecutors with appointees willing to pursue politically motivated investigations while shielding his closest allies.⁴ President Trump and Elon Musk have openly attacked judges who rule against the administration, deriding them as biased or illegitimate, echoing the rhetoric of authoritarian leaders who seek to undermine judicial independence.⁵

The Trump administration has signaled a willingness to deploy the military for domestic crackdowns, as seen in Trump’s first term when he ordered the violent dispersal of peaceful protesters for a photo opportunity.⁶ And more recently, President Trump has threatened to invoke the Insurrection Act to suppress organized dissent, even though he pardoned individuals convicted of violently attacking law enforcement on January 6, 2021.⁷ He has recklessly purged critical government agencies, firing independent inspectors general across multiple departments, sidelining career officials and experts, and stacking intelligence and security agencies with loyalists to further undermine institutional checks on executive power.⁸

This report offers a road map to counter these threats. Drawing on global case studies, it examines how democracies have confronted and mitigated the rise of authoritarian movements within their own governments. From Poland and Hungary to India, Georgia, and South Korea, these examples offer vital lessons on strengthening institutions, codifying democratic norms, and building resilience against authoritarian encroachments. The strategies outlined here emphasize prevention as much as restoration. Defending democracy requires more than faith in institutions; it demands proactive engagement, popular mobilization, legal reinforcement, and an unwavering commitment to democratic principles.

This is a call to action. Democracies across the world—including the United States—must recognize that the principles of freedom, equality, and justice are neither self-executing nor self-sustaining. Complacency is not an option. If left unchecked, authoritarian tendencies can calcify into permanent changes that render meaningful political opposition difficult if not outright impossible.⁹ This report provides not only an analysis but a framework for action—a strategy to defend, strengthen, and ultimately fortify democracy against those who seek to dismantle it from within.

Fortifying democracy means making democratic institutions more resilient against internal and external threats to the rule of law and extraconstitutional politics—actions that bypass or undermine constitutional limits. To best confront and counteract the rise of the populist far right, democracies must:

• Modernize legislative procedures to prevent governing abuses and obstruction.
• Codify unwritten norms to safeguard judicial independence.
• Strengthen electoral oversight and accountability to prevent manufactured majorities.

When institutional avenues are closed and the opposition is excluded from power, a whole-of-society response becomes essential to activate and align pro-democracy forces. Opposition lawmakers can play a crucial role by issuing a top-down signal to labor unions, universities and think tanks, professional associations, and civil society networks—catalyzing coordinated, bottom-up mobilization. Working in concert, these actors help construct the connective infrastructure of democratic resistance—one that can be summoned when the opportunity arises to restore representative government with full checks and balances.

The global rise of far-right authoritarian parties and actors within mature democracies is a pressing challenge to the modern constitutional state. Often characterized by their deeply nationalist, xenophobic, and overtly authoritarian agendas, these perpetrators exploit societal and economic grievances to challenge and subvert governing institutions—such as parliaments and courts—from within.

By fortifying the foundational structures of democracy against various authoritarian schemes, constitutional democracies can—and indeed must—proactively defend themselves to succeed in the 21st century and beyond.

The Threat

Overview

Authoritarian movements reject the foundational principles of constitutional democracy such as separation of powers and equality before the law. Driven by radical ideologies rooted in extreme nationalism and xenophobia, these movements work proactively to undermine democratic institutions from both inside and outside of government.¹⁰ When in government, far-right extremists often dismantle constitutional checks from within, overturning long-established norms to consolidate power. These authoritarian perpetrators deliberately attack state institutions to abet corruption and empower cronyism for themselves, siphoning away resources and opportunities at the expense of ordinary citizens. Meanwhile, movements and actors operating outside of government aim to delegitimize democratic institutions through organized obstruction; destabilize essential public functions; and pave the way for authoritarian actors to gain political footholds. Together, these internal and external pressures signify different stages of state capture—a process wherein previously independent institutions are co-opted for personal and partisan ends.¹¹

The Threat from Outside Government

When operating outside of government, far-right political parties such as the National Rally (RN) in France, led by Marine Le Pen and her young protege Jordan Bardella, peddle in virulent ethnonationalism and Islamophobia, seeding mainstream political discourse with racialized dog whistles.¹² By stretching the limits of mainstream debate, these parties shift the Overton window—the range of acceptable public opinion—rendering racialized asylum policies, mass deportations, and other once-unthinkable positions more palatable to the public.¹³ The normalization of extreme views can create dangerous permission structures for violence, starting with radicalized individuals or paramilitary groups—such as Italy’s CasaPound, which systematically targeted newly arrived North African immigrants in the early 1990s—and escalating to more organized political movements.¹⁴ For example, France’s Generation Identity, a movement that actively promotes the widely discredited and openly racist “great replacement theory,” propagated a far-right conspiracy claiming that immigration and demographic changes are deliberately orchestrated by governing elites to replace white European populations.¹⁵

Far-right politicians often play a double game when extremists act on these incitements: They publicly distance themselves from the violence while privately benefiting from the atmosphere of fear and division it fosters.¹⁶ In this way, authoritarian movements operate as engines of radicalization, eroding democratic norms from the outside while priming society for ever-greater methods of state repression.

In Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party has stoked economic grievances and fears related to immigration to promote a nativist backlash that is openly hostile to the state.¹⁷ AfD supporters have disrupted opposition rallies, harassed rival candidates, and obstructed debate in parliament—effectively normalizing aggression in the political sphere.¹⁸ The party’s rise has sparked concerns that Germany’s postwar Brandmauer—the constitutional firewall against the far right—may be weakening.¹⁹ Similarly, the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party in Greece, though now partly disbanded, physically attacked rival parliamentary candidates in the street in outright defiance of democratic norms.²⁰ By openly rejecting democratic norms, the AfD and Golden Dawn highlight how far-right parties and movements weaken institutions through sheer intimidation, intensifying societal polarization and undermining mediating democratic institutions from the outside.

The Threat from Within Government

Once in control of government, parties such as Hungary’s Fidesz under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán or the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) under co-founder and politician Jarosław Kaczyński embrace authoritarian politics by co-opting formerly independent public institutions, waging a shadow war on democracy through perfectly “legal” administrative means.²¹ Authoritarian consolidation takes shape through a range of tactics, including stacking constitutional courts with party loyalists; redrawing electoral districts to secure unfair advantages; and tightening control over media, universities, and cultural institutions.²² The ruling party takes these steps to entrench its dominance, to narrow the democratic space until opposition becomes functionally impossible. Hungary’s Fidesz wrote the playbook on executing the dismantling of democratic checks and balances.Orbán and his party have redrawn electoral districts to entrench their partisan advantage; stacked the courts with loyalists to neutralize oversight; and imposed media regulations that stifle independent journalism, transforming once-trusted public broadcasters into veritable government mouthpieces.²³

While some of these actions may conform to the strict letter of the law, they are fundamentally at odds with its spirit. By exploiting legal loopholes or bending rules to serve narrow partisan interests, authoritarians bypass the very spirit of transparency, accountability, and popular representation that are cornerstones of any democratic system. The impact on democratic systems is devastating: These tactics undermine public trust in institutions and create a perception of government as arbitrary, and in so doing, they weaken the legitimacy of democracy itself. When citizens lose faith in the integrity of their institutions, they become more susceptible to populist narratives that decry democracy as irreparably flawed.²⁴

In modern-day hybrid regimes—those that blend democratic institutions with authoritarian practices, such as Hungary—the state leverages this cynicism to cajole and ultimately pacify its population. “We may be liars and grifters,” the expression goes, “but frankly, so is everyone else.” Kleptocracy thrives in such a world. Corrupt autocrats systematically undermine state governing capacity, diverting resources away from ordinary citizens while concentrating immense wealth and power in the hands of a connected few. The collapse of the public sphere discourages civic engagement and paves the way for what the late historian and philosopher Hannah Arendt called “the politics of inevitability”: Nothing will ever change, so why bother.²⁵ Anticipating the autocrat’s playbook is key. The good news: It is out in the open and can be defeated.

The Autocrat’s Playbook

This report identifies three critical actions that autocratic parties, whether inside or outside government, take to drive democratic backsliding: legislative obstruction, ideological court capture, and manufactured majorities. Each presents distinct challenges to democracy and requires distinct countermeasures.

Legislative obstruction occurs when opposition parties exploit parliamentary procedures to block key reforms, paralyzing basic lawmaking and capitalizing on the resulting dysfunction to strengthen their political position. Once elected, they often dismantle the very checks they leveraged to propel their ascent. Court capture means ruling parties reshape the judiciary in their image, stripping it of its independence and reducing judges to mere political instruments. Manufactured majorities occur when ruling parties manipulate electoral laws and processes to inflate their representation, diminishing the power of genuine opposition voices. Crucially, this report offers actionable strategies to fortify democratic institutions against these threats. Democracies can resist the autocrat’s playbook by reinforcing judicial independence, codifying procedural norms, and insulating against crooked majorities.

Legislative Obstruction

The Dangers of Legislative Obstruction

Minority safeguards such as judicial review, bicameralism, and supermajority thresholds play a vital role in parliamentary democracies, acting as essential checks against would-be authoritarians and their manufactured majorities. But extremists who assume public office can weaponize these safeguards, using them to paralyze the legislative process and dismantle the system from within.²⁶ Here, the enemy-versus-adversary distinction in parliamentary politics is useful: An adversary competes in good faith, while an enemy seeks to dismantle the system itself. Destruction, not governance, is the point.

Democracy requires a delicate balance between the right of a duly elected majority to govern effectively and the right of a loyal opposition to challenge that government in good faith. This balance is best understood by examining two modes of opposition: the politics of adversary and enemy.²⁷ In adversarial politics, parties compete vigorously within an existing constitutional framework. They challenge one another through elections, offering contrasting governing philosophies all while respecting shared democratic principles. The goal is not to destroy the opposing side but to compete to govern in service of the greater good. By contrast, the politics of enemy emerges when the opposition is seen not as a rival to be debated but as a foe to be vanquished. Enemy politics degrade institutions, polarize societies, and corrode the very foundations of democracy by prioritizing dominance over coexistence.²⁸

Weaponizing the politics of enemy undermines representative democracy, erodes public trust in institutions, and ultimately blocks the implementation of widely supported policies.²⁹ When skillfully deployed, these parliamentary tactics can lay the groundwork for a hostile takeover of government, handing would-be authoritarians the keys to the castle.

When in the opposition, extremist parties such as the AfD in Germany can use delay tactics similar to the U.S. Senate filibuster to block legislation and deliberately cause dysfunction. They can then leverage that same dysfunction to argue that the government—and perhaps even democracy itself—is ineffective.³⁰ Political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have highlighted how such tactics can bolster extremists and entrench fringe rule, leading to a scenario wherein a partisan minority consistently thwarts the will of the majority.³¹ During the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Nazi Party, along with other extremist parties, exploited the vulnerabilities of the Weimar Republic’s constitution to create instability.³² They used obstructionist tactics in the Reichstag such as walking out of sessions to prevent a quorum and leveraging procedural rules to delay or block legislation.³³ This persistent obstruction contributed to a sense of democratic decay and ineptitude among the public, which weakened institutions and facilitated the rise of extraconstitutional politics.³⁴

Obstructionist tactics are not a relic of the past. In recent years, they have become the weapon of choice for far-right parties and movements across Europe.³⁵ By leveraging procedural delays and even physical disruptions, these parties have stalled legislative progress, amplified their extremist agendas, and cast themselves as the only viable alternative to what they claim is an ineffectual mainstream.³⁶ The far-right Finns Party in Finland exemplifies this approach.

Founded in 1995, the party has consistently disrupted normal procedure with its Eurosceptic and fiercely nationalist interventions.³⁷ In 2020, it attempted to block Finland’s approval of the European Union’s COVID-19 recovery plan by delaying the passage of the EU budget and stimulus package.³⁸ Through marathon speeches—including one lasting more than eight hours—party members sought to frame the recovery plan as a threat to Finnish sovereignty, a recurring theme among nationalist and far-right movements across the continent.³⁹ Their obstructionism risked delays in the disbursement of urgently needed economic stimulus funds, exacerbating financial strain on already struggling sectors.

