We Know You’re There: Political Counterintelligence in Mid-Republican Rome

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Agents gathered information about other states in order to aid their political and martial decisions.

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By Dr. Sara Margaret Perley
Historian

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Abstract

This paper explores the strategies undertaken to preserve information in an age without formal services devoted to national security and counterintelligence. It examines the primary efforts of political counterintelligence denial undertaken by Roman senate during the mid-Republic. The fundamental focus revolved around restricting and monitoring access to available information. The senate determined what information, and in what detail, the public should have access to. This served to control both Roman citizens and the information available to foreigners. Extant sources mention the existence of spies and informers resident in or visiting Rome. These agents gathered information about other states in order to aid their political and martial decisions. Acknowledging this, the Republican senate undertook efforts to protect against these forces.

Introduction

Counterintelligence is one of the most important tools in national security. While national security was not as larger concern in antiquity as in the modern age, it still played a role in political concerns. It is only through political counterintelligence that one state can protect against the intelligence activities of other powers and peoples. It serves to protect against espionage, sabotage, and assassination conducted by other powers or on their behalf. Counterintelligence in the mid-Republican Roman political sphere revolves around the fundamental idea that it was important to protect information and was largely restricted to the city of Rome itself during the period discussed here.¹ Roman actions to defend against external espionage and domestic insurgencies have been poorly addressed in studies of Roman intelligence. The attitude of Roman intelligence scholars is that ‘a naive attitude toward the importance of intelligence prevailed during the Republic and it was never entirely shaken off.’² Their engagement with counterintelligence challenges this image.

The protection focused on two sectors, the boundaries between which are flexible. Roman political counterintelligence revolved around denial. Active measures were put in place by the senate to control the flow of information available to both the public and to foreign agents in Rome who arrived under the guise of trade, immigration, or most importantly diplomatic missions. Political censorship defended against internal insurgencies and against the presence of spies or residents of split loyalties. That is, the active attempt to control what foreigners and domestic citizens would perceive and comprehend to be the state of affairs at any given point in Rome. The procedures put in place highlight the recognition of the Roman state about the importance of information in international affairs, and the need to control the information in an attempt to maintain power.

Domestic Control

Denial measures had their starting point in the senate’s control of information. The initial measure was to suspend belief about any information that arrived in Rome. One of the fundamental denial methods that the Roman state used to defend itself and counter the limitations of the speed of transport, and on occasion the politicisation of information received was the refusal to accept rumour as valid information about the state of affairs. Rumours will always exist. The sources for rumours were innumerable. Traders, prostitutes, and all kinds of camp followers were sources of information about the state of affairs. How accurate their information was however, was never guaranteed. The inability to trust information from one source, or a variety of sources was acknowledged in Roman political affairs. To defend themselves against the follies of rumour the senate waited for information believed to be from more reliable sources. Rumour could easily hide disinformation from enemies and distort the image of affairs, undermining any Roman intelligence and policy decisions.³ According to Livy, in 193, where events in Spain were rumoured to be falling out of control Gaius Flamininus attempted to force the senate to pass a decree giving him one of the urban legions, with which he would go into action.⁴ The senators’ response was that senatorial decrees were not to be made based off idle rumour foolishly concocted and spread by citizens to suit their purposes. No news was to be considered official until either written reports form praetors in the provinces, or reports from the praetors’ dispatched legates was received. Only after this official news was received would any decision be taken.⁵

There were plenty of rumours around Rome at various instances regarding military affairs. The rumours were not regarded as fact, in most cases until there was some form of verification to prove their validity. A pertinent example of this appreciation is shown in the aftermath of the battle of Metaurus in 207. After the defeat and death of Hasdrubal, news reached Rome that was not regarded as fact. As much as the people wanted to believe the rumours the state of affairs at the time did not lend itself to positive thinking and hope. It was only after more messengers arrived with the same news, and with added detail that the Roman victory was accepted.⁶ Livy dramatizes his account, but the effect is the same. After Nero sent news of his plans, the senate informed the people and retired to the senate house, presumably to discuss what to do in both defeat and success. The people lingered in the forum and in temples. It was a state of anxiety and suspense. Then rumours of the battle came to the city – first two cavalry riders from Narnia announced Roman victory, then a letter arrived from Lucius Manlius Acidinus. This missive was taken through the forum to the curia. The people were so desperate for news they wanted the missive read in the rostra before the senate deliberated its contents. Even after this missive was received, members of the senate still refused to believe it or announce it to the public until the received word from either of the consuls.⁷ Then rumour came that emissaries from the consuls were arriving, followed by their arrival. Again, the missive was read in the senate, despite the people’s pressure for the announcement of news immediately.⁸ It was only after the senate knew the official state of affairs that the emissaries were taken to the rostra to announce what had happened.⁹ The joyous reaction to the news in Livy, the attitude that the war was over, the celebrations and the financial levity, highlight the danger that announcing this news based on rumour could have had. If information received was wrong, the despondency of the people, having begun to celebrate would have been worse than it was originally.¹⁰ To give something to celebrate and to take it away is worse than never having something to celebrate at all. The entire account episode reveals the recognition of the power of rumour. The senate defended the people against manipulation, false belief and false hope. Even when they had official sources they waited for more before any statement was made to the people. Lucius Salinator exploited the opposite in the field. In Livy’s account of the battle of Metaurus, Salinator ordered that the Ligurian and Celtiberian forces be allowed to escape alive to spread the news of Hasdrubal’s defeat.¹¹ He exploited the psychological manipulation gained from stories, which would be elaborated as they spread, to gain power and influence for Rome in an environment where peoples had been defecting from alliances or collaborating against them. News true or false had immense power in antiquity, as it does today. With the advent of modern technology we can verify information received with relative ease. States in antiquity could not rely on these measures. Instead, they had to withhold judgment and wait for verification. The Roman state realised this and protected themselves.

Even news from official sources was not believed without question.¹² Even though the competitive system of the Roman aristocracy held the threat of politicised information, other members of the senate were aware of the potential of this politicisation – they did it themselves.¹³ After the battle of Trebia, information received from the consul was distorted so as not to present himself as the cause of defeat. This intelligence was believed until contrary sources began to distort the image of affairs.¹⁴ More tellingly, Marcus Valerius Messalla was sent to conduct raids and gather intelligence about the plans of the Carthaginians along the African coast by the consul Marcus Valerius in 210. Messalla raided and captured Carthaginians during his voyage. He then returned to Sicily, removing the hope of escape from his captives, and interrogated them. He made a transcript of the information received and sent it to the Laevinus. It was reported that 5000 Numidians were in Carthage. Masinissa and other mercenaries were being hired and shipped to Hasdrubal in Spain. At the same time, Carthaginian forces were building an armada to retake Sicily. The senate was informed of this information – they took it seriously enough that a dictator was appointed.¹⁵ The information was important enough that it should not be ignored, but it was still later verified. The arrival of Gaius Laelius, Scipio’s legate from Spain, provided the senate with information about the state of affair there. The interrogation of captives allowed for the verification of Messalla’s earlier account of Carthaginian plans. The sensitivity toward rumour is only one indication that the state was aware of power of information. It reveals the most basic appreciation for counterintelligence.

