The Rise and Growth of U.S. Global Economic Dominance since the 19th Century

**1864, Pennsylvania oil drilling early in the history of the petroleum industry in the United States. / Courtesy Wikimedia Commons**

The future of American economic influence will depend on its ability to adapt its policies to a multipolar world.

By Matthew A. McIntosh
Public Historian
Brewminate

Introduction

The foundation of the United States’ economic dominance in the Industrial and Gilded Ages lay primarily in its rapid industrialization, which began in earnest after the Civil War. This period witnessed the transformation of the U.S. from a largely agrarian society into the world’s leading industrial power by the turn of the twentieth century. Key to this transformation was the abundant availability of natural resources, including coal, iron, timber, and oil, which provided the raw materials essential for industrial growth. Railroads played a particularly pivotal role, not only facilitating the transportation of these resources but also stimulating other industries such as steel and finance. By 1900, the United States had more railroad track than all of Europe combined, an infrastructure that connected raw materials, manufacturing centers, and markets with unprecedented efficiency.¹ As historian Robert Gordon notes, the “Second Industrial Revolution” saw the emergence of major innovations in electricity, chemicals, and machinery that spurred productivity and economic expansion on a massive scale.²

Another cornerstone of American economic ascent during this period was its embrace of laissez-faire capitalism and the rise of powerful corporate enterprises. With minimal government regulation, entrepreneurs were free to expand operations, consolidate businesses, and suppress labor unrest with little state interference. This environment led to the emergence of industrial giants such as Andrew Carnegie in steel, John D. Rockefeller in oil, and J.P. Morgan in finance—individuals whose companies dominated their respective sectors and amassed enormous wealth and influence. These magnates practiced vertical and horizontal integration to eliminate competition and control entire supply chains.³ The resulting monopolies and trusts not only consolidated market power but also laid the groundwork for unprecedented capital accumulation and reinvestment, reinforcing the U.S.’s growing economic might. As economic historian Naomi Lamoreaux argues, the corporate form in America became a central tool for organizing large-scale enterprise, allowing for the mobilization of capital on a scale hitherto unimaginable.⁴

Labor, both native-born and immigrant, was indispensable to the expansion of American industry. The late nineteenth century saw a massive influx of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe who provided the cheap, abundant labor force necessary for rapid industrial growth. These workers were employed in often dangerous and exploitative conditions, with long hours and minimal pay, yet their contribution was vital to sustaining production and profits. Labor unrest and union activity—evidenced in strikes like the Great Railroad Strike of 1877 and the Homestead Strike of 1892—highlighted the tensions between capital and labor but also reflected the increasing organization of the working class.⁵ Despite resistance, labor movements made incremental gains that would lay the foundation for later reforms. The American Federation of Labor (AFL), under Samuel Gompers, focused on skilled labor and collective bargaining, setting a precedent for labor-management relations in the 20th century.⁶ The exploitation and eventual mobilization of labor were thus essential components of the industrial economy.

In tandem with industrial expansion, financial institutions and practices evolved to support the new economic order. New York emerged as a global financial center, with Wall Street becoming the hub of capital markets. Banking institutions like J.P. Morgan & Co. financed industrial consolidation and infrastructure development, facilitating mergers and stabilizing markets. The expansion of credit and the creation of investment instruments allowed for the mobilization of large pools of capital essential for industrial enterprise. Furthermore, the gold standard, adopted in 1879, tied the U.S. dollar to a stable commodity, increasing international confidence in American currency and trade.⁷ Economic thinkers such as Thorstein Veblen critiqued this system for fostering what he termed “conspicuous consumption” among the elite, but it nonetheless contributed to a financial architecture that undergirded American economic supremacy.⁸ By the dawn of the 20th century, the U.S. had not only caught up to but in many respects surpassed European powers in industrial output, export volume, and financial clout.