Similarly, the RN in France employs a range of procedural tactics to obstruct the legislative process, overwhelming debates with amendments and deliberately prolonging floor arguments––even on high- stakes votes such as those supporting Ukraine.⁴⁰ These obstructionist maneuvers serve a dual purpose: They paralyze parliamentary functioning while simultaneously bolstering the RN’s nationalist and antiestablishment image. In doing so, the party presents itself as a bulwark against elites, position itself as defenders of core French interests against what Marine Le Pen derisively calls the “globalist” caste.⁴¹

In parallel with its legislative tactics, the RN also regularly targets marginalized groups, particularly asylum seekers, using racialized dog whistles that incite hostility and invite violence.⁴² This strategy allows the party to signal alignment with xenophobic sentiments without overtly violating democratic norms. When violence does occur, the RN distances itself from the perpetrators, even while doubling down on its incendiary rhetoric––a pattern that has drawn censure from fellow parliamentarians.⁴³

In Germany, the far-right AfD has also employed obstructionist strategies within the Bundestag. Through an influx of amendments, constant procedural objections, and prolonged debates, the AfD has managed to delay critical policymaking on issues from deficit spending to climate legislation.⁴⁴ Greece’s Golden Dawn party, although now diminished in influence, previously used disruptive tactics in parliament to effectively hold government proceedings hostage.⁴⁵ Party members resorted to vocal and physical disruptions during sessions, going as far as to instigate brawls on the plenary floor.⁴⁶ These episodes underscore how even established democracies can be paralyzed when far-right and extremist forces exploit procedural mechanisms and physical violence to advance their agenda.

To be clear, the examples above focus on political parties that are in the opposition. When would-be authoritarians gain power, they often pivot from confrontation to consolidation—from exploiting minority safeguards to dismantling them—as they seek to eliminate constitutional protections that could otherwise constrain their rise. This transition follows a well-trodden path, as demonstrated by the actions of Viktor Orbán and Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni of Italy. In both cases, institutional weaknesses and political crises created fertile ground for right-wing populists to gain political footholds, enabling them to exploit democratic dysfunction for rapid electoral gain.

Italy’s parliamentary system struggled to withstand the pressures of the eurozone crisis, a sovereign debt and financial crisis that rippled through southern Europe from 2009 to 2012 in the wake of the United States’ Great Recession. When market turmoil forced Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi to resign, the president of the republic convened a technocratic government under Mario Monti.⁴⁷ However, deep institutional weaknesses including fragmented coalitions, numerous legislative veto points and a Senate supermajority all contributed to paralyzed decision-making, dooming repeated attempts at financial reform.⁴⁸ As mainstream parties floundered, public frustration mounted. The Italian parliament’s failure to provide solutions to the crisis eroded trust in traditional parties, creating a political vacuum that far-right forces eagerly filled. A decade later, the Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia) emerged as a dominant force, advancing a neofascist agenda rooted in Italy’s wartime past.⁴⁹

Positioning themselves as defenders of traditional “Italian values” and virulently anti-immigrant, the Brothers of Italy thrived in a polarized political climate that marginalized centrist, consensus-driven politics.⁵⁰ Meloni, alongside other populist firebrands such as Matteo Salvini, leveraged their outsider status to first condemn and then exploit elite dysfunction.⁵¹ What began as obstruction matured into a campaign for power. Prolonged economic stagnation and deepening disillusionment with institutions further legitimized reactionary forces, allowing Meloni to present herself as the only alternative to a broken system that was unresponsive to the needs of Italians.

Meloni leveraged her electoral success to attack judicial independence—targeting judges who ruled against extralegal asylum policies—and to advance specific powers to control critical media outlets.⁵² Her efforts included direct attacks on Italy’s public broadcaster, RAI, where officials abruptly canceled the airing of an antifascist monologue and sparked widespread alarm among free speech advocates across Europe and beyond.⁵³ The broader lesson here is that dysfunction and gridlock can breed extremism, creating a self-reinforcing mechanism that emboldens populism at the expense of democratic norms.⁵⁴ The perception of a broken system fed their rise, and as a result, as Matteo Richetti, a lawmaker from the opposition Democratic Party, put it, “The genie had escaped and it was impossible to put it back in the bottle.”⁵⁵

Fortifying against Legislative Obstruction

As far-right and populist forces gain ground around the world, countries have explored mechanisms to counteract obstructionism, streamline processes, and uphold critical democratic principles––that is, to fortify against the politics of enemy. Germany’s approach stands as a compelling example: Through institutional reforms aimed at fostering collaboration and reducing divisive theatrics, the country has fortified its parliamentary system against the pitfalls of legislative obstruction. Part of the problem was that the Bundesrat—the upper house of the German legislature—was increasingly burdened by procedural hurdles. Routine legislation required supermajorities to pass, leading to long delays and sustained legislative gridlock.⁵⁶ By the time of former Chancellor Angela Merkel’s first government from 2005 to 2009, as much as 60 percent of all laws required Bundesrat approval, up from 10 percent in the immediate postwar period, with half requiring supermajority assent.⁵⁷

To address the issue, Merkel’s first government passed a series of federal reforms that clarified the division of responsibilities between state and federal governments, reduced the number of laws requiring upper-house approval, and allowed for more decisions to be made by simple majority vote.⁵⁸ A critical reform was modifying the infamous upper-house veto, or “Einspruchsgesetz.” Previously, overriding certain upper-house vetoes required a two-thirds lower-house majority. The reforms cut this requirement to a simple majority for specific legislation, including financial and tax legislation.⁵⁹

The change aimed to expedite the legislative process and prevent a small number of dissenting states from indefinitely stalling reforms. By reducing the Bundesrat’s power to block laws, the reform enabled a more efficient governing structure, which fostered a more responsive legislature.⁶⁰

Structural remedies alone may be insufficient to fortify against the politics of enemy. They should be considered alongside behavioral incentives that foster good governance. In Germany, mechanisms such as the “debate cutoff motion” and “mediation committees” have facilitated depolarization through processes by which legislators learn, maintain, and reinforce democratic values and collegial attitudes.⁶¹ By limiting prolonged, often theatrically charged debates, these practices reduce the scope for grandstanding and shift the focus toward substantive policy dialogue. Political scientists have shown that countries such as Germany, with strong consensus-based institutions and fewer legislative veto points, tend to exhibit greater legislative efficiency and lower levels of polarization as evidenced by their parliamentary vote tallies⁶²—that is, how often a governing coalition successfully passes legislation. The timing of these remedies is also crucial: Implementing them under the rule of an aspiring autocrat would almost certainly compromise their purpose and effectiveness.

Indeed, Germany’s recent federal elections, in which the far-right AfD secured 20.8 percent of the vote, have sparked urgent institutional and parliamentary responses aimed at preventing extremist disruption.⁶³ Anticipating the AfD’s potential use of procedural loopholes to paralyze decision-making, Bundestag leaders have reinforced key parliamentary rules to deny the party committee chairmanships and limit its ability to filibuster or stall proceedings.⁶⁴ The government has also taken preemptive legislative action to lock in major policy priorities—such as defense spending and constitutional protections for the judiciary—before the new parliament convenes, ensuring critical initiatives remain insulated from far-right obstruction.⁶⁵

Legislative safeguards are most effective when consolidating fragile or new democracies. For example, Spain’s “guillotine motion” sets a strict timetable for debating bills and requires a vote once the allotted time has expired, regardless of whether all aspects of the debate have been successfully concluded.⁶⁶ This procedural innovation is partially credited with stabilizing Spanish politics during the tumultuous 1970s and 1980s following military dictatorship.⁶⁷ It helped limit the influence of a radical minority of Francoist sympathizers who aimed to topple the government of democratically elected Prime Minister Felipe González, who served from 1982 to 1996.⁶⁸ By curbing gamesmanship and other delay tactics, the guillotine motion fostered a more predictable legislative calendar, which in turn helped build public confidence in the new democratic process.⁶⁹

Streamlined procedures and consensus mechanisms, such as cutoff motions or simple majority thresholds, can facilitate more thoughtful debate and build cross-aisle support for complex public policies.⁷⁰ In Denmark, scholars have found that laws passed with a simple majority in the Danish Folketing, or parliament, are far less likely to be revisited compared with those passed in countries such as Portugal with higher legislative thresholds.⁷¹Lower legislative thresholds incentivize coalition building, foster greater cooperation, and lead to more durable and broadly popular lawmaking. Additionally, by encouraging parties to negotiate and compromise early in the legislative process, lower thresholds can reduce legislative gridlock and enhance policy stability.

Still, consensus-based political systems and the mechanisms that enable them to function all depend on the threat remaining external to the party in power. When authoritarians do seize power, they often move swiftly to dismantle the very foundations of democracy. In such moments, an entirely different set of tools is required to fortify and restore democratic governance.

Court Capture

The Dangers of Court Capture

The judiciary plays a critical role in upholding democratic norms and protecting minority rights. However, courts are not infallible, and governments can exert undue influence over them. Far-right and authoritarian movements and parties around the world have moved first to undermine and then to usurp judicial authority.⁷² Once completed, court capture can cannibalize a democracy from within. In recent years, Poland experienced rapid democratic backsliding under the far-right Law and Justice Party (PiS). Shortly after winning control of the government in 2015, PiS began a sustained attack on the independence of the Polish court system, suggesting that it was made up of arrogant “intellectual,” “globalist,” and “alien”––by which party members often meant “Jewish”––political forces that did not represent the true will of the Polish people.⁷³

Absent political checks, the new governing majority moved quickly. PiS amended the law regulating Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal, the nation’s highest court, enabling the PiS-controlled parliament to appoint five new judges to the tribunal even though the previous parliament had already filled those old vacancies.⁷⁴ To break judicial opposition, PiS then passed legislation that increased both the number of judges required to render rulings and the majority they needed for those rulings to take effect.⁷⁵ The ploy effectively stalled court operations until all PiS appointees were in place.

Political scientist Tomasz Koncewicz writes of the onslaught: “After thirty years of building an impressive resume as one of the most influential and successful European constitutional courts … the Tribunal [fell] under the relentless attack of right-wing populists and succumbed to it.”⁷⁶ PiS’ attack on the Polish Tribunal was successful for two reasons. The first can broadly be described as social priming: PiS portrayed the judiciary as an obstacle to the “will of the Polish people,” leveraging populist rhetoric to delegitimize the court in the eyes of their base.⁷⁷ The second reason lies in the structural vulnerabilities of Poland’s constitutional framework. The system lacked robust checks to prevent a bullish majority from riding roughshod over uncodified norms.⁷⁸

One of the most notable results of PiS’ ideological court capture was the tribunal’s 2020 ruling outlawing previously legal abortions of pregnancies where there were grievous medical complications.⁷⁹ The decision effectively imposed a nationwide ban on abortions and triggered sustained popular protests, among the largest in Poland since the fall of communism in 1989.⁸⁰Human rights organizations condemned the ruling, citing significant dangers to women’s health and bodily autonomy.⁸¹ Reports surfaced of women being denied medical care, resulting in severe health complications and preventable deaths.⁸² These tragedies fueled a broader reckoning with the government’s erosion of fundamental rights, galvanizing activists and further polarizing Polish society. The ruling also intensified scrutiny of PiS’ broader efforts to reshape Poland’s judiciary, with critics arguing that the politicization of the courts had not only undermined the rule of law but had also stripped citizens of essential legal protections.⁸³

Stripping reproductive rights away was part of a larger, coordinated assault on fundamental freedoms by the PiS-led courts. In rapid succession, the tribunal ruled to strip powers from the National Council of the Judiciary, a constitutionally established body responsible for safeguarding the independence of courts and judges; chilled press freedom by upholding penalties on independent media; and upheld discriminatory laws curbing LGBTQ+ rights.⁸⁴PiS also lowered the retirement age for judges on the Supreme Court—a separate judicial body—to force out unfavorable incumbents and replace them with party loyalists.⁸⁵ To further chasten the opposition, PiS created a new disciplinary chamber to penalize judges deemed critical of the party.⁸⁶ In one high-profile example, the disciplinary chamber targeted Judge Igor Tuleya, a prominent Warsaw jurist and human rights defender, for allowing media access to a 2017 hearing concerning an allegedly unlawful parliamentary vote.⁸⁷ These actions, along with other high-profile disciplinary cases, led the European Union to invoke Article 7 proceedings, a mechanism that allows the EU to impose punitive sanctions against member states found to be in violation of its fundamental rule of law.⁸⁸

Authoritarian forces attacked Poland’s courts to erode checks and balances. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s far-right government went even further, outright dismantling judicial independence and accelerating democratic backsliding.⁸⁹ Shortly after securing a supermajority in 2010, Orbán’s Fidesz party expanded the court’s size, enabling Orbán to appoint additional judges aligned with his party.⁹⁰ In 2011, Fidesz rammed through a law to force judges older than 62 into early retirement, creating even more vacancies for Fidesz-friendly replacements.⁹¹ The captured court consistently upheld controversial Fidesz policies, such as the 2018 “Stop Soros” law that criminalized aid to undocumented migrants and severely restricted the operations of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and independent media outlets.⁹² In 2020, the government passed a series of new laws that curtailed the powers of local municipalities, restricted the autonomy of research universities, and centralized government control over key cultural institutions.⁹³

The court supported these policy changes with alacrity​. One of the most disturbing developments was its complicity in the expulsion of Central European University (CEU) from Budapest, Hungary.⁹⁴ Founded by Hungarian-born philanthropist George Soros, CEU is a top-tier research institution accredited in the United States, with its main campus located in Budapest. In 2017, Orbán’s government introduced legislation specifically targeting CEU’s charter. The so-called Higher Education Act required foreign universities to keep a campus in their country of origin or face closure in Hungary.⁹⁵ The move was widely viewed as a direct attack on the institution due to its association with Soros, a frequent target of Orbán’s nationalist and antisemitic rhetoric.⁹⁶

Upon the act’s passage, CEU mounted a series of legal challenges culminating in an urgent appeal to the Constitutional Court of Hungary. Despite intense international condemnation, the court deferred its decision on the matter, effectively allowing the law to stand unchallenged. The high-profile deferment was seen as a cynical ploy to avoid making a politically sensitive decision that would have, in effect, contradicted the government line.⁹⁷Moreover, when CEU successfully challenged the legislation at the European Court of Justice, Hungarian authorities refused to comply.⁹⁸ As a result, CEU was forced to move its operations to Vienna, Austria, marking the first time that a university was expelled from an EU member state.⁹⁹ The expulsion of CEU from Hungary not only marked a significant blow to academic freedom but also signaled a broader attack on democratic principles within the country. The message was clear: Conform or face targeting.