The Roman state however, engaged in further protectionist measures. The senate was to control the information disseminated to the public. This not only related to unsubstantiated news, but even to official missives. The senate controlled information about military affairs, declarations of war, and diplomatic events in an attempt to control what was potentially damning information. The most basic form of protection was the ban on senators discussing what had occurred in senatorial meetings. In an incident that is admittedly only recorded in Valerius Maximus, thus of questionable historicity, Quintus Fabius Maximus told his friend Publius Crassus, in 149, about classified discussions in the senate regarding the potential declaration of the Third Punic War.¹⁶ Maximus apparently had a lapse of judgement, for he did not recall if Crassus had been enrolled in the senatorial order by the censors, though he was quaestor in 152. The consuls severely reprimanded Maximus, as they wanted to maintain the sanctity of senatorial silence, being the best and most secure bond of future events.¹⁷ Valerius Maximus’ anecdote elaborates on practices that are mentioned throughout the Republican historical narrative. In a similar episode, Zonarus relates Roman aid given to the Volsinii in 265.¹⁸ The people had placed too much of administration in the hands of their slaves, who subsequently rose to power. The old citizens sent secret envoys to Rome to ask for aid in remedying what was a shameful situation.¹⁹ Zonarus tells us that the envoys urged the senate to meet secretly by night, in a senator’s private house in order to prevent information leaks. The senators did so, without apparent question or concern. The house they chose however, was housing a Samnite who proceeded to listen to their conversation. He informed the slaves of the Volsinii, who put the envoys to death. The information was not used to save the Volsinii’s position. Instead, through their chosen actions, the city was raised to the ground after a siege and the collaborators killed.²⁰ Zonarus’ account of the security of this meeting is somewhat problematic. The choice to move from the curia into a private house suggests that a senatorial meeting by night would have raised questions even if the discussion was kept private. Though, by the same token, the amassing of the entire body in one house would have been equally suspicious. The alternative is that the curia was not considered secure, but then the security conscious senators simply made the assumption that the private house was secure. Regardless, the Samnite guest was reportedly ill. But, this house was surely not the only accessible home. Nor if the situation required such security would there have been the assumption that illness was a sufficient enough reason to ignore his presence. These parts of the episodes seem likely to be fabrications, inserted to explain how and why the Volsinii gained information about activities. What is important in the episode is that there needed to be an explanation for how the information was revealed – suggesting that the control of information was indeed the norm.²¹

The same kind of secrecy seems to have been expected in the political discussion of other Mediterranean states. In a discussion of the Achaean assembly, pro-Roman Stratius of Tritaea was accused of conveying all secret matter of discussion to the Roman legate Gnaeus Papirius. Stratius had been a political hostage, who was released along with Polybius.²² Stratius claims that they were simply friends and discussions never included anything of politics. Continuous discussions with the legate, whose purpose was to investigate the commotion in the Peloponnese, do seem suspicious.²³ It is of little surprise that most did not believe him, especially with the seemingly anti-Roman sentiment that existed.²⁴ Diplomats acted as a primary force of Roman intelligence. They had agents. Stratius was likely one of them. In Carthage too, political discussions were kept secret, thwarting the efforts of Gulassa to give information to the Roman senate. According to Livy, the Carthaginian senators had sequestered themselves in the temple of Aesculapius and that no information had leaked out except that ambassadors were to be sent to Rome.²⁵ It was because Masinissa could not infiltrate or discover knowledge of what went on in the meeting that he sent his son to Rome. He had to pre-empt whatever the Carthaginians were to say about him.²⁶ There is no pejorative commentary on the nature of secret meetings. They seem to be common and accepted part of political discussions when a state did not want people to know what was going on. This does not mean that all discussions of the senate were secret but implies the acknowledgement of the presence of spies and the need for information security. One that was not unique to any Mediterranean power.

Much of what was protected related to military reports. To protect the public from reports and to protect the information from the public has two primary purposes – to control your own population and to limit the information available to spies and peoples of disparate loyalties. It ensures that panic does not set in, something that serves only to destabilise senatorial control in times where domestic control is tantamount. Polybius tells us that after the defeat at Trasimene, the senate could not conceal or soften the results of the battle. In part they had to announce this, because soldiers who were present at the defeat were now in Rome.²⁷ If the senate withheld official information, rumour would spread to the public, grow, and become distorted. Because it was so disastrous, they had to announce it. This, predictably, caused panic. This panic resulted because for many years the Roman public had no experience of the word or fact of defeat.²⁸ This is despite Roman armies suffering from defeats in the previous year at Ticinus and Trebia. According to Polybius, the Roman senate convinced themselves that the routing of the cavalry at Ticinus was not a defeat.²⁹ The defeat of Trebia, once the senate gathered true information about what had occurred simply prepared for contingencies.³⁰ Neither defeat was announced to the public, at least not in a manner that highlighted the realities of a military defeat.³¹ In circumstances where defeats were announced to the public, the senate tried to maintain control of the situation. Defeats were withheld from the public at one level to stop panic. Panic undermines power, and is extraordinarily dangerous when faced with severe external threats.

It was not only panic that required control. The senate also had a responsibility to control the beliefs of the Roman people, insomuch that anything that may undermine the traditional values and ways of the state, including of course the power of the senate, was censored. To censor these things requires an understanding of their potential power. It requires understanding your citizens and being able to predict how they will react in any given circumstance. The two primary domestic censorship activities during the mid-Republic are the burning of Numa’s books and the suppression of the Bacchanalian conspiracy. The Bacchanalian conspiracy was controlled after state mandated investigations of affairs determined it to be dangerous.³² The introduction of new gods into the Roman pantheon was not unusual. The practices of this cult, and the ideas that practitioners were likely to hold, were undermining the Roman state. The cult was threat to security, the maintenance of senatorial power, and the cultural values of Rome.³³ Instead of suppressing this information, the senate attempted to calm the population with a public pronouncement – there was no purpose to the public meeting other than to announce information. Not doing this was not an option in this incident. To avoid panic, the people needed to know why others in Rome were being questioned and contained. Part of the speech that Livy includes in his narrative suggests the developed awareness of the fickleness of public information. Some information has to be released in order to stop idle speculation spreading but all information cannot be released so as not to incite panic and threaten the rise of the mob’s view of justice.³⁴ Only as much information was revealed as the senate required to ease their investigation and suppression. In the case of Numa’s books, after discovery the books were read by a number of the scribe, Lucius Petillius’, friends. The praetor Quintus Petillius seized the books, read them, and determined them to be too dangerous to traditional Roman religion – that is that they would undermine the ways things were done in Rome.³⁵ Petillius was referred to the senatorial tribunes and it was voted that the books ought to be burned.³⁶ Interestingly, they were burnt in public. This would highlight their existence to the general public, most of whom would logically have remained ignorant of the affair. If knowledge of them had leaked, then the senate would have needed to justify their destruction and prove that it was done, rather than covered up and the books hidden from view. Both these episodes of political censorship allegedly related to religion. The connection rests in that Roman state religion was closely connected with the manner in which the Republic was organised and run. To allow contrary religious practices was a threat to the sanctity of state control. These threats had to be quashed as in the early 2nd century Rome was engaged in numerous international conflicts can could not afford dissidence in domestic affairs to interfere with their focus on the tumultuous Mediterranean situation. As Aeneas Tacticus states, a disaffected citizenry is no less dangerous than external threats to national security.³⁷

Domestic control was not the only evident motivation for the senate’s censorship. While domestic control utilises intelligence and serves as a counter for foreign disinformation it is not as closely related to counterintelligence as the other rationale for controlling information present in extant sources. Both Livy and Polybius refer to the public announcement of plans when the senate believed these to be appropriate, the refusal to announce plans when it was thought to be inappropriate, as well as the public accounts of events in order to dispel rumours. There is some evidence of rumour mongering in the later Republic at least, with the attested presence of whisperers, known as susurratores and subrostrani – literally those who lingered under the rostra to get information.³⁸ Explicit reference to these survives only in a letter of Cicero.³⁹ His complaints about them suggest that they spend their time spreading gossip. Such people are hardly unique to the political climate of the late Republic. Regardless of whether it was the specific goal of people to spread rumours, any information that was reported to the public would spread and be distorted. This not only potentially upsets the people but also gives both valid and distorted information to allies and enemies – something highly problematic in an anarchic international system.