The Gilded Age, a term coined by Mark Twain, encapsulates the paradoxes of this era of economic dominance—extraordinary wealth paired with deep social inequality. Despite the growth of industry and capital, wealth was concentrated in the hands of a few, while many Americans lived in poverty. Urbanization intensified the challenges of housing, sanitation, and labor exploitation, prompting reform movements and political backlash. The Populist and Progressive movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries arose in part as reactions to the perceived excesses of industrial capitalism and the inequalities it produced. Nevertheless, the technological advancements, entrepreneurial dynamism, and structural innovations of this era laid the groundwork for American economic leadership in the 20th century and beyond. The U.S. would enter the new century not only as an industrial giant but also as an emerging geopolitical power, its economic foundations rooted in the transformations of the Industrial and Gilded Ages.⁹

World Wars and the Transition to Global Leadership

**The Arsenal of Democracy exhibit. / Photo by Michael Barera, Michigan History Museum, Wikimedia Commons**

The World Wars catalyzed the transition of the United States into a dominant global economic power. Prior to World War I, the U.S. was already an industrial and agricultural giant, but its role was largely inward-looking. The outbreak of war in 1914 enabled the U.S. to become the “arsenal of democracy” before the phrase was even coined, supplying the Allies with weapons, raw materials, and food in exchange for massive financial commitments. By 1917, American banks had lent over $2 billion to Allied powers.¹⁰ This not only tied the U.S. financially to European victory but also positioned it as a creditor nation—a status shift from its pre-war debtor status. The war effort stimulated American manufacturing, while the destruction of European economies created a relative economic vacuum the U.S. began to fill. As Adam Tooze notes, the war “ended the European epoch,” elevating the United States into a new league of global financial influence.¹¹

The interwar period, despite the Great Depression, was marked by America’s continued economic centrality. The Dawes Plan (1924) and later the Young Plan (1929) facilitated the restructuring of German reparations through American loans, demonstrating the pivotal role of U.S. capital in maintaining European economic stability.¹² Wall Street essentially became the financial engine of global recovery, though the 1929 stock market crash reverberated worldwide. The depression momentarily tempered U.S. ambitions, but the economic infrastructure remained fundamentally intact. Protectionist policies such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff worsened the global downturn, but the long-term trend of U.S. economic ascendance remained unbroken.¹³ Furthermore, innovations in mass production, consumer culture, and technological advancement during the 1920s laid an industrial foundation that would support American wartime mobilization a decade later.

World War II definitively transformed the United States into the preeminent global economic superpower. While much of Europe and Asia lay in ruins, the American homeland was untouched by the destruction of war. U.S. industrial output surged, with factories retooled to produce weapons, vehicles, and supplies at an unprecedented scale. By 1945, the United States was producing nearly half of the world’s industrial goods and controlling roughly two-thirds of global gold reserves.¹⁴ The Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 institutionalized American economic dominance through the creation of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, both headquartered in Washington, D.C., and designed largely according to U.S. policy preferences.¹⁵ The U.S. dollar, pegged to gold, became the linchpin of international trade, formalizing a new world economic order that revolved around American financial hegemony.

In the immediate postwar period, U.S. economic leadership was solidified through the Marshall Plan, which injected over $13 billion into the reconstruction of Western Europe. This not only helped stabilize European economies but also secured export markets for American goods and staved off the spread of communism.¹⁶ Simultaneously, American multinational corporations began to expand overseas, bringing with them technological expertise, managerial systems, and consumer culture. The Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union further entrenched America’s global economic position, as military spending on both conventional arms and nuclear capabilities ensured ongoing industrial demand. Defense contractors like Lockheed, General Dynamics, and Boeing became central to the American economy, giving rise to what President Eisenhower later termed the “military-industrial complex.”¹⁷ Economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s was fueled by both domestic prosperity and the extension of American financial and commercial influence around the globe.

By the 1960s, the United States had constructed a network of international institutions, military alliances, and trade relationships that confirmed its status as the nucleus of the global capitalist system. Its corporations, banks, and technologies penetrated markets across Latin America, Europe, and Asia. American economic leadership was not merely about production or finance, but about setting the rules of the game—through regulatory standards, patent law, development aid, and cultural exports. The shift to a post-industrial economy in the late 20th century would alter the structure of American dominance, but its foundation was laid during the half-century bracketed by the World Wars.¹⁸ The Pax Americana, underwritten by unmatched economic and military strength, was the outcome of both deliberate policy and historical contingency—a convergence of domestic capability and global devastation from which the United States emerged ascendant.