The backsliding that gripped Hungary and Poland was not inevitable; rather, the opposition was simply unprepared for the scale of the assault on state institutions.¹⁰⁰ As then-CEU President Michael Ignatieff remarked about his struggles with Orbán, “We were playing chess while they were eating all the pieces.”¹⁰¹ The opposition and civil society underestimated just how far Orbán in Hungary and Kaczyński in Poland were willing to go to make these changes. Gyula Molnár, leader of the Hungarian opposition from 2016 to 2018, pointedly lamented in a BBC interview his election loss and inability to stop Orban.¹⁰² The experiences of Poland and Hungary underscore a critical lesson: Democratic institutions alone cannot withstand determined authoritarian actors. To counter such threats, opposition parties and civil society must act promptly, decisively, and proactively to defend democratic principles.

In the summer of 2023, protesters in Israel challenged Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud government over its proposed judicial overhaul, fighting to defend the independence of the country’s judiciary.¹⁰³ The proposed reforms would have granted the government greater control over judicial appointments and would have limited the Supreme Court’s ability to strike down key legislation, fundamentally weakening the separation of powers. Opposition lawmakers and civil society organizations have accused Netanyahu, who faces multiple criminal indictments for corruption, of using the overhaul to shield himself from accountability and to consolidate power.¹⁰⁴ The Knesset—Israel’s legislature—passed the reforms, but the Israeli Supreme Court struck down a key part of them in January 2024, ruling by a narrow 8-7 majority that the law unduly limited the court’s right of review.¹⁰⁵

In response to the ruling, Netanyahu and his allies in the Likud government condemned the court’s decision, framing it as judicial overreach and an attempt by unelected justices to undermine the will of the people.¹⁰⁶Undeterred by the Supreme Court’s rejection of the broader overhaul, Netanyahu’s coalition has since pursued a piecemeal approach, introducing judicial reforms incrementally rather than as a sweeping package.¹⁰⁷ By targeting specific aspects of the judiciary—limiting judicial review in certain cases, altering appointment procedures, and expanding government influence over legal advisory positions—his government aims to gradually reshape Israel’s legal system while avoiding the mass protests and intense backlash that accompanied the initial proposal.¹⁰⁸

Fortifying against Court Capture

To prevent erosion of the rule of law, democracies must act proactively to establish key safeguards. This means ensuring that the judiciary remains independent, codifying previously unwritten norms, and committing to term limits. Fortifying the courts is fundamentally an act of democracy building, especially after decades of norm breaking by populist and far-right governments––assaults intended to co-opt and degrade these institutions. Democracies must adapt and fortify their frameworks to withstand authoritarian practices before they do irreparable harm.

In November 2024, Poland elected a new center-right coalition committed to rolling back the politicization of the Constitutional Tribunal.¹⁰⁹ The Sejm, the lower house of Poland’s parliament, has started to review and undo some of the more egregious rule of law violations enacted under the previous government, including drafting a resolution that requests the resignation of tribunal judges who were appointed under questionable circumstances.¹¹⁰ Justice Minister Adam Bodnar has further outlined legislation to restore Poland’s judicial independence, including a plan to depoliticize the National Council of the Judiciary, the governing body that oversees judicial appointments, by having its 15-member council elected by a consortium of judges rather than by the Sejm.¹¹¹

These safeguards are only a start. The government is also considering a raft of constitutional changes, including a requirement for all judicial nominees to obtain a three-fifths majority in parliament to secure their place on the high circuit,along with age limits and a prohibition on previous political officeholders.¹¹² Taken together, these efforts aim to strengthen judicial independence and ensure broader parliamentary consensus on appointments. They have also provoked criticism from the far right, which has framed the proposed reforms as power grabs—an ironic charge given PiS-led efforts to pack the court in 2015 as well as key differences in the scope of the initiatives and the intent of the law.¹¹³

Such accusations are unfounded. By depoliticizing the nomination process, barring previous officeholders, and requiring broader consensus for appointments, the new reform package seeks to make the judiciary more independent and less vulnerable to future partisan interference. These changes are a proactive effort to rebuild public trust, fortify against future abuses, and establish a framework for a more resilient and agile democracy. They are also not cookie-cutter solutions, but responses tailored to Poland’s specific democratic challenges, shaped by the recent lessons of its past.

These lessons are being heeded in Germany. German authorities have embraced the concept of “Wehrhafte Demokratie,” or “fortified democracy,” which empowers democratic states to take preemptive action against future authoritarian threats.¹¹⁴ As the far-right AfD gains momentum in local, state, and now federal elections, German leaders are responding with urgency to insulate institutions from far-right extremist influences.¹¹⁵ Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Germany’s major parties have advanced reforms to shield the Federal Constitutional Court from political manipulation.¹¹⁶ These proposals aim to embed judicial safeguards into the Grundgesetz—Germany’s constitution, also known as the Basic Law—preventing future court-capture attempts such as those seen in Poland and Hungary. Measures under consideration include strengthening the court’s two-chamber structure by clearly defining each chamber’s jurisdiction and decision-making authority; requiring a two-thirds majority for judicial appointments; and introducing mechanisms to resolve appointment deadlocks.¹¹⁷ For example, ​if the responsible electoral body—the lower or upper house—fails to appoint a successor within three months of receiving a nomination from the Federal Constitutional Court, the other electoral body may assume the appointment authority.¹¹⁸ ​

Taken together, such proposals represent a layered approach to institutional resilience, seeking not only to protect the judiciary from political interference but also to establish procedural barriers to authoritarianism. By codifying democratic safeguards, Germany aims to counter the rising influence of authoritarian parties such as the AfD and prevent the erosion of its institutions before that happens, ensuring the judiciary remains an independent check even if an authoritarian party should one day come to power. At a more fundamental level, these reforms demonstrate that proactive measures to safeguard and strengthen democracy are indeed possible.

Timeline of Parliamentary Elections Leading to the Rise of Right-Wing Populists, 2010-2024

2010

Hungary: The Fidesz party won 68 percent of the seats in the parliamentary election, resulting in 263 seats and a two-thirds supermajority.

2012

Georgia: The Georgian Dream (GD) party won 54.97 percent of the seats in parliament, resulting in a majority of 85 out of 150 seats.

2014

Hungary:The Fidesz party won 44.54 percent of the seats in parliament, resulting in 133 seats out of 199 and preserving its supermajority.

India: The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) received 31 percent of the vote and won 282 out of 543 seats in the Lok Sabha. With the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the BJP secured a majority, resulting in 336 out of 543 seats.

2015

Poland: The Law and Justice party (PiS) won 38 percent of the seats in parliament, resulting in 235 of the 460 seats—a majority of four seats.

2016

Georgia: GD won 48.7 percent of the seats in parliament—resulting in 115 seats out of 150—securing a landslide victory and a supermajority.

2018

Hungary: The Fidesz party won 48.53 percent of the seats in parliament, resulting in 134 seats out of 199 and preserving its supermajority.

2019

Poland: The PiS retained its majority in the Sejm, but lost its majority in the Senate. They won 43.6 percent of the seats in parliament, resulting in 235 of the 460 seats.

India: BJP won 37 percent of the vote and 303 out of 543 seats. With the NDA, the combined vote total was 45 percent, resulting in 353 out of 543 seats and securing a BJP majority.

2020

Georgia: GD won 48.22 percent of the vote and 89 out of 150 seats in parliament, losing its supermajority.

2022

Hungary: Fidesz won 49.27 percent of the seats in the parliamentary election. After the election, the party controlled 135 seats of the 199-seat parliament, securing a supermajority in the legislature.

2023

Poland: The PiS held onto its majority in the Sejm but lost its majority in the Senate. They won 35.4 percent of the seats in parliament, resulting in 248 out of 460 seats.

2024

India: BJP received 240 out of 543 seats, losing its national majority. Combined, the NDA and BJP won a total of 293 out of 543 seats, securing a third term but failing to achieve an outright parliamentary majority.

Georgia: GD won a simple majority with 54 percent of the vote, securing 89 of the 150 seats in parliament.

Electoral Majorities

The Danger of Electoral Majorities

In a number of countries, illiberal governments have strong-armed legislatures to build manufactured majorities that enable a single party or faction to dominate regardless of the party’s actual support. These distortions not only erode democratic values but also serve as a strategy for would-be authoritarians to consolidate power.

This section explores how such distortions—as seen in India, Hungary, and Georgia—enable illiberal governments to entrench their dominance, silence opposition, and enact policies that undermine minority rights and democratic norms. Under such conditions, democracy is hollowed out, leaving the facade of electoral processes while ruling parties systematically dismantle the substance of competitive party pluralism.

India

India’s first-past-the-post, winner-take-all system––a voting system in which the candidate with a plurality of the votes, even if not a majority, secures the seat while all other votes effectively do not contribute to the outcome––has resulted in dramatically skewed election results.¹¹⁹ These distortions overwhelmingly benefit the governing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which espouses a Hindu nationalist ideology that seeks to reshape India’s secular and pluralistic traditions.¹²⁰

In the 2014 elections, the BJP won 282 out of 543 seats (approximately 52 percent) with only 31 percent of the popular vote.¹²¹ Similarly, in the 2019 election, the party secured 303 seats (56 percent) with 37.4 percent of the vote.¹²² The 2024 elections followed a similar but less pronounced pattern, with the BJP’s majority marginally decreasing to 240 seats, secured with only 36 percent of the final vote.¹²³ Distortions in representation enable the BJP to maintain and expand a manufactured majority, principally by passing controversial antidemocratic legislation, overpowering concerns from the parliamentary opposition and civil society.¹²⁴

For example, the BJP pushed through the Citizenship Amendment Act in 2019, which deliberately excluded Muslim immigrants from neighboring countries from a path to Indian citizenship, despite the well-documented persecution of the Muslim Rohingya in neighboring Myanmar.¹²⁵ The law marked the first time India explicitly tied citizenship to religion, sparking widespread protests and concerns over the law’s compatibility with the country’s secular constitution. That same year, the government revoked Article 370, a provision in the Indian constitution dating back to 1950, thereby stripping self-governance from the Muslim-majority region of Jammu and Kashmir.¹²⁶ This move was accompanied by an extensive military lockdown, mass arrests of political leaders, and restrictions on communication and movement—all of which reinforced the perception of targeted repression.¹²⁷ Both measures underscore how the BJP government has strategically used legislative tools to consolidate power at the expense of minority communities.

Manufactured majorities as seen in India and elsewhere are hallmarks of illiberal democracies: Parties outwardly maintain the facade of democratic processes, such as free elections, while systematically undermining the institutions, norms, and minority rights that define genuine democracy. The Citizenship Amendment Act, for instance, disproportionately burdened Muslim populations by imposing stringent documentation requirements to prove citizenship—an often-insurmountable hurdle for marginalized groups.¹²⁸ Such policies exacerbate religious and social divisions and undermine the secular principles enshrined in the Indian Constitution. In this context, electoral malapportionment paved the way for profound and systematic assaults on norms.