Control of Foreign Agents

To counter such behaviour, the release of information was controlled. Extant episodes usually relate to either the protection of military reports until a version of events was deemed reasonable or requisite to release to the public, or diplomatic and political affairs. There are the occasional efforts to control public opinion regarding things thought to be dangerous, but also to manipulate and limited the power of any potential listeners, spies, infiltrators, or people or divided or dubious loyalty. There were spies in Rome; information travelled throughout the Mediterranean long before Rome was even an influential party in the East. The first embassy sent to Rome by Ptolemy in 273 was timed remarkably well. It came at a time when Rome was about to defeat Pyrrhus, and Ptolemy II was running out of friends. Ptolemy had been helping Pyrrhus.⁴⁰ It is likely that someone in Pyrrhus’ army or a camp follower was keeping him apprised of what was going on. The timing of the embassy suggests an investigating into what Rome’s immediate intentions were after the defeating Pyrrhus. Rome’s response the embassy suggests they knew the situation Ptolemy was facing, and were not interested in engaging with Hellenistic kingdoms at that point;⁴¹ during the Second Punic War a Carthaginian spy was caught after living in Rome in two years;⁴² there is recognition of agents, presumably some of the Macedonian residents, of Perseus in the city prior to the outbreak of the Third Macedonian War. These, according to Philippus in his conversation with Perseus, no doubt informed him about what was going on.⁴³ There were people who had questionable loyalty. As discussed earlier, traders were excellent sources of rumour. Rome had had connections with the commercial empire of Rhodes since the late 4th century.⁴⁴ It was an acknowledged reality that information would move throughout the Mediterranean. It was difficult if not impossible to censor information completely. But it could be controlled. This is what Roman counterintelligence focused on. The more that was publically known, the more likely it was that this information might find its way throughout the Mediterranean. It was not just traders who held this power however, at times there were numerous groups in Rome who were neither Roman citizens nor members of an allied state.⁴⁵ When Livy has Philippus discuss the presence of Macedonian agents there is no sense of censure, or even the identification of these agents, just the acceptance and assumption that they were there. Securing the available verifiable information ensured that Roman plans and decisions were not prematurely exposed. The conscious decision to announce some information reveals the level of thought that went into this protection. At a basic level, everything is simply denied, creating a void of viable information and leaving room for rumours to grow. The next level is to pick and choose what the public has access to and what you allow to spread. Choosing to reveal certain information becomes deception rather than just denial. It opens the possibility of disinformation and psychological manipulation. Both of which suggest a conscious awareness of the potential reactions to information and the manner in which this information will disseminate. Without this knowledge the choice to announce certain diplomatic events and restrict knowledge of others is difficult to explain.⁴⁶

The presence of spies in embassies, and embassies in general being accused of being spies is relatively common in historical narrative.⁴⁷ Whether the incidences reported in ancient sources occurred or not is not easy to establish. But the stories serve to illustrate the close connection between diplomacy and intelligence in antiquity.⁴⁸ Importantly, the use of diplomats to gather intelligence is not judged. Livy has no moral condemnation of the envoys that came to see Lucius Aemilius in Liguria, ostensibly for diplomacy but in truth to gather information (Livy 40.25.2).⁴⁹ The existence of intelligence officers in embassies and diplomatic missions in modern appointments is a politely ignored open secret. In recent years there have been growing reports, and public acknowledgement, of embassies either housing spies or serving as the base for intelligence operations, wittingly or not.⁵⁰ Reportedly, one third of members of the Russian embassy in Stockholm are intelligence officers posing as diplomats and officials – a number that remains constant.⁵¹ It is often claimed that the legitimate diplomatic officials are unaware of the presence of intelligence agents, whether this is true or not is questionable. But the statement allows for the maintenance of plausible deniability – something of utmost importance for clandestine diplomacy and covert action. It is important to note for studies of intelligence that it is only with the development of permanent services that a distinct separation between the realms of diplomacy and intelligence activities has developed. Prior to the mid-nineteenth century diplomats served dual purposes, as both what modern interpretations would deem diplomats and intelligence officials. Diplomacy and intelligence in antiquity were more closely than modern governmental departments. Before the separation of the two fields of international interaction, diplomats were part of their intelligence process; they gathered their own secret agents as part of their information gathering and acted in an overt and covert capacity.⁵² The most problematic issue with relating intelligence and diplomatic action is the prevalent idea that intelligence is covert and involves secrecy. Secrecy while an important factor in some intelligence activity is not defining attribute of intelligence.⁵³

If it were not the ambassadors themselves who were gathering information, it would be their attendants. The anonymous Byzantine military handbook, Peri Strategikes¸ issues advice on how to deal with these incognito, but privately acknowledged agents. Envoys themselves should be treated with dignity and respect, but their attendants must be kept under surveillance to stop them gathering information by talking to locals. The author goes on to discuss the relative importance of this surveillance depending on who the people are and where they are from. Those from far away, are less of a risk and can be exposed to more, those from powerful and close nations cannot be allowed to see the true extent of resources or the realities of the nation.⁵⁴ This attitude reveals many things about Byzantine world knowledge. To know whom to hide things from and whom it was safe to reveal information to requires an understanding of their position and capabilities. It implies that Byzantine sources had what they conceived to be up to date and accurate information about visiting peoples. It also implies a perceived knowledge of how one people will react to certain revelations, that is their susceptibility to psychological manipulation. While this attitude is most explicitly expressed in Byzantine documentation, it was shared by earlier Republican sources. There are accusations of espionage levelled against diplomats, both Roman and foreign.⁵⁵ These accusations, while the moralistic tendencies of authors may deny them on Rome’s behalf, are valid.

Acknowledging the presence of agents and spies, the senate of Rome consciously chose what information to announce to the public and what to withhold.⁵⁶ The choice to publically proclaim that the Roman state would not help anyone who wished to depart from the Achaean league rather than privately report this to envoys is political manipulation. It reveals the depth of understanding that the senate had about the power of perception. By publically pronouncing this, the knowledge would find its way throughout the Mediterranean world. It would legitimise the Achaean league, and give power to pro-Roman groups, by making the Roman position very clear. Public pronouncements were not the only option. The decision to declare Africa a provincia was not announced despite senatorial discussion over attempting to move the Second Punic War out of Italy. According to Livy this was done for the explicit purpose of ensuring that any potential Carthaginian spies could not discover Roman plans before they were ready.⁵⁷ A similar concealment of plans happened prior to the outbreak of the Third Macedonian War. Eumenes came to the senate and provided intelligence about what Perseus was planning. The senate refused to issue any kind of proclamation about what went on in the curia. Instead all that the people knew was that Eumenes was in Rome and had met with the Senate. It was only when the war was over that any knowledge of Eumenes’ statements, and the Senate’s subsequent reply, were leaked.⁵⁸ According to Appian, the Senate had decided that war with Perseus was necessary after gaining intelligence about the state of affairs in Macedonia, but used Eumenes’ statements as justification. This decision was kept secret.⁵⁹ The news of Eumenes’ presence of Rome leaked to various Greek and Asian states, most of whom allegedly sent envoys. According to Livy these envoys were sent for a variety of reasons, but primarily as spies.⁶⁰ They knew that Eumenes’ presence meant something, but did not have enough access to determine what it was – for Rome to declare no information is itself suspicious. To truly maintain secrecy, Rome should have announced something innocuous, though plausible to explain his presence. The choice to maintain secrecy ensures that while Perseus and other states may have been suspicious of Roman plans, they had no way to confirm their information. By publically announcing certain plans and to conceal others is an acknowledgement of the presence of informers in their midst. There is no reason to pick and choose between secrecy and openness if you are not intent upon concealing facts. It suggests that the Republican senate was well aware of how information would be transmitted from its borders, and was an active measure to maintain power in the international sphere.⁶¹