Cold War Capitalism and Global Markets

Mr. Dana Wilgress, a senior Canadian diplomat, signing the Final Act of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade. The following year, he was elected the first Chairman of the GATT Contracting Parties. / Courtesy World Trade Organization, Public Domain

The Cold War was not only a geopolitical and ideological struggle but also a contest of economic systems in which the United States positioned itself as the leader of global capitalism. In contrast to the centrally planned economies of the Soviet bloc, the United States promoted free-market principles, private enterprise, and liberal trade as foundational to peace and prosperity. Institutions created in the aftermath of World War II—such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and later the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—were all undergirded by American financial and ideological influence.¹⁹ These institutions were instrumental in shaping a world economy conducive to U.S. interests by stabilizing currencies, facilitating reconstruction loans, and encouraging open markets. The U.S. not only had the largest and most productive economy during this period, but it also shaped the rules and norms of international commerce in ways that reinforced its economic hegemony.²⁰

Central to Cold War capitalism was the use of economic aid and investment as instruments of geopolitical strategy. The Marshall Plan had already established a precedent for using economic reconstruction to foster political alignment with the West. During the Cold War, the United States extended this approach globally, particularly in Latin America, Asia, and parts of Africa. Programs such as the Alliance for Progress and foreign direct investments from American corporations were intended to counteract Soviet influence by promoting capitalist development models.²¹ At the same time, U.S.-based multinational corporations expanded their global footprint, exporting not only goods but also managerial practices and cultural values. This outward expansion of capital, facilitated by American banking institutions and protected by diplomatic and military leverage, embedded U.S. economic power in the global periphery.²² While this approach fostered growth in some regions, it also led to accusations of neocolonialism and dependency, as many developing countries found themselves economically tethered to U.S. interests.

The role of the U.S. dollar became increasingly important in maintaining economic dominance. As the world’s primary reserve currency, especially after the Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1971, the dollar became central to international trade and finance. President Nixon’s decision to abandon the gold standard further entrenched this dominance, as nations continued to hold dollars for trade and investment despite the lack of a gold backing.²³ The creation of the petrodollar system, wherein oil-exporting countries agreed to price oil in U.S. dollars, reinforced America’s monetary supremacy.²⁴ This arrangement ensured constant global demand for the dollar, enabling the United States to run persistent trade deficits and finance its global military presence without the usual economic penalties. It also made the U.S. Federal Reserve one of the most influential economic institutions in the world, as its monetary policy decisions affected inflation, capital flows, and interest rates far beyond America’s borders.

Technology and innovation also played key roles in solidifying American dominance in Cold War-era capitalism. Massive government spending on research and development, especially through the Department of Defense and NASA, produced spin-off technologies that fueled private sector growth. The rise of Silicon Valley in the 1970s and 1980s was rooted in Cold War defense contracts and university research funded by the state.²⁵ These innovations—ranging from microchips to the early internet—were later commercialized and exported, further embedding U.S. technological and economic influence worldwide. Intellectual property regimes established under U.S. leadership, such as the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), ensured that American firms could profit from innovation while shaping the global legal framework in their favor.²⁶ This combination of public investment and private enterprise became a hallmark of American Cold War capitalism, blurring the line between state and market in the service of national power.

By the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the United States stood economically unrivaled. The collapse of the Soviet Union was not only a political victory but also a validation of the capitalist model, as promoted by Washington. U.S.-led globalization entered a new phase, marked by the rise of neoliberal policies that emphasized deregulation, privatization, and free trade.²⁷ The Washington consensus, a set of economic policy prescriptions for developing countries, epitomized this post-Cold War moment in which American economic philosophy appeared universal and inevitable. Even as rising powers like China began to emerge, they often did so by integrating into U.S.-dominated global markets. Thus, Cold War capitalism did not merely win the ideological battle—it institutionalized a global economic system in which the United States remained the central player.²⁸