Hungary

In Hungary, Orbán’s Fidesz party has maintained power through a system of gerrymandering and egregious electoral distortions that skew the playing field heavily in its favor. After coming to power in 2010, Fidesz undertook significant electoral overhaul to redraw district boundaries, strategically restructuring constituencies to consolidate its voting base and dilute the power of the opposition.¹²⁹ In Hungary, parliamentary seats are allocated through a mixed system: Single-member districts (SMDs) fill a portion of the seats, and a proportional representation model determines the remainder of the National Assembly. Similar to the American voting model, SMDs operate on a winner-takes-all basis in which each district elects one representative, and the candidate with the most votes wins the seat. By contrast, proportional representation is designed to reflect the overall share of votes that a party receives nationwide.¹³⁰ Fidesz has exploited both aspects of this system to solidify its electoral dominance, gerrymandering SMDs and then leveraging large winning margins in rural districts to inflate its national proportional tallies.

The system’s structural biases have allowed Fidesz to secure supermajorities in parliament with as little as 42 percent of the popular vote.¹³¹ Fidesz easily wins the gerrymandered districts outright, not only securing a large number of seats but also triggering a so-called bonus effect: Votes cast beyond what is needed to win any individual district are then added to Fidesz’s total national seat allocation.¹³²

For instance, when a party wins 60 percent of the vote in a rural SMD, it not only secures the seat for that district but also contributes to a surplus formula where any margin beyond the winning threshold is then added to a national tally, boosting the party’s seat allocation beyond its strict proportional share. The result is grossly inflated representation. Fidesz has also raised the threshold for qualifying for proportional representation, making it significantly harder for smaller or newer parties to gain a foothold.¹³³ With these supermajorities, Orbán has pushed through sweeping constitutional amendments, further entrenching his power, including purging government ranks and the civil service in an effort to demand loyalty.¹³⁴

In 2010, soon after returning to office, Orbán’s government removed civil service job protections by passing a law that allowed bureaucrats to be fired with two months’ notice and no stated cause. Thousands of state employees, disproportionately those perceived as opposition supporters, were dismissed under this change​.¹³⁵ Hungary’s Constitutional Court later struck down the no-cause dismissal provision as unconstitutional but delayed the decision for several months, by which time the purge had already been largely completed​. Orbán’s administration filled the vacated posts with Fidesz loyalists and continued to politicize the bureaucracy in the following years; experts estimate that since 2010, more than one-quarter of Hungary’s civil-service staff has been replaced by partisan appointees.¹³⁶

This influx of loyalists often came at the expense of competence and institutional memory, as high turnover and the loss of seasoned administrators eroded the professional capacity and neutrality of the public administration​. Meanwhile, key agencies and oversight bodies were packed with Orbán’s allies, eliminating impartial checks on executive power. By Orbán’s fourth term, from 2018 to 2022, virtually every politically relevant institution from the Constitutional Court to the Audit Office was led by officials loyal to Fidesz​.¹³⁷ These moves have prompted international alarm: In 2012, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Hungary’s arbitrary firing of civil servants without justification violated the right to a fair trial​, and more recently, NATO allies voiced concern when a 2023 “rejuvenation” law empowered the defense minister to force out any military officer older than 45—a step widely seen as a new purge of disloyal military officials.¹³⁸ By expelling independent career officials and entrenching loyalists at all levels of the state, Orbán has tightened his grip over Hungary’s governance machinery—stifling internal dissent, blurring the line between party and state, and further undermining democratic accountability​.

Georgia

Since coming to power in 2012, the Georgian Dream (GD) political party has steadily consolidated its authority through undemocratic means, even as it publicly professes support for the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.¹³⁹ Like Fidesz, GD secures victories by gerrymandering its stronghold districts, ensuring a lock on continued power.¹⁴⁰Coupled with credible reports of voter intimidation and bribery, these structural manipulations enabled GD to secure a decisive victory in the October 2024 parliamentary elections, despite considerable opposition from pro-European parties and voters.¹⁴¹ Like Hungary, GD also restricted media access for opposition candidates and exploited state resources, including public funding for campaigns, in ways that grossly favored GD incumbents.¹⁴² GD has also intensified its crackdown on civil society and independent institutions by targeting NGOs and media outlets critical of the government. The party has advanced legislation modeled after Russia’s “foreign agent” law, branding Western-funded organizations as threats to national sovereignty and attempting to stifle dissent.¹⁴³ Security forces have also used force against protesters, and authorities have arrested prominent opposition figures, further shrinking democratic space.¹⁴⁴

None of this can be achieved without willing participants. Manufactured electoral advantages often rely on the support of oligarchs. Oligarchic state capture—where the intertwining of state and private power allows authoritarian leaders to consolidate resources and fabricate electoral majorities—stands as a defining feature of rapid democratic decay. In Georgia, Bidzina Ivanishvili, a billionaire and founder of the ruling GD party, has leveraged his immense private wealth and influence to tilt the political landscape in his party’s favor. Ivanishvili’s financial support and control over key media outlets have played a central role in consolidating GD’s power, often at the expense of democratic institutions.¹⁴⁵Similarly, in Hungary, Orbán has cultivated a network of oligarchs, most notably including Antal Rogán, a former information technology mogul turned Hungary’s unofficial “propaganda minister.” Rogán’s rapid accumulation of wealth under Orbán’s government, driven by lucrative state contracts and acquisition of major media outlets, underscores the mutually beneficial relationship between authoritarian regimes and their billionaire supporters.¹⁴⁶

Systems with distorted representation—as seen in India, Hungary, and Georgia—function as antidemocratic superweapons. These imbalances effectively disenfranchise large segments of the electorate, particularly in urban and cosmopolitan centers where voters tend to oppose democratic backsliding.¹⁴⁷ By maintaining the illusion of democratic legitimacy while systematically hollowing out its substance, authoritarian governments entrench their power and shield themselves from meaningful accountability. Reforming such systems is predictably difficult, as these regimes often wield extensive state and private coercive powers. Yet the task remains essential. When elections cease to serve as a mechanism for redress, democracy itself stands on the brink of collapse.

Timeline of Democratic Erosion: Major Legislative Attacks by Right-Wing Populist Governments, 2010-2024

2010

Hungary: The Fidesz party culled civil service job protections and fired bureaucrats and replaced them with partisan appointees.

2011

Hungary: Fidesz introduced a new constitution, which allowed for the redrawing of electoral districts, and culled the number of parliamentary seats from 386 to 199.

Hungary: Fidesz packed the Constitutional Court with judges supportive of the party’s agenda. The party’s majority allowed it to expand the court’s size from 11 judges to 15 judges and to appoint loyal judges without any negotiation with the opposition.

2012

Hungary: Fidesz enacted the “Fundamental Law of Hungary” to force judges over age 62 into early retirement in order to fill vacancies with Fidesz party loyalists.

Georgia: The Georgian Dream (GD) party gerrymandered districts. They also engaged in preelection voter intimidation and bribery to consolidate power.

2015

Poland: The Law and Justice Party (PiS) instituted judicial reforms under the “Law on the Organization of Ordinary Courts,” which allowed for sustained attacks on the independence of the court system.

Poland: The PiS amended Poland’s constitutional tribunal to appoint new judges in order to have a majority for court rulings.

Poland: The PiS stripped the powers of the National Council of the Judiciary and captured state media, and high-profile human rights reports highlighted widespread LGBTQ+ discrimination across the country.

2018

Poland: PiS purged Poland’s Supreme Court by introducing reforms that lowered the retirement age of justices from 70 to 65, effectively forcing out 27 sitting judges—about one-third of the court—including the chief justice.

Hungary: Fidesz passed the “Stop Soros” law, which criminalized providing aid to undocumented migrants and imposed restrictions on nongovernmental organizations and independent media outlets.

2019

Hungary: Following opposition gains in local elections, the governing Fidesz party passed a series of laws that reduced the powers of municipal governments, curtailed university autonomy, and brought key cultural institutions under centralized state control.

2020

Poland: Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal imposed a nationwide ban on abortions except in cases of rape or incest or if the mother’s health is at risk.

2024

India: The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government passed the Citizenship Amendment Act to exclude Muslim immigrants from pathways to citizenship.

India: The BJP-led government revoked Article 370, stripping self-governance from the Muslim-majority region of Jammu and Kashmir and leading to military lockdowns, mass arrests of political leaders, and the restriction of movement.

Georgia: GD passed legislation modeled after Russia’s “foreign agent law” in an attempt to stifle dissent.

Fortifying against Manufactured Electoral Majorities

Fortifying against manufactured electoral majorities is most effective before authoritarians consolidate power. Preventive measures such as strengthening electoral oversight, safeguarding independent media, and bolstering judicial independence are critical to protecting democratic systems from long-term erosion. Even when authoritarian regimes become entrenched, resistance remains possible. Grassroots mobilization, international advocacy, and strategic protests play pivotal roles in exposing state abuses and amplifying dissenting voices. Additionally, uniting disparate opposition parties and reorganizing at the subnational level can lay the foundations for future democratic transitions. While challenging, these efforts demonstrate that resistance can sustain hope and pave the way for democratic renewal.

One potential model can be found in Canada. To combat gerrymandering, Canada delegates the redistricting process to independent, nonpartisan commissions established in each of its provinces.¹⁴⁸ Typically composed of three members, these commissions are chaired by a judge appointed by the province’s chief justice; other members are appointed by the speaker of the House of Commons. The commissions operate transparently, holding public consultations and considering factors such as population, community interests, and geographic features to create more balanced electoral districts.

Conducting elections is a whole other matter. France’s two-round runoff system for parliamentary elections allows voters to unite strategically against parties with strong but limited support. In the 2024 snap elections, this system enabled a broad coalition to block the RN party from securing a parliamentary plurality despite its first-round success. The “front républicain”—a tactic in which centrist and left-wing parties withdrew candidates in key districts to consolidate the anti-RN vote—proved decisive in denying Marine Le Pen’s party parliamentary dominance.¹⁴⁹

With these structural reforms out of reach, Hungarian civil society has shifted its focus to combating corruption. Civil society can rally around anti-corruption messaging to expose the regime’s abuses, erode its legitimacy, and more effectively unify a fragmented political opposition. These efforts have shown promise in holding the government accountable for its most blatant abuses of power and have propelled opposition leader Péter Magyar into serious electoral contention.¹⁵⁰

The decision to focus on anti-corruption efforts offers several real benefits. First, in countries where the ruling party has blocked institutional avenues for reform or rendered parliamentary efforts ineffective, mass mobilization through anti-corruption messaging provides a powerful alternative for engagement outside official channels. For example, recent protests in Hungary sparked by a leaked audio recording in which Justice Minister Judit Varga described Fidesz party corruption in blistering detail¹⁵¹ have become the largest of Orbán’s 15-year rule.¹⁵²

The second advantage: Anti-corruption efforts strategically target the soft underbelly of state capture—the entrenched networks of nepotism and party patronage that erode public trust in government and corrode civic life. In Poland, PiS consolidated its power through executive measures reminiscent of Hungary’s Orbán.¹⁵³ Public outrage grew over widespread party cronyism, blatant abuses of power, and systematic attacks on democratic norms.¹⁵⁴ In November 2023, opposition parties came together around a shared platform of defending constitutional democracy and restoring accountability in government to achieve a narrow victory.¹⁵⁵However, structural barriers have stymied their progress. A president aligned with PiS frequently vetoes key legislation, and a packed Constitutional Tribunal continues to block pro-democracy reforms.¹⁵⁶ Poland’s experience demonstrates that mass mobilization can counter backsliding, but a nation’s best defense lies in preventing such entrenchment before it takes root.

Romania serves as a compelling example of this proactive approach. In the wake of a 2024 presidential election marred by suspected Russian meddling​, Romania’s institutions responded decisively. The Constitutional Court took the unprecedented step of annulling the first-round results, citing evidence that a coordinated online disinformation campaign had skewed voter perceptions and undermined a fair vote​.¹⁵⁷ Romanian intelligence findings on thousands of fake TikTok accounts and paid influencers orchestrating the interference were declassified​, exposing how the ultranationalist frontrunner’s campaign was artificially amplified by a Russian-linked network.¹⁵⁸ Prosecutors launched criminal investigations into the candidate’s camp, seizing cash and weapons from his alleged supporters and probing undisclosed funding behind the TikTok propaganda operation​.¹⁵⁹ The government also sought international support, asking the European Commission to scrutinize the social media meddling​; the EU responded by formally investigating TikTok’s role and ordering the platform to preserve election-related data as evidence​.¹⁶⁰ Together, these measures—from canceling a tainted vote to prosecuting influence networks and enlisting EU oversight—reflect Romania’s resolve to counter disinformation, strengthen election security, and protect the nation’s institutions before aspiring authoritarians can take hold.