In times of war and degraded relations with external states, these inhabitants posed a major risk to Roman plans and Roman security. There is some indication that the state was aware of how many foreigners were within its bounds. Whether they were registered or not, as Aeneas Tacticus suggested, is difficult to determine.⁶² Nonetheless, with the breakdown of diplomatic relations between Rome and hostile states the senate ordered the removal of these non-citizen groups. Part of the banishment of foreigners, especially the members of embassies, was an indication that Rome was no interested in discussing terms or reinitiating diplomatic relations. After the battle of Cannae for instance, Hannibal sent ten Rome cavalrymen as spokesmen along with Carthalo to offer terms. Carthalo was met by a lictor, who in the name of the dictator told him to leave Roman territory before nightfall.⁶³ In the case of more formal embassies sent to Rome to legitimately discuss affairs, their banishment from the city of Rome, and then Italy was general was a reflection of the breakdown of discussion but also of the need to protect and limit the access to information. If it were only indicative of a breakdown in discussion, the length of time available for the embassies to depart would likely have been constant and relatively relaxed. The reality of the situation however, is that the time given to depart depended on the circumstances and the perceived consequences of the breakdown in relations. The banishment stops the lobbying of senators but also the discussion of affairs with local inhabitants.⁶⁴ In 190, Aetolian embassies were told to leave Rome within the day and Italy within fifteen days.⁶⁵ They had refused to enter into a deditio arrangement, and to pay 1000 talents and become the socii of Rome, after asking what the terms of these arrangements would be and not receiving a coherent reply.⁶⁶ The Aetolians were given the same time frame to leave in 189. In this incident, they were escorted on their journey by Aulus Terentius Varro, ostensibly to provide them with protection.⁶⁷ That the Aetolians were told to never send embassies to Rome again without the support of a Roman governor and accompanied by a legate if they did not wish to be regarded as enemies highlights the change in attitude toward them.⁶⁸ Banishment implies that their escort was more than a form of protection. The Aetolians were no longer trusted to transport themselves to Rome. What they saw on their journey, what routes they took, and who they interacted with now required active monitoring.

Regarding Macedonia, the senate went further, or they had records of more Macedonian citizens resident in Rome. At the breakdown of negotiations and relations between Rome and Perseus, and the decision to declare the Third Macedonian War in 172, all Macedonian citizens and their envoys were to depart from Rome that day and Italy within 30.⁶⁹ Livy recounts the same tale with slight variations earlier in book 42. In his earlier version, as with the Aetolian envoys, the ambassadors are banished from Italy, and told in future to only present themselves to a Roman governor. They are given eleven days to remove themselves from Italy. And they are to be guarded until they board a ship.⁷⁰ In Appian’s version, the mandate for all Macedonian residents to remove themselves within the day caused consternation, as there was simply not enough time to gather belonging to animals or to travel far enough to find decent lodgings.⁷¹ If we take Appian’s narrative to be valid, the rush presented suggests a large contingent of Macedonian residents in Rome. Due to the rapid efforts to depart, it seems likely that these residents were known to authorities and feared reprisals if they did not obey. Considering the acknowledgement and awareness of spies in the city, it does seem likely that foreign contingents would be monitored. They posed the most obvious espionage threat, either inadvertently or with the intent to pass information. It is difficult to determine with accuracy whether immigrants tended to reside in similar areas, but there is a tendency in modern immigration to live around people who have similar native tongues and cultural values.⁷² If this was the case their presence would be easy to detect and monitor.

If this were a standard and blanket procedure it would not raise questions. But the banishment of groups is in stark contrast to how Rome treated allied embassies, more especially how they treated allied embassies that they felt they could impress and solidify the loyalty of.⁷³ When embassies from Saguntum came to Rome and were introduced by the Scipio to the senate in 205, the alliance between the people was ratified, and the actions taken by Roman forces in Spain given senatorial support. The envoys were awarded with Roman hospitality gifts of not less than 10,000 asses each.⁷⁴ This could be read as a bribe for continued loyalty and as a reward for furnishing Rome with information about Hannibal’s early actions in Spain before the war began. Polybius notes that they sent intelligence, because in part they feared for themselves but that they also wanted to ensure that Rome had intelligence about what was happening with the Carthaginians in Spain.⁷⁵ Equally so, there is the issue of guilt. Rome ignored Saguntine pleas for aid and only sent armies to Spain after the nine month on Saguntum was over.⁷⁶ Regardless, the Saguntine envoys asked permission to go on a tour of Italy.

Instead of being escorted out of regional boundaries, the embassy was guided around Italy. At the time, the Italian peninsula had suffered as a battle ground for a decade. What the Saguntine ambassadors desired to see is contentious. Nonetheless, the envoys were escorted by guides, and letters were sent to Italian towns with instructions to give the ambassadors a warm welcome.⁷⁷ These are the only attested letters regarding the movement of embassies in Italy. These escorts, as with those provided to ambassadors forced to depart, were presumably given instructions as to what to show the ambassadors and what to hide in order to display Rome as a powerful state. Coudry suggests that these escorts were purely for safety during a time of war.⁷⁸ While it is true that the Second Punic War was not yet over, and their safety was not guaranteed, it seems idealistic to think that the senate did not guide ambassadors away from certain areas and toward certain people, presumably to those with no hint of anti-Roman sentiment. The letters sent in advance could easily have included instructions as to what to reveal. Saguntine loyalty had to be maintained. They were a valuable source of information for what happened in the Iberian Peninsula, even if it were only to verify news from other sources. If they saw a disheartened population, with limited resources and destruction their faith that the Roman state could and would protect them would be challenged. We hear nothing more about the tour in extant sources. But this situation in conjunction with the later refusal to admit future ambassadors from Perseus and Aetolia support the notion of an attempt to create a certain perception from those who ventured through Italy. Sending ambassadors to Rome without first gaining permission and the escort from a commander or governor outside of Rome gave the ambassadorial party the opportunity to view Italian towns uninterrupted and outside of Roman control. By refusing to allow this the senate limited the availability of open source intelligence that could be gained by potentially hostile parties. The situation with the Saguntine envoys serves as a contrast and arguably a sign that the senate thought they had nothing to fear from Saguntum. Even if what they saw was controlled, allowing them to view Italy when still at war was a risk to security. Any information gleaned about anti-Roman sentiment or weakness could have been manipulated. There was never any indication however that the people of Saguntum were remotely a threat to Rome. Hence, they saw a Roman constructed view of what they wanted and upon their return undoubtedly informed others about the state of affairs.