Neoliberal Globalization and the Washington Consensus

**Plaque Commemorating the Formation of the IMF in July 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference. / Photo by Barry Livingstone, Wikimedia Commons**

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the ideological victory of capitalism paved the way for a global economic paradigm rooted in neoliberalism, with the United States at the helm. Neoliberal globalization—characterized by deregulation, privatization, free trade, and financial liberalization—was institutionalized globally through the framework known as the Washington consensus. Coined by economist John Williamson in 1989, the term described a set of ten economic policy prescriptions endorsed by institutions based in Washington, D.C., such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and U.S. Treasury.²⁹ These policies were promoted as the most effective means of fostering economic growth, especially in developing countries, but in practice they also served to open markets to U.S. investment and exports.³⁰ By tying access to financial aid and debt restructuring to the implementation of these reforms, the United States and its institutions wielded enormous influence over the economic policies of sovereign states.

The spread of neoliberalism through the Washington consensus fundamentally restructured global economic governance. Structural adjustment programs imposed by the IMF and World Bank on indebted countries required sweeping reforms that aligned national economies with global markets.³¹ As a result, state-owned enterprises were sold to private, often foreign, investors; labor protections were weakened; and tariff barriers were lowered or removed altogether. These shifts facilitated the penetration of U.S.-based multinational corporations into previously protected markets, enabling American capital to dominate global supply chains.³² U.S. leadership in setting trade rules through agreements like NAFTA and the WTO further cemented its role as the architect and beneficiary of the neoliberal world order. The hegemony of U.S. capital was not merely economic but also ideological—markets, deregulation, and free enterprise were sold as not only efficient but morally superior systems.

Technological advancements and financial innovations in the 1990s and early 2000s further accelerated globalization under U.S. dominance. The rise of the internet and the digital economy created new global markets, and American firms like Microsoft, Google, and Amazon quickly became indispensable actors in the global system.³³ Simultaneously, financial deregulation enabled rapid capital flows across borders, leading to increased investment opportunities for U.S. firms and institutional investors. The growth of capital markets and speculative instruments, such as derivatives, further empowered U.S.-based financial institutions, especially Wall Street banks, to act as global gatekeepers.³⁴ This techno-financial dominance allowed the United States to shape not only the rules but also the architecture of global capitalism, reinforcing its central role even as production dispersed internationally.

Despite its widespread adoption, neoliberal globalization provoked considerable backlash, especially from developing nations that experienced severe social costs. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, for instance, exposed the fragility of liberalized financial systems and the dangers of over-reliance on foreign capital.³⁵ Critics argued that the Washington consensus neglected inequality, undermined democratic accountability, and prioritized investor interests over public welfare. Movements like the anti-globalization protests at the 1999 WTO summit in Seattle underscored a growing resistance to the neoliberal agenda. Yet, even amid this critique, the United States remained largely insulated from the worst effects and continued to project economic power through global institutions and capital markets.³⁶ The flexibility and resilience of the U.S. economy allowed it to weather volatility better than many of the nations that had adopted its prescriptions.

By the early 21st century, the Washington consensus began to evolve into what some have called a “post-Washington consensus,” incorporating limited attention to poverty reduction and governance, but the essential neoliberal tenets remained intact.³⁷ The 2008 financial crisis marked a significant turning point, exposing deep flaws in unregulated capitalism but failing to dislodge U.S. dominance. Instead, the U.S. orchestrated a global recovery through massive fiscal and monetary stimulus, reaffirming the centrality of its economic institutions.³⁸ Although rising powers like China have since challenged certain aspects of the neoliberal model, they have largely operated within the global capitalist framework initially shaped by the U.S. Thus, while the Washington consensus may no longer dominate the rhetoric of development economics, its legacy persists in the structure of global markets—and in the enduring economic supremacy of the United States.