South Korea’s recent experience highlights the transformative power of anti-corruption mobilization in challenging entrenched power structures and revitalizing democracy.¹⁶¹ When President Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law in an attempt to suppress political opposition and consolidate power, chaos quickly ensued. Citizens rushed onto Seoul’s streets, peacefully gathering in large numbers around the National Assembly to block the military’s effort to seize the chamber. Spurred by this bold public resistance, lawmakers urgently convened and voted unanimously to revoke the martial law decree, forcing Yoon to retract his order within hours. The crisis ultimately contributed to impeachment proceedings against Yoon, underscoring both the strength of South Korea’s democratic institutions and the power of mass mobilization in holding leaders accountable.¹⁶²

Complementing these efforts, resistance at the subnational level offers another avenue for challenging state capture, particularly when the national government is already compromised. In federal systems— where power is shared between central and subnational governments—states, provinces, and municipalities can serve as safeguards against overreach by central authorities. In India, the southern state of Kerala illustrates this dynamic. Governed by the Left Democratic Front (LDF), Kerala has frequently resisted central policies perceived as undermining its constitutional autonomy or the welfare of its citizens. More recently, Kerala has challenged central economic policies from New Delhi that it views as detrimental to its fiscal health. In 2023, the state filed a suit in the Indian Supreme Court contesting the central government’s restrictions on its borrowing limits, asserting that such constraints hindered its legally enshrined development initiatives.¹⁶³ These actions go beyond mere symbolism. Subnational entities play a crucial role as counterweights to federal authority and, in times of constitutional jeopardy, provide prudent and legally grounded avenues for resistance.

Fortifying democratic systems against manufactured majorities requires a multifaceted approach that combines structural reform, civic mobilization, and subnational resistance. While the best defense lies in strengthening institutions—such as electoral oversight, independent media, and impartial courts—before authoritarians rise to power, resistance remains possible even after regimes consolidate their control. Social science literature purports that reversing autocratization, the process of arresting and reversing backsliding, is indeed possible.¹⁶⁴ Here, anti-corruption campaigns, as seen in Hungary and South Korea, can help expose abuses, rally public dissent, and weaken antidemocratic actors. At the same time, uniting fragmented opposition groups and leveraging civil society pressure, as seen in Hungary, can counteract systemic distortions and create pathways for future reform, keeping the democratic flame alive.

Recommendations

Overview

To address the challenges of legislative obstruction, court capture, and manufactured majorities—and to fortify democratic institutions against these tactics—democracies should implement structural reforms and codify unwritten norms. These recommendations, drawn from the international examples above, aim to protect the independence of institutions, enhance legislative responsiveness, and ensure that no majority can circumvent critical checks and balances.

Modernize Parliamentary Procedures to Enhance Responsivebness and Counter Obstruction

To modernize parliamentary procedures, democracies should:

• Establish structured mediation committees.
• Implement time-limited filibusters.
• Deploy parliamentary censure for extremist and demagogic speech.

Codify Norms to Safeguard Judicial Independence and Prevent Court Capture

Democracies should prioritize codifying norms that guarantee judicial impartiality in the following ways:

• Implement fixed terms for judges.
• Establish transparent and merit-based appointment procedures.
• Ensure protections against political dismissal.

When courts are captured, such as in Poland, rebuilding judicial independence becomes a cornerstone of restoring democracy. To start the process by reversing the mechanisms of capture, democracies should:

• Remove partisan judges appointed unlawfully or under politically compromised circumstances.
• Establish independent judicial review commissions to oversee the reinstatement of impartiality.

Strengthen Electoral Oversight and Accountability to Prevent Manipulation

To counter the exploitation of manufactured majorities, democracies should:

• Strengthen electoral oversight and transparency throughout the voting process.
• Delegate the redistricting process to nonpartisan commissions, as seen in Canada.
• Look to subnational counterbalances as a vital role in resisting the central government.

When manufactured majorities are already in place, the focus must shift to mobilizing civil society to:

• Issue a clear demand signal through opposition lawmakers to mobilize labor unions, universities, think tanks, professional associations, and civil society networks.
• Launch targeted anti-corruption campaigns to weaken the foundations of such regimes.
• Expose electoral manipulation, corruption, and abuses of power through investigative reporting, grassroots activism, and legal challenges.

Although the process is incremental, sustained efforts to expose corruption, empower subnational resistance, and challenge authoritarian practices can gradually erode the legitimacy of ruling parties and open pathways for democratic renewal.

Conclusion

Democracies must guard against authoritarianism by codifying unwritten norms, modernizing legislative procedural safeguards, and establishing institutional checks against manufactured electoral majorities. The task ahead is urgent. Far-right parties are once again gaining ground, fueled by—and indeed fueling—disinformation, societal polarization, and public discontent with economic stagnation, social inequality, and declining trust in democratic institutions. To counter this threat, democratic leaders must proactively act to bolster electoral integrity, curb the abuse of executive power, and strengthen independent media and civil society. Policymakers should enact legal frameworks that protect judicial independence, enhance transparency in political financing, and reinforce mechanisms that prevent the erosion of democratic accountability. Yet such efforts cannot rest solely on governments or policymakers; they require the active engagement of all citizens. Democracy is not merely a political system—it is a shared endeavor, dependent on the common recognition of its fragility and the will to protect it.

Most critically, this defense begins with the acknowledgement that no nation is immune to authoritarianism. The attack on democratic processes and norms is not confined to distant lands or historical anecdotes. It can—and has—happened in the most unlikely of places. Recognizing that it can happen is the first step toward ensuring that it never does. But recognition alone is not enough; recognition must translate into action. Democracies must confront creeping authoritarianism not only in overt power grabs but also in the gradual erosion of institutional checks, the normalization of political violence, and the undermining of electoral legitimacy. History shows that backsliding often begins with small, incremental changes—attacks on judicial independence, suppression of dissent, and loyalty tests. The most effective defense lies in early intervention, civic mobilization, and an unwavering commitment to liberal democratic principles.

This moment demands action. As outlined earlier, President Trump’s return to power has brought a renewed assault on the United States’ democratic institutions, from the politicization of law enforcement to threats against judicial independence. His administration’s efforts to consolidate power and weaken oversight echo the strategies used by authoritarian leaders worldwide. The case studies explored in this report demonstrate that democracies can push back—but only when they act before it is too late. Defending democracy requires more than faith in institutions; it demands vigilance, legal safeguards, and a collective commitment to democratic principles. Complacency is not an option.

Glossary of Key Terms

Adam Bodnar: Former commissioner for human rights in Poland and a key advocate for judicial independence and rule of law reforms.

Alternative for Germany (AfD): A far-right populist political party in Germany, known for its anti-immigration rhetoric and opposition to EU integration.

Angela Merkel: Germany’s chancellor from 2005 to 2021, known for her pragmatic leadership and for enacting federal reforms to reduce legislative gridlock in the Bundesrat.

Article 370: A provision in the Indian Constitution that granted special autonomy to the Jammu and Kashmir region, revoked in 2019 by the Bharatiya Janata Party government.

Article 7 of the Treaty of the European Union: A mechanism allowing the EU to suspend certain rights of a member state, such as voting rights, if it breaches the EU’s fundamental values.

Autocratic legalism: The process by which authoritarian leaders exploit legal frameworks to consolidate power while maintaining the facade of democracy.

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP): A right-wing political party in India, currently governing, which promotes Hindu nationalism and has implemented policies that challenge India’s secular foundations.

Bidzina Ivanishvili: A Georgian billionaire and founder of the Georgian Dream party, whose financial and media influence has significantly shaped Georgian politics.

Brandmauer: The German term for a political firewall used to isolate extremist parties, particularly the far-right AfD.

Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia): A far-right nationalist political party in Italy, led by Giorgia Meloni, that has emphasized sovereignty and anti-immigration policies.

Bundestag: The German federal parliament, which is the lower house of Germany’s legislative body.

Bundesrat: The German upper house, which represents the federal states and plays a significant role in legislation requiring state consent.

CasaPound: An Italian far-right extremist group that emerged in the 1990s, notorious for targeting asylum seekers and promoting neo-fascist ideologies.

Central European University (CEU): An international research university founded in Budapest but relocated to Vienna after facing political pressure from Hungary’s government.

Citizenship Amendment Act: A 2019 Indian law that offers citizenship to non-Muslim immigrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan, raising concerns about religious discrimination.

Constitutional Court of Hungary: Hungary’s top court, tasked with reviewing the constitutional validity of legislation but increasingly criticized for its lack of independence under Viktor Orbán’s government.

Constitutional Tribunal of Poland: The top Polish court responsible for constitutional interpretation, heavily criticized for its capture under the Law and Justice Party government.

Court capture: The process by which political actors co-opt judicial institutions to serve partisan goals, undermining judicial independence.

Democratic backsliding: The erosion of democratic norms, institutions, and processes, often resulting in increased authoritarianism within previously democratic systems.

Einspruchsgesetz: The German upper house’s veto rule, which allows the Bundesrat to object to legislation passed by the Bundestag under certain conditions.

Electoral distortion: The manipulation of electoral systems, such as gerrymandering or winner-take-all rules, that allows ruling parties to disproportionately benefit from their support base.

European Court of Justice: The highest judicial authority in the European Union, ensuring compliance with EU law.

Felipe González: The prime minister of Spain from 1982 to 1996, credited with consolidating Spanish democracy after the Franco dictatorship.

Fidesz: A right-wing populist political party in Hungary, led by Viktor Orbán, that has systematically undermined democratic norms since 2010.

First-past-the-post voting: An electoral system in which the candidate who receives the most votes in a constituency wins, regardless of whether they secure a majority. This system, commonly used in single-member districts, often leads to a two-party dominance, and can result in outcomes where the winning candidate is elected without an absolute majority of votes. Also known as majoritarian voting.

Generation Identity: A far-right European movement promoting the “great replacement” theory, advocating for white ethnonationalism and opposing immigration.

Georgian Dream (GD): A ruling political party in Georgia, founded by Bidzina Ivanishvili, criticized for its democratic backsliding and manipulation of electoral systems.

Gerrymandering: The practice of redrawing electoral district boundaries to favor a particular political party, as seen in Hungary and the United States.

Golden Dawn: A neo-Nazi political party in Greece, known for its violent attacks on minorities, political opponents, and democratic institutions, now largely disbanded.

Great Replacement Theory: A racist and xenophobic conspiracy theory claiming that nonwhite populations are replacing white populations in Western countries, often cited by far-right movements such as Generation Identity.

Guillotine motion: A legislative mechanism that sets a fixed time limit for debates, requiring a vote once the time expires.

Hannah Arendt: A political theorist whose concept of “the politics of inevitability” describes the resignation to authoritarianism under the belief that change is impossible.

Higher Education Act: A 2017 Hungarian law targeting foreign-funded universities, particularly the relocation of CEU from Budapest to Vienna.

Jarosław Kaczyński: Leader of Poland’s Law and Justice Party, known for his role in undermining judicial independence and promoting nationalist policies.

Jordan Bardella: Leader of the National Rally in France, succeeding Marine Le Pen and continuing the party’s far-right agenda.

Law and Justice Party (PiS): A right-wing nationalist and populist political party in Poland founded in 2001 by Jarosław and Lech Kaczyński. PiS has dominated Polish politics for much of the 21st century, advocating a platform centered on conservative social values, Euroscepticism, and state-driven economic policies. During its time in government (2015–2023), PiS implemented reforms that weakened judicial independence, restricted media freedom, and undermined democratic institutions.

Left Democratic Front (LDF): A left coalition led by the Communist Party of India opposing Hindutva politics and championing secularism and progressive policies.

Loyal opposition: A principle in which opposition parties accept the legitimacy of the ruling government while opposing its policies within democratic norms.

Marine Le Pen: Former leader of France’s RN, known for her far-right nationalist policies and controversies surrounding party financing.

Michael Ignatieff: Former president of CEU, who resisted Orbán’s authoritarian measures before CEU’s relocation to Vienna.

Mixed-member electoral system: An electoral structure combining single-member districts and proportional representation, used in Hungary to benefit the ruling party.

National Council of the Judiciary: The body responsible for nominating judges in Poland, criticized for losing independence under the Law and Justice Party government.

National Rally (RN): A far-right political party in France, advocating nationalism, Euroscepticism, and anti-immigration policies.

Overton window: The range of policies politically acceptable to the mainstream at a given time, often shifted by far-right movements to normalize extremist positions.

Parliamentary socialization: The process by which legislators adopt democratic values and practices, fostering collegiality and institutional trust.

Péter Magyar: A Hungarian opposition leader who has gained prominence through anti-corruption campaigns against Viktor Orbán’s government.

Politics of adversary: A mode of political opposition in which parties compete within the boundaries of democratic norms, respecting constitutional rules while challenging one another’s policies.

Politics of enemy: A mode of political opposition in which parties treat their rivals as foes to be vanquished rather than adversaries to be debated, disregarding democratic norms and undermining institutional trust.

Proportional representation: An electoral system in which legislative seats are allocated based on the proportion of votes received by parties.

Reichstag: The historic seat of Germany’s federal parliament, now the Bundestag.