As Coudry attests, the treatment of ambassadors and foreigners in Rome is a public declaration of how the senate was feeling toward whosoever had sent the embassy.⁷⁹ On the one hand, it is a manifestation of the perception of power. While not always a form of counterintelligence deception, the perception, and the projection of a powerful image is itself power. If external states believe you to be powerful, then you will be treated as if you are.⁸⁰ The Roman state banished or allowed people to remain and depart at their leisure depending on the perception of power of themselves and the relevant external party. These manipulations, grounded in reality or not, rely on an awareness of the lines of information transferral. If the state wanted to conceal information, as we know that they did they did on occasion, then a negative response could be given to the embassy, which would eventually return home and reveal what they knew. By publically banishing or rewarding the ambassadors Rome revealed their plans and position to the entire system. The different manners in which the senate banished embassies underlines the conscious manipulation of these channels. A general picture of disagreement and lack of appreciation can be formed through the removal of ambassadors. The length of time given to them to depart, while not necessarily actively monitored, reveals the depths of Roman antipathy. The faster they were expected to leave, removing the ability to travel leisurely, or with regular rest stops indicates how much the senate wished to cease all friendly relations. Ambassadors could not be harmed. But they were representatives of now hostile states. They needed to be removed. Extending this to removing foreign residents only expounds upon the very public image of adopted policy. To publically announce such policy, when it was not necessary, presents Rome as being in the position of power. It attempts to construct the image that the Roman state had nothing to fear from the external party; the senate did not care how soon they were apprised of the situation.

Denial of Foreign Embassies

Counterintelligence denial is supported by the contrast in treatment of ambassadors and embassies when they arrive at the city of Rome for whatever purpose. Those who were considered hostile were refused entry into the city itself. They were traditionally housed in the state villas.⁸¹ Allies on the other hand, were admitted to the city and treated as guests.⁸² Part of this can be construed as a power play – as mentioned above it places Rome in the superior position for negotiations. But they use their power to deny access to information. The gathering of intelligence was a major function of embassies in antiquity. To be cut off from information, effectively results in the failure of mission.⁸³ Hence, Rome’s denial bought them time to discover who the embassy contained and to determine if the embassy was legitimate. The protective practice denied foreign intelligence free reign in Rome. According to Livy, when Carthaginian ambassadors were sent to the city for peace negotiations, missives were sent to Rome, claiming that the embassy had been sighted at Puteoli.⁸⁴ The timing of the Carthaginian envoy was unfortunate. For earlier in 203, Saguntine envoys had arrived in Rome with Carthaginian prisoners allegedly in Spain to hire mercenaries.⁸⁵ After the sighting of Carthage’s ambassadors it was decided even before the embassy reached Rome that they would forbidden entrance to the city, and would instead be housed in a state villa.⁸⁶ This serves to protect the Roman state from potential spies within the group. Under the assumption that this envoy was present for peace negotiations, Gaius Laelius was recalled to Rome, and Scipio Africanus’ legate, Quintus Fulvius Gillo was sent to escort them. This embassy was determined to be in reality a group of spies; they were all young, strong men, who had little knowledge of previous negotiations or treaties with Rome. The senate deemed it a case of Punic duplicity, which is something of a sound interpretation. If Livy is correct, the embassy was asking for a renewal treaty terms, yet no one among them knew what the treaty terms were. In a diplomatic mission, for every member to be ignorant of what exactly it is they are trying to gain, is suspicious. Their presence served to vindicate the original Roman suspicion, and their policy of keeping foreigners outside the walls. Their counterintelligence had ensured that Carthaginian spies could not gain information about the political state of Rome. The situation, along with the presence of recruiters in Spain, seems to imply that Carthage was either wavering as to whether they should enter legitimate peace negotiations or not, and needed more information, or they were delaying in order to amass more troops.⁸⁷ Both Livy and Zonarus suggest the latter.⁸⁸ Livy denounces the act as religious violation and a disregard of the sanctity of diplomatic relation.⁸⁹ It was suggested that this embassy be escorted from Roman territory until they reached their ships, in a similar practice to the Aetolian and Macedonian envoys mentioned earlier.⁹⁰ According to Livy they were sent away without securing peace, and almost without an answer.⁹¹ The idea that ambassadors, especially Punic ones, would spy is not contradictory to Roman ethnographic conceptions. Frontinus is a short and relatively futile anecdote tells us that Carthaginian ambassadors were ordered to delay as much as possible in Rome in order to find out what they could about Roman plans.⁹² Keeping such ambassadors outside the city limits the potential for any such act. The idea that various foreign groups were duplicitous rationalises the decision to keep hostile foreigners out of the city.⁹³ There was a reasonable expectation that would engage in acts contrary to the espoused Roman morality.

In 201, Carthaginian ambassadors returned to Rome. They were again housed outside the city, and received an audience in the temple of Bellona.⁹⁴ The senate observed their ages and ranks and determined that they were a genuine embassy. The most conspicuous member was Hasdrubal Haedus, who was a known promotor of peace and opponent of the Barca faction.⁹⁵ Livy has Haedus place the blame for the war entirely on the Barcids, and praise the glory the Rome. It was only after this embassy and the ratification of peace that Carthaginians were granted leave to enter the city and to talk to any Carthaginian prisoners of war that were present.⁹⁶ There were some 200 names provided to the senate that the Carthaginian envoys wished to ransom. These were not all the prisoners. The existence of these people in the city of Rome, and the access to them serves as an example as to why foreigner dignitaries were not permitted into the city. Prisoners of war or not, the simple of act of residing in a city furnishes you with information that those kept beyond the walls do not know. Rumours, attitudes, decrees, and the general belief about the continuing state of war could have been gained by the fake embassies if they had allowed entrance.

Again it is the contrast in treatment that fully reveals Roman consideration. Allied states were not considered to be threats or in need of the information they might gain in Rome. Nonetheless, even allied or presumably friendly embassies were not allowed free reign in the city. They were housed as guests. The staff in these homes presumably monitoring their actions; they were escorted wherever they went by senatorial members. Receiving them is diplomatically important. All embassies had to state their intent before a magistrate. Depending on the ostensible reason for their visit, they were granted an audience before the senate or not.⁹⁷ Sometimes these goals changed from when the embassy set out. The Rhodian embassy that came to mediate the war between Perseus and Rome, quickly changed its mandate upon the end of war, and instead offered congratulations.⁹⁸ An embassy from Ptolemy came to do the same thing, but was advised Aemilius Lepidus not to announce this as their purpose for being in Rome, as it would be not be appreciated. Instead they renewed declarations of friendship.⁹⁹ One cannot expect to treat hostile and friendly forces in the same manner, if alliances were important. There has to be a distinction. If not the ability the appreciated advantage to an alliance is more difficult to detect. To maintain the perception of power, Rome needed to maintain the conception of alliances. If allies began to question the state of affairs, the Roman state lost their perception of power. The easiest way to reduce questioning is to have distinct treatment and create the illusion that the allied party is trusted. Extensive treatment of how ambassadors were received in Rome is not overly well attested in extant sources.¹⁰⁰ We can however, deduce that depending on the perceived threat level of those who sent the embassy and the alleged rationale for their presence, the senate determined whether they should be allowed into the city itself. For instance, Sicilians who had come to Rome to complain about their treatment by Marcellus, were evidently received into the city. The spent time visiting senators dressed in mourning after Marcellus’ imperium was prorogued.¹⁰¹ There is some indication that senatorial policy ensured even friends were monitored, be it under the guise of helpful guides. Their monitoring reveals the extent to which there was an awareness of the need to protect information. Masgaba, the son of Masinissa was met and escorted to Rome at public expense in 168;¹⁰² Prusias came to Rome in 167. He was allowed entrance, and was escorted by Lucius Cornelius Scipio.¹⁰³ The choice of who to admit and who to block based on the alleged purpose and the perceived threat levels does leave gaps for manipulation and deceit. Denial attempts had to counter the threat of manipulation and access to information with the importance of maintaining alliances. Guides serve as a convenient measure to monitor who visitors would visit and what they said, under the guise of friendship, which was potentially legitimate. As alliances and relationships in anarchic world systems are not static, intelligence is not only important in times of war; nor is it only important to hold intelligence about enemies. Knowledge about allies, enemies, and neutral parties has power. The senate acknowledged this.