Challenges and Adjustments in the 21st Century

The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (headquarters pictured), the fourth-largest U.S. investment bank, on September 15, 2008, is often considered the climax of the 2008 financial crisis. / Photo by David Shankbone, Wikimedia Commons

The 21st century has witnessed both the endurance and the recalibration of U.S. economic dominance in response to a rapidly evolving global landscape. While the United States remains a central actor in the global economy, its preeminence has faced increasing strain from shifting geopolitical dynamics, economic crises, and the rise of new powers. One of the earliest and most significant challenges came with the 2008 global financial crisis, which originated in the U.S. housing market but quickly rippled across the world, casting doubt on the infallibility of the American financial system.³⁹ Although the U.S. government responded with aggressive fiscal stimulus and monetary policy through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and quantitative easing, the crisis undermined confidence in neoliberal economic models and exposed vulnerabilities in unregulated financial markets.⁴⁰ It also provided an opening for critics and competitors to question the sustainability of U.S.-led economic governance.

China’s dramatic economic rise has posed perhaps the most profound long-term challenge to American economic hegemony. Since joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, China has pursued a hybrid economic model combining state-led development with market reforms, achieving unprecedented growth and becoming the world’s second-largest economy.⁴¹ China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and currency internationalization efforts signal a concerted strategy to reshape the global economic order.⁴² In response, the U.S. has adopted both cooperative and confrontational strategies, including trade wars initiated under the Trump administration, efforts to decouple critical supply chains, and restrictions on Chinese access to key technologies.⁴³ While these moves aim to preserve U.S. strategic advantage, they also reflect an acknowledgment that global economic power is becoming more multipolar and contested.

Technology and digital innovation have remained essential arenas for maintaining U.S. economic leadership, though even here challenges abound. American companies such as Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, and Google continue to dominate the global digital economy, but regulatory pushback—both domestic and international—has intensified.⁴⁴ Concerns over data privacy, monopolistic practices, and the political influence of Big Tech have led to growing calls for antitrust enforcement and digital sovereignty. Meanwhile, China’s advances in artificial intelligence, 5G, and e-commerce through firms like Huawei and Alibaba present formidable competition.⁴⁵ The race for technological supremacy has become a key battleground, with both countries investing heavily in research, cybersecurity, and strategic innovation, often framed as a new “tech Cold War.”

Another major shift affecting U.S. economic influence has been the transformation of global trade. The multilateral trading system—long shaped by U.S. leadership—has come under strain from nationalist and protectionist currents, including within the U.S. itself. The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), imposition of tariffs, and challenges to the World Trade Organization marked a significant retreat from America’s traditional role as champion of open markets.⁴⁶ Although the Biden administration has attempted to restore alliances and stabilize global trade, it has also maintained certain protectionist measures, particularly regarding semiconductors and green technologies.⁴⁷ Simultaneously, regional agreements such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) have proceeded without the U.S., signaling a possible realignment of trade leadership in Asia and beyond.

Environmental and socio-economic pressures are also reshaping the terrain of U.S. economic power. The urgent need to transition to a green economy has prompted significant investment in renewable energy and sustainable infrastructure through legislation such as the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022.⁴⁸ This shift not only seeks to combat climate change but also to reassert U.S. industrial competitiveness in the face of China’s dominance in green technology supply chains. Meanwhile, domestic challenges—including widening inequality, political polarization, and debates over the future of work—raise questions about the sustainability of U.S. economic leadership at home and abroad.⁴⁹ In navigating these complexities, the U.S. continues to adapt its strategy: leveraging technological leadership, reconfiguring alliances, and reasserting state intervention in markets to meet the demands of a more fragmented and competitive global economy.⁵⁰

Conclusion

In tracing the arc of American economic power from the upheavals of the World Wars to the complexities of the 21st century, it becomes clear that the United States’ role in shaping global capitalism has been both dynamic and contested. The postwar ascent to global leadership, solidified during the Cold War through market-driven diplomacy, gave rise to a dominant neoliberal framework under the Washington Consensus. Yet, the challenges of economic inequality, geopolitical shifts, and environmental imperatives in the new millennium have prompted critical reassessments of this legacy. As the global order continues to evolve, the future of American economic influence will likely depend on its ability to adapt its policies to a multipolar world while reconciling domestic and international demands for more equitable and sustainable models of growth.

Appendix

Endnotes

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