Rohingya: A predominantly Muslim ethnic minority in Myanmar, subject to severe persecution and statelessness.

Second-round voting: An electoral mechanism requiring a runoff vote if no candidate achieves an outright majority in the first round, used in France to block far-right parties.

Sejm: The lower house of Poland’s parliament, central to legislative decision-making.

Single-member districts (SMDs): Electoral districts that elect one representative, often benefiting ruling parties in systems with gerrymandering or first-past-the-post voting.

Social priming: A strategy where political parties frame institutions or individuals as “elitist” or “unrepresentative,” as seen in PiS’ rhetoric against Poland’s judiciary.

Stop Soros law: A 2018 Hungarian law criminalizing assistance to undocumented migrants, aimed at nongovernmental organizations associated with George Soros.

Tactical voting: A strategy where voters support a less-preferred candidate to prevent a disliked candidate from winning, often seen in France’s two-round elections.

Viktor Orbán: Hungary’s prime minister and leader of the Fidesz party, central to the country’s democratic backsliding.

Wehrhafte Demokratie: A German concept of “fortified democracy” that empowers the state to proactively defend itself against antidemocratic threats.

Weimar Republic: Germany’s constitutional federal republic from 1918 to 1933, undermined by economic turmoil and extremist politics.

Endnotes

1. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “The Path to American Authoritarianism: What Comes After Democratic Breakdown,” Foreign Affairs, February 11, 2025, available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/path-american-authoritarianism-trump.
2. Nicholas Riccardi, “Trump’s moves test the limits of presidential power and the resilience of US democracy,” The Associated Press, March 1, 2025, available at https://apnews.com/article/542ac437a58880e81c052f8f2df1643f; Matthew Lee, Aamer Madhani, and Jill Colvin, “Loyalty tests and MAGA checks: Inside the Trump White House’s intense screening of job-seekers,” The Associated Press, January 25, 2025, available at https://apnews.com/article/trump-loyalty-white-house-maga-vetting-jobs-768fa5cbcf175652655c86203222f47c.
3. Steven Levitsky, “The New Authoritarianism,” The Atlantic, February 10, 2025, available at https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/02/trump-competitive-authoritarian/681609/.
4. Reuters, “Trump picks first-term loyalists for top Justice Department posts,” February 19, 2025, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-picks-first-term-loyalists-top-justice-department-posts-2025-02-19/.
5. Peter Eisler and others, “Exclusive: Judges face rise in threats as Musk blasts them over rulings,” Reuters, March 5, 2025, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/us/judges-face-rise-threats-musk-blasts-them-over-rulings-2025-03-05/.
6. Tom Gjelten, “Peaceful Protesters Tear-Gassed To Clear Way Ror Trump Church Photo-Op,” NPR, June 1, 2020, available at https://www.npr.org/2020/06/01/867532070/trumps-unannounced-church-visit-angers-church-officials.
7. Mandy Teheri, “Insurrection Act Explained: Trump Admin Deciding Whether to Invoke 1807 Law,” Newsweek, March 8, 2025, available at https://www.newsweek.com/insurrection-act-explained-trump-admin-deciding-whether-invoke-1807-law-2041626; The White House, “Granting Pardons and Commutation of Sentences for Certain Offenses Relating to the Events at or Near the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021,” January 20, 2025, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/granting-pardons-and-commutation-of-sentences-for-certain-offenses-relating-to-the-events-at-or-near-the-united-states-capitol-on-january-6-2021/; Alanna Durking Richer and Michael Kunzelman, “Trump grants sweeping pardon of Jan. 6 defendants, including rioters who violently attacked police,” The Associated Press, January 21, 2025, available at https://apnews.com/article/capitol-jan-6-pardons-trump-justice-department-8ce8b2a8f8cb602d5eaf85ac7b969606.
8. Lindsay Whitehurst, “Government watchdogs fired by Trump sue his administration and ask a judge to reinstate them,” The Associated Press, February 12, 2025, available at https://apnews.com/article/watchdogs-trump-mass-firing-inspectors-general-5b4629fb34a168322bf61170286efb76; Devlin Barrett, “Trump’s Justice Dept. ousts national security officials in latest purge,” The Washington Post, March 8, 2025, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/03/08/trumps-justice-dept-ousts-national-security-officials-latest-purge/.
9. Terry Gross, “Journalist describes Trump’s movements as a ‘regime change’ towards authoritarianism,” NPR, February 19, 2025, available at https://www.npr.org/2025/02/19/g-s1-49659/journalist-describes-trumps-movements-as-a-regime-change-towards-authoritarianism.
10. Tamir Bar-On, “The Radical Right and Nationalism,” in Jens Rydgren, ed., The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2018).
11. Elizabeth Dávid-Barrett, “State capture and development: a conceptual framework,” Journal of International Relations and Development 26 (2) (2023): 224–244, available at https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-023-00290-6.
12. Bridge Initiative Team, “Factsheet: National Rally (Rassembelement National, Previously Front National or National Front),” The Bridge Initiative, February 24, 2020, available at https://bridge.georgetown.edu/research/factsheet-national-rally/.
13. Théo Aiolfi, “How France’s Mainstream Normalized the Far Right,” JACOBIN, April 22, 2022, available at https://jacobin.com/2022/04/france-elections-mainstream-far-right-normalization-le-pen-macron-zemmour.
14. Bulent Kenes, “Casa Pound Italy: The Sui Generis Fascists of the New Millennium,” European Center for Populism Studies, June 18, 2021, available at https://www.populismstudies.org/casapound-italy-the-sui-generis-fascists-of-the-new-millennium/.
15. Thomas Chatterton Williams, “The French Origins of ‘You Will Not Replace Us,’” The New Yorker, November 27, 2017, available at https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/04/the-french-origins-of-you-will-not-replace-us; Kim Willsher, “France bans far-right ‘paramilitary’ group Génération Identitaire,” The Guardian, March 3, 2021, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/03/france-bans-far-right-paramilitary-group-generation-identitaire.
16. Al Jazeera, “How the violent far right infiltrated France’s National Rally,” December 10, 2018, available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/10/how-the-violent-far-right-infiltrated-frances-national-rally; Sophia Dimopoulos, “‘Very Fine People’: Trump, Political Violence, and the Rise of the Far-right” (Purchase, NY: SUNY Purchase, 2023), available at https://soar.suny.edu/handle/20.500.12648/11797.
17. Veronika Koller and Marlene Miglbauer, “What Drives the Right-Wing Populist Vote? Topics, Motivations and Representations in an Online Vox Pop with Voters for the Alternative für Deutschland,” Zeitschrift für Anglistik und Amerikanistik 67 (3) (2019): 283–306, available at https://doi.org/10.1515/zaa-2019-0024.
18. Hans Pfeifer, “The far-right AfD’s disruptive tactics in German parliament,” Deutsche Welle, November 27, 2020, available at https://www.dw.com/en/the-far-right-afds-disruptive-tactics-in-german-parliament/a-55748873.
19. Emily Schultheis, Chris Lunday, and Nette Nöstlinger, “Germany’s Merz Sparks Firestorm by Breaking Postwar Taboo,” Politico, January 29, 2025, available at https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-friedrich-merz-cdu-political-tightrope-far-right-votes-afd-migration-crackdown/.
20. Human Rights First, “Greece’s Prosecution of Golden Dawn,” April 17, 2015, available at https://humanrightsfirst.org/library/greeces-prosecution-of-golden-dawn/.
21. Kim Lane Scheppele, “Autocratic Legalism,” The University of Chicago Law Review 85 (2) (2018): 545–584, available at https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol85/iss2/2.
22. Ibid.
23. Patrick Kingsley, “Orban and His Allies Cement Control of Hungary’s News Media,” The New York Times, November 29, 2018, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/29/world/europe/hungary-orban-media.html.
24. David Olusoga, “As the world loses faith in democracy, leaders of vision are desperately needed,” The Guardian, February 2, 2020, available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/02/as-world-loses-faith-in-democracy-leaders-of-vision-are-desperately-needed.
25. Roger Berkowitz, “The Politics of Inevitability,” Amor Mundi, Hannah Arendt Center for Politics and Humanities, March 20, 2022, available at https://hac.bard.edu/amor-mundi/the-politics-of-inevitability-2022-03-20.
26. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, Tyranny of the Minority: Why American Democracy Reached the Breaking Point (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2023).
27. Michael Ignatieff, “The Politics of Enemies,” Journal of Democracy 33 (4) (2022): 5–19, available at https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-politics-of-enemies/.
28. Michael Ignatieff, “Enemies vs. Adversaries.” The New York Times, October 16, 2013, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/opinion/enemies-vs-adversaries.html.
29. John W. Patty, “Signaling through Obstruction,” American Journal of Political Science 60 (1) (2016): 175–189, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/24583057.
30. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, “When Should the Majority Rule?”, Journal of Democracy 36 (1) (2025): 5–20, available at https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/when-should-the-majority-rule/; Rosa Balfour and others, “Divide and Obstruct: Populist Parties and EU Foreign Policy,” German Marshall Fund of the United States (13) (2019), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21237.
31. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2019) pp. 162–163.
32. Luke T. Ziegler, “A House Divided: How Hitler Exploited the Politics of Weimar Germany,” Tenor of Our Times 11 (18) (2022), available at https://scholarworks.harding.edu/tenor/vol11/iss1/18.
33. Larry Eugene Jones, “‘The Greatest Stupidity of My Life’: Alfred Hugenberg and the Formation of the Hitler Cabinet, January 1933,” Journal of Contemporary History 27 (1) (1992): 63–87, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/260779.
34. Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, p. 95.
35. Ariadna Ripoll Servent and Natascha Zaun, “Under Which Conditions Do Populist Governments Use Unpolitics in EU Decision‐Making,” Politics and Governance 12 (2024), available at https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.8923; Ramona Coman, “Backsliding Populist Governments in the Council: The Case of the Hungarian Fidesz,” Politics and Governance (12) (2024), available at https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.8161.
36. Cas Mudde, The far right today, (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2019); Thomas Escritt, “What Can Germany’s Far-Right AfD Do with Its Regional Blocking Minority?”, Reuters, September 23, 2024, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-can-germanys-far-right-afd-do-with-its-regional-blocking-minority-2024-09-05/.
37. Jan Sundberg, “Who are the nationalist Finns Party?”, BBC News, May 11, 2015, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32627013.
38. Reuters, “Finland rejects proposed EU recovery package in current form,” Reuters, June 4, 2020, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/business/finland-rejects-proposed-eu-recovery-package-in-current-form-idUSKBN23B26U/.
39. YLE News, “Parliamentary debate on EU stimulus package finally over,” May 15, 2021, available at https://yle.fi/a/3-11932416.
40. Clea Caulcutt, “French election: Le Pen threatens to clip Macron’s wings on Ukraine and defense,” Politico, June 28, 2024, available at https://www.politico.eu/article/marine-le-pen-emmanuel-macron-jordan-bardella-french-parliamentary-election-far-right-national-rally-war-in-ukraine-defense/.
41. Jon Henley, “Jean-Marie Le Pen, the far-right provocateur whose ugly nationalism lives on,” The Guardian, January 7, 2025, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/07/jean-marie-le-pen-the-enfant-terrible-of-french-politics-who-normalised-populism; Angelique Chrisafis, “Marine Le Pen rails against rampant globalisation after election success,” The Guardian, April 24, 2017, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/24/marine-le-pen-rails-against-rampant-globalisation-after-election-success.
42. Catherine Porter, “France’s Far-Right National Rally Rebranded Itself: Here’s How.”, The New York Times, June 25, 2024, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/25/world/europe/france-national-rally-rebranding.html.
43. Davide Basso, “French far-right MP excluded from parliament over racist comment,” Euractiv, November 4, 2022, available at https://www.euractiv.com/section/non-discrimination/news/french-far-right-mp-excluded-from-parliament-over-racist-comment/.
44. Lisa Kuner, “Populist AfD ‘sand in the gears’ of German climate efforts,” Clean Energy Wire, May 24, 2024, available at https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/populist-afd-sand-gears-german-climate-efforts.
45. Takis S. Pappas, Populism and crisis politics in Greece (London: Palgrave Pivot, 2014); Daniel Trilling, “Golden Dawn: the rise and fall of Greece’s neo-Nazis,” The Guardian, March 3, 2020, available at https://www.theguardian.com/news/2020/mar/03/golden-dawn-the-rise-and-fall-of-greece-neo-nazi-trial.
46. Anthoula Malkopoulou, “Greece: A Procedural Defence of Democracy Against the Golden Dawn,” European Constitutional Law Review 17 (2) (2021): 177–201, available at https://doi.org/10.1017/S1574019621000146;Nektaria Stamouli, “Greek Lawmaker Faces Criminal Charges After Brawl in Parliament,” Politico, April 24, 2024, available at https://www.politico.eu/article/greece-parliament-brawl-konstantinos-floros-vassilis-grammenos/. Note: The politician in question, Konstantinos Floros, was formerly associated with the far-right Spartans party, which has been considered a legacy group of Golden Dawn since its leadership was arrested.