Conclusion

The above survey of Roman political counterintelligence does not support the image of the bumbling naïve state that knew nothing of underhand action, perfidious thought, or the power of information. Instead, it suggests that there was a conscious acknowledgement of the dangers of information in the wrong hands. They may have lacked a service devoted to national security, but it does not follow that Republican senators did not understand the importance of it. The actions undertaken were much the same as political counterintelligence actions in the modern world. The primary defensive measure is to restrict public access to information and provide only as much as is necessary, acknowledging that those who held loyalties to other states and peoples, and that their own public could not be trusted with information. As argued above the Roman efforts to maintain control of the information available to the people, and to counter any subversive or dangerous information or activities that were released suggests that national security was considered an important factor of the Roman state.

In general, Roman counterintelligence focused on denying information rather than it focussed on stopping the introduction of hostile agents as long term spies, although these are poorly attested in ancient sources. Regardless, their potential and probable presence was acknowledged and accounted for. By acknowledging their existence, the state removes some of their power. The senate chose to deal with their presence by restricting information. The focus on denying information serves a two-fold purpose. It allowed Rome not to have to develop a service or official body of staff to patrol the city and monitor foreign groups and practices. Spies could exist in Rome, and their access to important political information would be restricted. Part of this reflects the Roman tendency to need to verify rumours before they were believed. The belief was transplanted onto any agents in their midst. Reports of rumours that reached Rome were dismissed until verifiable information was gathered by the senate. The assumption seems to have been that foreign peoples would do the same. Hence, the senate reduced the information available to the public to rumours. It was only in times of desperation, or in instances of despondency, or where the senate appeared to want people to find out what was going on that information was revealed.

The practice does not stop open source intelligence from leaving Rome through agents. However, open source intelligence is impossible to control. In antiquity to control it would require the refusal to admit traders, travellers, or allies. In part, Rome’s pattern of alliances and the maintenance of these ensured that access to open source intelligence was necessary. By allowing allied states and traders entrance to the city, but controlling what they saw and what information they could here, Rome ensured that the information that was inevitably going to travel abroad was such that supported their agenda as much as possible. The same is true of allowing spies to continue to exist in the city if they were identified.¹⁰⁴ By controlling the flow of information, the information that could and would be transported back to other lands is manipulated. As in military counterintelligence, disinformation and dissimulation are extremely powerful. People act on perception. If the senate could control the perception of others, they could influence their position in the international arena.

The attempts to control this perception and the verified information that external peoples could receive was why the denial of information was not the sole counterintelligence measure. Instead, diplomatic envoys were allowed or denied entrance based on what their intention was, what the senate perceived their intention to be, how much of a threat or an asset the sender of the embassy was. Part of this was a power play. But it was also in the best interests of Rome to restrict any official information accessible to other states, especially if the Roman state had yet to determine what it intended to do, or what it was in a position to do. The detainment of envoys outside the city walls or in the Curia, and refusing to grant answers delays information that can be transmitted until Rome was in a better position for information to be released. What is telling about Roman methods is that there was no one blanket policy applied neither to diplomatic procedures nor to the release of information. Rather, information was recognised as powerful. Its role in creating perceptions of future actions and relationships with the Roman state was recognised. Hence, the senate allowed entrance into the city for some, and not others. And they chose to reveal information publically on occasion or hide it as it was deemed necessary in an attempt to protect the power they held, and to influence their power in the international system. This mentality of attempting to control or at least access the flow of information extended to Roman efforts to gain information about what they thought were important affairs.

Appendix

Endnotes

1. What constitutes counterintelligence activity is difficult to resolutely define. There is no theory behind counterintelligence, nor is there a uniformly accepted definition. According to Lowenthal there are at least three types of counter intelligence: collection, that is undertakings to gain information about others intelligence capabilities that may be turned against you; defensive counterintelligence comprises of actions taken to thwart hostile intelligence; and finally offensive counterintelligence, actions taken once hostile espionage or intelligence has been identified aimed at either misleading or manipulating their loyalty and the information they can report. (LOWENTHAL 2006 145-7).
2. (SHELDON 1987 viii). See also (DVORNIK 19740); (AUSTIN/RANKOV 1995); (FOURNIE 2004); (SHELDON 2005).
3. Hannibal advised Antiochus to take his troops to Greece, and encamp them somewhere that inferred he would soon cross to Italy. This would serve to create the impression he intended to cross and consequently spread rumours of his intent to do so (Regem cum ceteris omnibus transire in Europam debere et in aliqua parte Graeciae copias continere neque traicientem et, quod in speciem famamque belli satis sit, paratum traicere: LIVY 34.60.6.
4. All dates in this paper are BCE unless otherwise indicated.
5. Seniores negare ad rumores a privatis temere in gratiam magistratuum confictos senatus consulta facienda esse; nisi quod aut praetores ex provinciis scriberent aut legati renuntiarent, nihil ratum haberi debere; si tumultus in Hispania esset, placere tumultuarios milites extra Italiam scribi a praetore. Mens ea senatus fuit ut in Hispania tumultuarii milites legerentur: LIVY 35.2.6-7.
6. POLYB. 11.3.4-6.
7. LIVY 27.50.4-11. The recognition of the power of rumour does not mean that the Roman state was never manipulated by it for any length of time, or that they had the power to verify it. There is a limit to the strength of most to hold out against rumour, especially if it is loudly and commonly proclaimed. The longer it takes for contrary evidence to arrive, the more rumours become facts. In light of this, some rumours were taken as true until proven otherwise. As such, they were investigated. See for instance, LIVY 29.21, 37.48; ZON. 9.19.
8. For other instances see for example, LIVY 33.24, 37.51.
9. LIVY 27.51.1-10.
10. Cf. LIVY 36.12.
11. LIVY 27.49.9.
12. In a speech before the senate Eumenes begs the senate to listen to his pleas, because he is not spouting rumours of doubtful veracity (LIVY 42.13). The need to proclaim this suggests that while Rome relied on intelligence from allies, they did not usually take the information received from one or another as truth without question.
13. Politicisation of information occurs when analysis of events is deliberately or inadvertedly skewed to present support a certain ideology or policy. See (JOHNSON/WIRTZ 2008: 189-231).
14. POLYB. 3.75. 15 LIVY 27.5.
15. Quintus Fabius Maximus is thought to be Servilianus, who became consul in 142.
16. numquam enim taciturnitatem, optimum ac tutissimum administrandarum rerum vinculum, labefactari volebant: VAL. MAX. 2.2.1A.
17. Cf. OROS. 4.5.3.
18. οὔτ᾿ οὖν φέρειν σφᾶς οἱ ἀρχαῖοι πολῖται οὔτε καθ᾿ ἑαυτοὺς δεδυνημένοι ἀμύνασθαι, λάθρᾳ πρέσβεις εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ἀπέστειλαν.
19. ZON. 8.7.
20. As we shall see the control of information does not necessarily mean that senatorial meetings were kept secret, but that the senate consciously chose what information was revealed and what was hidden. Cf. (HARRIS 1979) Additional Note 1, 255.
21. POLYB. 28.6, 32.3.14-17. RE STRATIOS (SUPPL. 11), 1257-1258 (J. DEININGER).
22. POLYB. 38.12.1-2.
23. POLYB. 38.12-13.
24. In aede Aesculapi clandestinum eos per aliquot noctes consilium principum habuisse, unde nihil emanasse praeterquam legatos occultis cum mandatis Romam mitti : LIVY 42.24.3. Cf. LIVY 41.22.2 for another secret Carthaginian meeting. One of the accusations levelled against Perseus in 172 was that he had been having secret meetings at Samothrace with various Asian delegations. The accusation seems petulant. The image constructed is that Rome was upset because they could not access what went on in his secret meetings. They lacked a reputable spy in the cohorts that met Perseus, and his counterintelligence in ensuring this had defeated them (Samothracae praeterea per multos dies occultum consilium cum legationibus civitatium Asiae regem habuisse: LIVY 42.25.6).
25. LIVY 42.24.4.
26. …τηλικαύτην συνέβη γενέσθαι διατροπὴν ὥστε τοῖς παραγενομένοις ἐφ᾿ ἑκατέρων τῶν καιρῶν πολλῷ μεῖζον τότε φανῆναι τὸ γεγονὸς ἢ παρ᾿ αὐτὸν τὸν τῆς μάχης καιρόν: POLYB. 3.85.8.
27. πολλῶν γὰρ χρόνων ἄπειροι καὶ τοῦ ῥήματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος ὑπάρχοντες τῆς ὁμολογουμένης ἥττης οὐ μετρίως οὐδὲ κατὰ σχῆμα τὴν περιπέτειαν ἔφερον: POLYB. 3.85.9.
28. POLYB. 3.68.9.
29. POLYB. 3.75.1-4.
30. LIVY 39.8-19. See also for example the public announcement of news from Liguria in 186: LIVY 39.20-21 The account of the battle of Cannae (APP. Han. 29).
31. The Bacchanalian conspiracy has been well studied. See for example (TIERNEY 1945); (BAUMAN 1990); (TAKÁCS 2000); (NOUSEK 2010); (PAGÁN 2013: 50-67).
32. (GRUEN 1990: 75-8).
33. equidem nec quid taceam nec quatenus proloquar invenio. Si aliquid ignorabitis, ne locum neglegentiae dem, si omnia nudavero, ne nimium terroris offundam vobis vereor: LIVY 39.15.4-5.
34. According to the fragments of Hemina, it was Gnaeus Terentius who discovered the books. He was too a scribe and a land owner on the Janiculum (FR. 37P). The content of these books is disputed by sources. Livy, following presumable
35. Claudius Quadrigus, claims there were seven pontifical law books in Latin and seven in Greek philosophy (40.29.7-8); Antias claims there were twelve of each – the Greek containing Pythagorean philosophy, as does Piso (PLIN. NH. 13.84-8).
36. LIVY 40.29.
37. AEN. TAC. 11.1.
38. For more on the role of rumours in the late Republic and their spread see (PINA POLO 2010); (RIPAT 2012).
39. CIC. Ad Fam. 8.1.
40. JUST. 17.2.13-14.
41. APP. SIC. 1; JUST. 18.2.9; EUTROP. 2.15.
42. LIVY 22.33.1; ZON. 9.1.
43. …certum habeo et scripta tibi omnia ab Roma esse et legatos renuntiasse tuos: LIVY 42.40.9.
44. POLYB. 30.5.
45. Aeneas Tacticus suggests that all foreigners should be kept inside during military exercises, and they should all be registered and disarmed. Further who may talk to embassies was restricted. All embassies were to be escorted at all times by trusted individuals (10.9-13).
46. For a discussion about the standard practice of diplomatic reports and information conveyance see (FERRARY 2007); (FERRARY 2009).
47. See for example APP. Illyr. 9, Syr. 6; LIVY 42.46; POLYB. 28.1-2.
48. The Roman use of diplomatic to embassies to investigate and gather information themselves will be examined in the following chapter.
49. …legati ad eum per speciem pacis petendae speculatum venerunt.
50. (AFP 2013); (JABOUR 2013).
51. (AFP 2015).
52. (HERMAN 1998: 2).
53. Intelligence is defined here as the gathering and analysis of any information, be it military, political, economic, or cultural, that aids one nation or group in understanding another, for the purposes of facilitating decision-making, both politically and in military situations.
54. Πρέσβεις ἢ παρ’ἡμῶν ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποστέλλονται. ἐὰν μὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποστέλλωνται, χρὴ φιλοτίμως τε καὶ δαψιλῶς τούτους ὑποδέχεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ τιμῶσι πάντες αὐτούς. Τοὺς δὲ ὑπηρετουμένους αὐτοῖς δι’ἀσφαλείας ἔχειν εἰς τὸ μηδενί το διδάσκειν ἐπερωτωμένους αὐτούς. Κἂν μὲν τῶν λίαν ἀφεστηκότων οἱ πρέσβεις εἶεν ὥστε μεταξὺ ἐκείνων τε καὶ ἡμῶν εἶναί τινα τῶν ἐθνῶν, ἐμφανιζειν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἡμετέρων ὁπόσα καὶ οἷα βουλόμεθα, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ πλησιόχωροι μὲν ἡμῶν καθεστήκεσαν, ἐνδεῶς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν ἔχουσι δύναμιν. Εἰ δὲ κατὰ πολὺ ἡμῶν διενηνόχασιν εἴτε πλήθει στρατοῦ εἴτε ἀνδρείᾳ, χρὴ μήτε πλοὺτον μήτε γυναικῶν κάλλη ἐμφανίζειν αὐτοῖς, πλήθη δὲ ἀνδρῶν καὶ ὅπλων εὐκοσμίαν καὶ τειχῶν ὑψώματα (PERI STRAT. 43.1-10).