47. Jonathan Hopkin, “A Slow Fuse: Italy and the EU Debt Crisis,” The International Spectator 47 (4) (2012): 35–48, available at https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2012.735508.
48. Ansley Langham, “How the Far-Right Won in Italy: A Story of Coalitions and Electoral Law,” Electoral Integrity Project, February 23, 2023, available at https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/eip-blog/2023/2/23/how-the-far-right-won-in-italy-a-story-of-coalitions-and-electoral-law.
49. Ibid.
50. James Imam, “Italy’s far right weaponizes culture in the interests of nationalism,” The Art Newspaper, September 23, 2022, available at https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2022/09/23/italys-far-right-weaponises-culture-in-the-interests-of-nationalism.
51. Cecilia Biancalana, “The Spectrum of Italian Populist Parties in the 2024 European Elections: A Shift to the Right” (Brussels: European Center for Populism Studies, 2024), available at https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0075.
52. Elena Giordano, “Giorgia Meloni’s vendetta against Italy’s judges,” Politico, November 13, 2024, available at https://www.politico.eu/article/giorgia-melonis-italy-judges-viktor-orban-hungary-albania-rome-court-russia-war-ukraine/; Jennifer Rankin, “Freedom safeguards for Italy’s public service media urgently needed,” The Guardian, July 24, 2024, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/24/italy-public-service-media-safeguards-eu-giorgia-meloni.
53. Angela Giuffrida, “Meloni ‘turning Italian broadcaster into megaphone for far right,’” The Guardian, April 17, 2024, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/17/meloni-italian-broadcaster-rai-megaphone-for-far-right.
54. Robert Benson, “The Rhetoric of Constitutional Hardball” (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, 2022).
55. Crispian Balmer, “Italy’s ‘demolition man’ the architect of his own downfall,” Reuters, December 6, 2016, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us-politics/italys-demolition-man-the-architect-of-his-own-downfall-idUSKBN13V2FE/.
56. Christian Schweiger, “Towards Institutional Gridlock? The Limitations of Germany’s Consensus Democracy,” German Policy Studies/Politikfeldanalyse 6 (1) (2010): 3–42, available at https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1542892.
57. Mark Joseph Ferguson, “Pledge fulfillment in Germany: an examination of the Schröder II and Merkel I governments” (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama, 2012), p. 37.
58. Simone Burkhart, Philip Manow, and Daniel Ziblatt, “A More Efficient and Accountable Federalism? An Analysis of the Consequences of Germany’s 2006 Constitutional Reform,” in Carolyn Moore and Wade Jacoby, eds., German Federalism in Transition (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 16–34; Nathalie Behnke and Arthur Benz, “The Politics of Constitutional Change between Reform and Evolution,” Publius 39 (2) (2009), p. 223, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40272207.
59. Christian Stecker, “The effects of federalism reform on the legislative process in Germany,” in Nathalie Behnke and Sabine Kropp, eds., Ten Years of Federalism Reform in Germany (London: Routledge, 2018), pp. 19–40.
60. Ibid; Deutscher Bundestag, “Mediation procedure,” available at https://www.bundestag.de/en/parliament/function/legislation/mediation-245702 (last accessed July 2024).
61. Marcel Lewandowsky and others, “New Parties, Populism, and Parliamentary Polarization: Evidence from Plenary Debates in the German Bundestag,” in Michael Oswald, ed., The Palgrave Handbook of Populism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80803-7_37.
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63. Kristin Zeier and Gianna-Carina Grün, “German Election Results and Voter Demographics Explained in Charts,” Deutsche Welle, February 27, 2025, available at https://www.dw.com/en/german-election-results-and-voter-demographics-explained-in-charts/a-71724186.
64. Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, “Unsuccessful Organstreit application by the AfD parliamentary group in the German Bundestag regarding the election and electoral removal of committee chairpersons,” Press release, September 18, 2024, available at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2024/bvg24-079.html.
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71. Erik Damgaard and Palle Svensson, “Who governs? Parties and policies in Denmark,” European Journal of Political Research 17 (6) (1989): 731–745, available at https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1989.tb00215.x; Flemming Juul Christiansen, “The Polarization of Legislative Party Votes: Comparative Illustrations from Denmark and Portugal,” Parliamentary Affairs 74 (3) (2021): 741–759, available at https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsab029.
72. Mudde, The Far Right Today.
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74. Maciej Kisilowski, “Poland’s ‘overnight court’ breaks all the rules,” Politico, December 8, 2015, available at https://www.politico.eu/article/law-vs-justice-poland-constitution-judges/.
75. Deutsche Welle, “EU Warns Poland on Rule of Law,” December 24, 2015, available at https://www.dw.com/en/eu-warns-poland-on-rule-of-law-as-constitutional-crisis-escalates/a-18937977.
76. Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, “The Capture of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and Beyond: Of Institution(s), Fidelities and the Rule of Law in Flux,” Review of Central and East European Law 43 (2) (2018), available at https://doi.org/10.1163/15730352-04302002.
77. Stephens, Carolyn. “Poland’s Populist Party Changing the Court System: a threat to democracy?”, Democratic Erosion Consortium, March 15, 2018, available at https://democratic-erosion.org/2018/03/15/polands-populist-party-changing-the-court-system-a-threat-to-democracy/.
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79. Human Rights Watch, “Poland: Abortion Witch Hunt Targets Women, Doctors,” September 14, 2023, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/09/14/poland-abortion-witch-hunt-targets-women-doctors#:~:text=The%20October%202020%20Constitutional%20Tribunal,for%20abortion%20under%20Poland’s%20highly.
80. Antatol Magdziarz and Marc Santora, “Women Converge on Warsaw, Heightening Poland’s Largest Protests in Decades,” The New York Times, October 30, 2020, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/30/world/europe/poland-abortion-women-protests.html.
81. Amnesty International, “Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal Rolls Back Reproductive Rights,” Press release, October 22, 2020, available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/10/polands-constitutional-tribunal-rolls-back-reproductive-rights/.
82. Anna Pamula, “6 Stories Show the Human Toll of Poland’s Strict Abortion Laws,” Time, September 28, 2023, available at https://time.com/6320172/poland-abortion-laws-maternal-health-care/.
83. BBC, “Poland Abortion: Top Court Bans Almost All Terminations,” October 23, 2020, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54642108.​
84. John Macy and Allyson K. Duncan, “The Collapse of Judicial Independence in Poland: A Cautionary Tale,” Judicature 104 (3) (2020–2021): 40–50, available at https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/the-collapse-of-judicial-independence-in-poland-a-cautionary-tale/.
85. Ibid.
86. Lydia Gall, “Eroding Checks and Balances” (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2023), available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/24/eroding-checks-and-balances/rule-law-and-human-rights-under-attack-poland.
87. Macy and Duncan, “The collapse of judicial independence in Poland: A cautionary tale,” p. 40.
88. Ibid.
89. Allison McManus, Robert Benson, and Sadhana Mandala, “The Dangers of Project 2025: Global Lessons in Authoritarianism,” Center for American Progress, October 9, 2024, available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-dangers-of-project-2025-global-lessons-in-authoritarianism/.
90. András Bozóki and István Benedek, “Politics in Hungary: Two critical junctures,” in Sabrina P. Ramet and László Kürti, eds., Civic and Uncivic Values in Hungary (London: Routledge, 2024), pp. 17–42.
91. Gábor Halmai, “The early retirement age of the Hungarian judges,” in (2017).
92. Lívia Benková, “Hungary-Orbán’s project towards ‘illiberal democracy,’” AIES Fokus 2 (2019): 1–4, available at https://www.aies.at/publikationen/2019/fokus-19-02.php; Euronews, “Hungary’s Stop Soros law that criminalises helping asylum seekers ‘infringes EU law,” November 16, 2021, available at https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2021/11/16/hungary-move-to-criminalise-support-of-asylum-seekers-infringes-eu-law.
93. Gábor Győri, András Bíró-Nagy, and Gábor Scheiring, Hungarian Politics in 2020 (Budapest, Hungary: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2021).
94. Jessica M. Zaccagnino, “The Tragedy of Central European University: Theorizing Hungarian Illiberal Democracy and Its Threat to Academic Freedom,” Connecticut Law Review 52 (3) (2020): 1187–1242, available at https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/448.
95. Nick Thorpe, “Hungary broke EU law by forcing out university, says European Court,” BBC News, October 6, 2020, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54433398.
96. Marc Santora, “George Soros-Founded University Is Forced out of Hungary,” The New York Times, December 3, 2018, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/03/world/europe/soros-hungary-central-european-university.html.
97. Nóra Chronowski and Attila Vincze, “The Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Central European University Case: Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied: Decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court of 6 July 2021 and the Judgment of the ECJ of 6 October 2020, Case C-66/18,” European Constitutional Law Review 17 (4) (2021): 688–706, available at https://doi.org/10.1017/S1574019621000407.
98. Florin Zubașcu, “Forcing the Central European University out of Hungary Was against EU Law, Court Says,” Science | Business, October 7, 2020, available at https://sciencebusiness.net/news/forcing-central-european-university-out-hungary-was-against-eu-law-court-says.
99. NPR, “American University CEU Kicked out of Hungary, Says It Will Move to Vienna,” December 6, 2018, available at https://www.npr.org/2018/12/06/674310948/american-university-ces-kicked-out-of-hungary-says-it-will-move-to-vienna.
100. Veronica Anghel and Erik Jones, “What Went Wrong in Hungary,” Journal of Democracy 35 (2) (2024): 52–64, available at https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/what-went-wrong-in-hungary/.
101. Comments delivered at “Enemies and Adversaries in 21st Century Politics” event at the Free University of Berlin, November 19, 2018, available at https://www.fu-berlin.de/en/presse/informationen/fup/2018/fup_18_325-feinde-kontrahenten-in-der-politik/index.html. The author draws the quote from his personal notes from the event.
102. BBC, “Viktor Orban: Hungary PM re-elected for third term,” April 8, 2018, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43693663; Roman Broszokowski, “Losing to Viktor Orbán Has Taught Hungary’s Left a Tough Lesson,” Jacobin, September 25, 2023, available at https://jacobin.com/2023/09/viktor-orban-fidesz-hungarian-left-2022-election-failure.
103. The Associated Press, “Hundreds of thousands march in Israel against Netanyahu’s judicial overhaul,” NPR, July 22, 2023, available at https://www.npr.org/2023/07/22/1189627225/israel-protests-netanyahu-judiciary.
104. Raffi Berg, “Israel judicial reform explained: What is the crisis about?”, BBC, September 11, 2023, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-65086871.
105. Ari Rabinovitch, “Israel’s Supreme Court strikes down disputed law that limited court oversight,” Reuters, January 1, 2024, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-supreme-court-strikes-down-disputed-law-that-limited-court-oversight-2024-01-01/.
106. Daniel Estrin and Brian Mann, “In landmark ruling, Israel’s Supreme Court rejects right-wing changes to judiciary,” NPR, January 1, 2024, available at https://www.npr.org/2024/01/01/1222400537/israel-supreme-court-ruling-judiciary-changes.
107. Amichai Cohen and Yuval Shany, “Israel’s Renewed Judicial Overhaul,” Lawfare, March 3, 2025, available at https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/israel-s-renewed-judicial-overhaul.
108. Yaniv Roznai, associate professor and vice dean, Harry Radzyner Law School at Reichman University, interview with author via video call, Herzliya, Israel, February 5, 2025, on file with author.
109. Raphael Minder, “Donald Tusk’s government moves ahead with plans to sack Poland’s top court judges,” Financial Times, February 4, 2024, available at https://www.ft.com/content/a990c360-e1d1-4554-8444-7c81a0159cc9.
110. Anna Wójcik, “Restoring the Rule of Law in Poland: An Assessment of the New Government’s Progress” (Washington: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2024), available at https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/Wojcik%20-%20Poland%20RoL%20-%20brief.pdf.
111. Reuters, “Poland to change process for judges’ nominations with eye on EU funds,” January 12, 2024, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-change-process-judges-nominations-with-eye-eu-funds-2024-01-12/.
112. Paulina Pacuła, “Duda Blocks Changes to the Constitutional Tribunal, Refers Bills for Preventative Review,” Rule of Law, October 7, 2024, available at https://ruleoflaw.pl/this-was-a-long-anticipated-decision-by-president-duda-as-expected-the-president-intends-to-block-the-proposed-reforms-to-the-constitutional-tribunal-which-had-been-politicized-by-the-law-and-justi/.