55. See for example APP. PUN. 69, ILL. 9; DIOD. SIC. 33.28; LIVY 33.24, 40.25,42.25, 42.26.
56. POLYB. 23.9.14.
57. Quamquam nondum aperte Africa provincia decreta erat, occultantibus id, credo, patribus, ne praesciscerent Carthaginienses, tamen in eam spem erecta civitas erat in Africa eo anno bellatum iri finemque bello Punico adesse: LIVY 29.14.1.
58. LIVY 42.14 cf. VAL. MAX. 2.2.1b.
59. APP. MAC. 11.1-4.
60. LIVY 42.14.5.
61. For other examples of senatorial secrecy see APP. Pun. 69; GELL. 1.23; PLUT. Mor. 507B-F.
62. AEN. TAC. 10.8-12.
63. LIVY 22.58.9. For the banishment of other ambassadors see for example APP. Han. 31; POLYB. 31.20.3, 33.11.5.
64. As we shall see, the distinction between allowing friendly ambassadors into the city, and keeping enemies outside restricted the ability of hostiles to mingle and discuss cases with politicians and the people.
65. LIVY 37.1.6.
66. LIVY 37.1.5. In 189, the Aetolians had encountered difficulties with Rome regarding the different social interpretations of diplomatic agreements: LIVY 36.27-29; POLYB. 20.9-10. SEE (GRUEN 1982); (ECKSTEIN 1995); (BURTON 2009); (ECKSTEIN 2009).
67. LIVY 37.49.8.
68. LIVY 37.49.8. Carthage too was forbidden to send embassies to Rome after the official declaration of the Third Punic War. The decree led to lamentation and riots (APP. Pun. 83-92).
69. POLYB. 27.6; LIVY 42.48; DIOD. SIC. 30.1; APP. MAC. 11.9.
70. LIVY 42.36.7.
71. APP. Mac. 11.9.
72. For modern immigration studies see for instance (ALBA 1999); (MYLES/ HOU 2004); (IBRAIMOVIC/MASIERO 2013). Aeneas Tacticus suggests the presence of passports and visas at 10.9, something supported by Aristophanes’ Birds vv. 1212-15. There is little evidence to conclusively argue about the identification of foreigners in antiquity however. For more information see (MOATTI 2004); (MOATTI 2006); (BAUZON 2007); (MOATTI/KAISER 2007); (DEPAUW/COUSSEMENT 2014).
73. In 167, Prusias came to Rome. He was not only allowed entrance into the city, but allowed to tour it under escort as well. Prusias explicitly wanted to visit the temples, the city itself, his friends and his guest friends (LIVY 45.44.7). It is a sign of trust that the senate allowed him to do this even under escort. Visiting his friends provided an opportunity to discuss his politics and thoughts about current events. While some may read the providing of an escort as a sign of honour, it is likely that it had another role. Escorts guide and judge what a visitor may see, how long he can examine things for, and how long he may remain with his friends. It provides ample opportunity for both psychological manipulation, and the opportunity to learn his beliefs, opinions, and goals.
74. LIVY 28.39. Gifts were customary but the gift of 10,000 asses is unusual in comparison to the amounts given to later embassies. 5,000 asses: LIVY 30.17.14, 31.9.5. 4,000 asses: LIVY 37.3.11. 2,000 asses: 42.19.6, 43.5.8, 43.6.10, 43.6.14, 43.8.8, 44.14.4, 44.15.8, 45.42.11.
75. Οἱ δὲ Ζακανθαῖοι συνεχῶς ἔπεμπον εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, ἅμα μὲν ἀγωνιῶντες περὶ σφῶν καὶ προορώμενοι τὸ μέλλον, ἅμα δὲ βουλόμενοι μὴ λανθάνειν Ῥωμαίους τὴν γινομένην εὔροιαν Καρχηδονίοις τῶν κατ᾿ Ἰβηρίαν πραγμάτων: POLYB. 3.15.1.
76. POLYB. 3.20.6. Polybius tries to deny the Roman delay, and to deny that there was any debate in Rome as to whether or not they ought to help the Saguntine people. His attempts to detract from Roman irresponsibility are admirable, but it is difficult to reconcile his attitude that the senate was always going to send aid with their lengthy delay and the general lack of attention given to Saguntine messages. Cf. APP. Hisp. 11-12; LIVY 21.6-21.
77. LIVY 28.39.
78. (BONNEFOND-COUDRY 2004: 547).
79. (BONNEFOND-COUDRY 2004).
80. For modern studies regarding power perception see for instance (BACHARACH/LAWLER 1976); (ROUHANA/FISKE 1995).
81. For other examples see DIO. FR. 79.1; LIVY 29.17-19, 33.24.5, Per. 46, cf. FESTUS 470L.
82. Cf. APP. IB. 49 – Τῶν δὲ πρέσβεων οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς φιλίας ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἐσελθόντες ἐξενίζοντο, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῶν πολεμίων, ὡς ἔθος ἐστίν, ἔξω τειχῶν ἐστάθμευον.
83. Cf. APP. Pun. 69; POLYB. 28.1.7; DIOD. SIC. 33.28A.1-3; DIO. 36.45.4-8. See (BRENNAN 2009: 179-82).
84. LIVY 30.21.12. The use of allied cities and states was a fundamental part of Roman political intelligence gathering. (AUSTIN/RANKOV 1995: 89-94); (SHELDON 2005: 68-71); (BRENNAN 2009).
85. LIVY 30.20.3-5.
86. Remaining outside the walls in this context, essentially corresponds with the Campus Martius. (BONNEFOND-COUDRY 2004: 531).
87. We know that one of Carthage’s agents in Rome had been captured in 217 (LIVY 22.33). They did presumably have more, but their information may not have been enough to determine whether peace was in the Carthaginian state’s best interest at this point. If Carthage followed the same procedure as Rome, then information from agents was but a starting point of intelligence gathering – trusted members were required to verify the information and interpret it from a Carthaginian perspective. Livy here is probably applying Roman methods to Carthage, as those are what he knew.
88. LIVY 30.23.6-8; ZON. 9.13.
89. Livy’s disdain for the action is ironic considering the same delaying tactic was used by Marcius Philippus with Perseus in 172 (42.38-43). The argument could be made that in the case of Philippus, Macedonia and Rome were not yet in a state of active war. Further, Livy does present certain senators as disliking the action. Regardless, it serves as contrast of Livy, and an example of the growing degeneration of morality.
90. LIVY 30.23.5.
91. Livy’s version of this embassy contradicts Polybius, who claims that the treaty was verified. The reality of the situation is not important here, rather the recognition of intelligence under the guise of diplomacy. Livy’s account presents the senate as being particularly offended by the act of spies. This is a reflection of his moral stance that does not reconcile with other episodes. Zonarus and Cassius Dio both record an attempt by embassies to be seen in Rome. The embassy was refused consultation because of the apparently Roman tradition to not receive envoys while an army was in Italy: DIO. FR. 77.74; ZON. 9.13.
92. Idem Carthaginienses miserunt, qui per speciem legatorum longo tempore Romae morarentur exciperentque consilia nostrorum: FRON. Stra. 1.2.4.
93. LIVY 30.42.11-13. There are occasions were non-friendly forces were allowed inside the city walls, with access to senatorial houses. The Rhodian envoy presented itself in 167, but was denied hospitality and a meeting with the senate, as it had not gained the right to be considered either a friend or an ally with Rome. In consequence, they began to beseech senators in their homes (LIVY 45.20).
94. The mentality of refusal admittance to foreign envoys extended symbolically at to military camps. Carthaginian envoys who came to visit the Roman camp at Utica in the initial stages of the Third Punic War found their access blocked by a rope (APP. Pun. 78).
95. For all his supposed long opposition to war, this is the first time Livy mentions Hasdrubal Haedus. Appian has him escorting Scipio’s envoys to Carthage in 202 (Pun. 34), then leading ambassadors to Scipio following the battle of Zama (Pun. 49-54). Haedus is presented as blaming the Barca faction for the entire war.
96. LIVY 30.43.3-5.
97. (FERRARY 2009: 123).
98. POLYB. 29.19.
99. POLYB. 28.1.
100. Various secondary sources have composed lists of embassies visiting Rome. That numerous embassies were sent and received by the senate in the Republican period is not contentious. How they received them is somewhat more ambiguous. See for example (BONNEFOND-COUDRY 1989: 291-310); (CANALI DE ROSSI 1997); (CANALI DE ROSSI 2004); (AULIARD 2006).
101. LIVY 26.26-32.
102. LIVY 43.13.
103. LIVY 45.44
104. There is no indication that the senate identified and allowed the presence of spies in the city so much as acknowledged their inevitable presence.

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Originally published by the Journal of Ancient History and Archaeology 2:3 (2015, 5-16) under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.