113. Anna Wlodarczak-semczuk and Karl Badohal, “Polish opposition faces challenges in undoing nationalist reform if it takes power,” Reuters, October 16, 2023, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/polish-opposition-faces-challenges-undoing-nationalist-reforms-if-it-takes-power-2023-10-16/.
114. Gregor Wiedemann, “Exemplary Study: Democratic Demarcation in Germany,” in Text Mining for Qualitative Data Analysis in the Social Sciences: A Study on Democratic Discourse in Germany (Berlin: Springer, 2016), pp. 167–211.
115. Robert Benson, “A Bellweather for Trans-Atlantic Democracy: The Rise of the German Far-Right,” Center for American Progress, October 30, 2024, available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/a-bellwether-for-trans-atlantic-democracy-the-rise-of-the-german-far-right/.
116. Geir Moulson, “German government, mainstream opposition move to protect highest court against extremist forces,” The Associated Press, July 23, 2024, available at https://apnews.com/article/germany-constitutional-court-protection-plan-df979a48418f8a7021d2dba399fa0746.
117. Ben Knight, “Germany moved to protect top court against far right,” Deutsche Welle, December 20, 2024, available at https://www.dw.com/en/germany-moves-to-protect-top-court-against-far-right/a-68403671.
118. Kathrin Hamenstädt, “Strengthening the Resilience of the German Federal Constitutional Court,” Birmingham Law School Research and Scholarship Blog, January 15, 2025, available at https://blog.bham.ac.uk/lawresearch/2025/01/strengthening-the-resilience-of-the-german-federal-constitutional-court/.
119. Milan Vaishnav, “Five Trends Shaping India’s Voting Landscape,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 10, 2013, available at https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2013/09/five-trends-shaping-indias-voting-landscape?lang=en.
120. Milan Vaishnav, “The BJP in Power: Indian Democracy and Religious Nationalism” (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019), available at https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/04/the-bjp-in-power-indian-democracy-and-religious-nationalism?lang=en.
121. Muhammad Shabbir, “Indian Elections 2014: Domestic and Reginal Fallout,” Margalla Papers 19 (1) (2015): 62–63,available at https://web.archive.org/web/20180424180153id_/http://www.ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/margalla-paper/Margalla-Papers-SE-2015/05-Indian-Elections-Mr-Shabbir.pdf.
122. Christophe Jaffrelot and Gilles Verniers, “A new party system or a new political system?”, Contemporary South Asia 28 (2) (2020): 141–154, available at https://doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2020.1765990.
123. Sarah Shamim, “India election results: Big wins, losses, and surprises,” Al Jazeera, June 4, 2024, available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/4/india-election-results-big-wins-losses-and-surprises.
124. Geoffrey Macdonald and Babak Moussavi, “Minoritarian Rule: How India’s Electoral System Created the Illusion of a BJP Landslide,” Economic and Political Weekly 50 (8) (2015): 18–21, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/24481416.
125. Abhinav Chandrachud, “Secularism and the Citizenship Amendment Act,” Indian Law Review 4 (2) (2020): 138–162, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3513828.
126. Mintu Pathak and Jhanin Mushahary, “The Revocation of Article 370 in Indian Constitution: An Analysis of the Socio-Political and Economic Effects after Withdrawal of the Article in Jammu and Kashmir,” Journal of Positive School Psychology 6 (4) (2022): 3012–3018, available at https://journalppw.com/index.php/jpsp/article/view/3779.
127. Amnesty International, “India: Protection of the human rights of the people of Jammu and Kashmir must guide the way forward,” December 5, 2023, available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/12/india-protection-of-the-human-rights-of-the-people-of-jammu-and-kashmir-must-guide-the-way-forward/; Human Rights Watch, “India: Repression Persists in Jammu and Kashmir,” August 2, 2022, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/02/india-repression-persists-jammu-and-kashmir.
128. Sheikh Saaliq, “India’s new citizenship law excludes Muslims. Here’s what to know,” The Associated Press, March 15, 2024, available at https://apnews.com/article/india-citizenship-law-modi-muslims-caa-28909f8df0e6d5e0915e065195abef14.
129. The Economist, “A wild gerrymander makes Hungary’s Fidesz party hard to dislodge,” April 2, 2022, available at https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2022/04/02/a-wild-gerrymander-makes-hungarys-fidesz-party-hard-to-dislodge.
130. Arend Lijphart, “PR Library: Proportional Representation vs. Single-Member Districts in States,” FairVote, available at https://fairvote.org/archives/pr-vs-single-member-districts-in-states/ (last accessed January 2025).
131. Bulcsú Hunyadi and Rudolf Berkes, “Hungary: derailed election campaign brings back national politics and overshadows anti-Brussels message,” in Carme Colomina and others, eds., European elections 2024: A turning point for EU integration? (Barcelona: Barcelona Center For International Affairs, 2024), available at https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/hungary-derailed-election-campaign-brings-back-national-politics-and-overshadows-anti.
132. Kim Lane Scheppele, “How Viktor Orbán Wins,” Journal of Democracy 33 (3) (2022): 45–61, available at https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/how-viktor-orban-wins/.
133. Ibid.
134. Hungarian Helsinki Committee, “Dismissal without justification violates the Convention,” September 21, 2023, available at https://helsinki.hu/en/dismissal-without-justification-violates-the-convention/; Alex Tausanovitch and others, “The civil service, explained,” Protect Democracy, June 11, 2024, available at https://protectdemocracy.org/work/the-civil-service-explained/#:~:text=In%20Hungary%2C%20for%20example%2C%20one,remove%20career%20employees%20without%20cause.
135. Kim Lane Scheppele, “Hungary and the End of Politics,” The Nation, May 6, 2014, available at https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/hungary-and-end-politics/ .
136. György Hajnal, Krisztián Kádár, and Éva Kovács, “Public administration characteristics and performance in EU28: Hungary” (Budapest: Corvinus University of Budapest and National University of Public Service, April 2018), available at https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/ae181e42-9601-11e8-8bc1-01aa75ed71a1.
137. Péter Krekó and Zsolt Enyedi, “Explaining Eastern Europe: Orbán’s Laboratory of Illiberalism,” Journal of Democracy 29 (3) (2018): 39–51, available at https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/explaining-eastern-europe-orbans-laboratory-of-illiberalism/.
138. Hungarian Helsinki Committee, “Dismissal without justification violates the Convention”; AFP Staff Writers, “Hungary sacks army chief in latest shakeup,” Space War, April 27, 2023, available at https://www.spacewar.com/reports/Hungary_sacks_army_chief_in_latest_shakeup_999.html.
139. Stephen Jones, “Perspectives: Mapping Georgian Dream’s path to ‘victory,’” Eurasianet, November 4, 2024, available at https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-mapping-georgian-dreams-path-to-victory.
140. Austin Spenzer and William Mockapetris, “Georgia’s Electoral Transformation: Landmark Elections Under New Rules,” International Republican Institute, August 16, 2024, available at https://www.publicnow.com/view/5C6A1CE06F56811848AC0C98215CEE23CDEE57ED?1723848506.
141. Paul Kirby, “Georgia PM rejects vote-rigging claims as president calls mass rally,” BBC, October 28, 2024, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c78ddj25kgvo.
142. Freedom House, “Georgia: Freedom in the World 2024” (Washington: 2024), available at https://freedomhouse.org/country/georgia/freedom-world/2024 (last accessed January 2025).
143. Journal of Democracy, “What Are Foreign Agent Laws? And Why Georgia Has Erupted in Protest,” available at https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/news-and-updates/what-are-foreign-agent-laws-and-why-georgia-has-erupted-in-protest/ (last accessed January 2025).
144. Felix Light, “Georgian police arrest opposition leaders at pro-EU protest,” Reuters, February 2, 2025, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/georgian-opposition-leader-arrested-pro-eu-protesters-block-highway-2025-02-02/; Human Rights Watch, “Georgia: Brutal Police Violence Against Protesters,” December 23, 2024, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/12/23/georgia-brutal-police-violence-against-protesters.
145. Maia Otarashvili and Robert E. Hamilton, “Government vs. the People in Georgia,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 6, 2024, available at https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/05/government-vs-the-people-in-georgia/.
146. Flora Garamvolgyi, “US imposes sanctions on senior Hungarian government minister,” The Guardian, January 7, 2025, available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jan/07/sanctions-antal-rogan-hungarian-minister-corruption.
147. Scott Hofer, Cong Huang, and Richard Murray, “The Trade-Offs between At-Large and Single-Member Districts” (Houston: University of Houston, 2018), available at https://uh.edu/hobby/cpp/white-paper-series/_images/hspa-white-paper-series_no.-14.pdf.
148. Anthony J. Gaughan, “To End Gerrymandering: The Canadian Model for Reforming the Congressional Redistricting Process in the United States,” Capital University Law Review 41 (2013), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2236507.
149. Michel Rose, “Rival French parties seek to build anti-far right front,” Reuters, July 2, 2024, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/far-right-bloc-wins-1st-round-french-parliament-elections-with-33-vote-ministry-2024-07-01/.
150. Andrew Higgins, “Emerging From Orban’s Shadow, a Former Ally Tries to Steal His Limelight,” The New York Times, June 17, 2024, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/17/world/europe/hungary-magyar-orban.html.
151. Al Jazeera, “Hungary’s government rocked as former insider leaks recordings,” March 27, 2024, available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/27/former-hungarian-government-insider-leaks-graft-case-audio-tape.
152. Euronews, “Thousands protest in Budapest as Orbán embroiled in corruption cover up,” March 26, 2024, available at https://www.euronews.com/2024/03/26/hungarian-whistleblower-releases-audio-suggesting-corruption-in-embattled-orban-government.
153. Aylin Aydin-Cakir, “The varying effect of court-curbing: evidence from Hungary and Poland,” Journal of European Public Policy 31 (5) (2023): 1179–1205, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2023.2171089; Reuters, “Thousands Protest Against Poland’s Plan to Discipline Judges,” January 11, 2020, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/world/thousands-protest-against-polands-plan-to-discipline-judges-idUSKBN1ZA0PC/.
154. The Associated Press, “Hundreds of Thousands March in Poland Anti-Government Protests to Show Support for Democracy,” Voice of America (VOA) News, June 4, 2023, available at https://www.voanews.com/a/hundreds-of-thousands-march-in-poland-anti-government-protests-to-show-support-for-democracy-/7122211.html.
155. Al Jazeera, “Poland’s pro-EU opposition parties reach coalition agreement,” November 10, 2023, available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/10/polands-winning-opposition-parties-reach-coalition-agreement.
156. Ibid.
157. Andrew Higgins and Matei Barbulesco, “Romanian Court Annuls Presidential Election Result and Orders a New Vote,” The New York Times, December 6, 2024, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/06/world/europe/romania-election-court.html.
158. Anda Bologa, “Romania’s Shady TikTok Election,” Center for European Policy Analysis, December 5, 2024, available at https://cepa.org/article/romanias-shady-tiktok-election/.
159. Reuters, “Romanian launches criminal inquiry against far-right presidential frontrunner,” February 26, 2025, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/romanian-prosecutors-question-far-right-frontrunner-presidential-election-probe-2025-02-26/; Reuters, “Romania investigates mercenary linked to presidential candidate after guns and cash haul,” February 28, 2025, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/romania-investigates-mercenary-linked-presidential-candidate-after-guns-cash-2025-02-28/; Andrew Higgins, “Romania Opens Criminal Case Against Ultranationalist Politician,” The New York Times, February 27, 2025, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/27/world/europe/romania-calin-georgescu.html.
160. Reuters, “Europe opens probe into TikTok over election interference following Romanian election,” CNN, December 17, 2024, available at https://www.cnn.com/2024/12/17/tech/eu-tiktok-investigation-romanian-election-intl/index.html.
161. ​Jin Yu Young and Choe Sang-Hun, “Who Is Yoon Suk Yeol, and What Comes Next for Him?”, The New York Times, April 4, 2025, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/04/world/asia/skorea-yoon-next.html.
162. Foster Klug, “What to know about South Korea’s martial law and the impeachment vote threatening its president,” The Associated Press, December 12, 2024, available at https://apnews.com/article/south-korea-martial-law-north-korea-emergency-b310df4fece42c27051f58b8951f346f.
163. The Hindu, “Fiscal battle: On borrowings and Kerala’s suit,” April 4, 2024, available at https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/fiscal-battle-borrowings-and-keralas-suit/article68024451.ece.
164. Marina Nord and others, “When autocratization is reversed: episodes of U-Turns since 1900,” Democratization (2025): 1–24, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2024.2448742.

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Originally published by The Center for American Progress, 04.09.2025, republished with permission educational, for non-commercial purposes.

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