The framers of the Constitution placed the purse in the people’s hands for a reason. They had seen what happens when a single ruler controls the treasury.
By Matthew A. McIntosh
Public Historian
Brewminate
Introduction
In July 2025, Congress did something unusual: it passed a sweeping bill that effectively handed over, even if only tacitly, the power to make detailed cuts and spending decisions to President Trump’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Some senators admitted they had “no earthly idea what specific cuts will occur,” yet still voted to grant the executive branch authority to decide. This moment, emblematic of the broader trend, casts a harsh spotlight on a deeper rupture in constitutional governance.
For over two centuries, the “power of the purse” has been one of Congress’s core tools of control; its constitutional prerogative to appropriate funds, allocate spending, and restrain executive overreach. But in recent years, especially under Republican congressional majorities, that principle has been steadily hollowed out. The latest shifts suggest we’ve moved beyond erosion into outright surrender.
Now, a cascade of legal rulings, executive maneuvers, and internal party fealty have combined to place what was once Congress’s most sacred fiscal authority increasingly in the hands of one man. The result is not just bad policy, but a structural threat to the balance of powers undergirding American democracy.
Here I will trace how the power of the purse was conceived, explore how it has weakened, and show how today’s Republican-led Congress, by design or malpractice, has ceded its authority to an executive with authoritarian ambitions. Congress must reclaim the purse or watch its co-equal status fade ever further into irrelevance.
Constitutional Foundation and Historical Precedent
Overview
At the core of the U.S. Constitution lies a deliberate allocation of power: Congress holds the authority to appropriate funds, while the executive branch executes those spending decisions. This “power of the purse” is rooted in Article I, Section 9, Clause 7, which stipulates that “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” It is this clause that vests Congress with the exclusive prerogative to decide how public money is allocated.
The Framers’ Intent
The framers viewed the power of the purse as essential to preventing executive overreach. James Madison, in Federalist No. 58, warned that if Congress surrendered its control over spending, the executive could gain dominance. The framers saw control of funding as a key check: Congress could withhold or condition appropriations to restrain executive initiatives.
In the Constitutional Convention debates, the idea was to place spending decisions in the most directly accountable branch. Since representatives are elected more frequently and more closely tied to the people, the logic went, they should be the ones approving budgets, not a distant executive.
Early Assertions and Limiting Executive Spending
In the early republic, Congress repeatedly used its appropriations power to shape executive action. It routinely added riders or restrictive clauses to appropriation bills (so-called “legislative conditions”) to prevent funds from being used in certain ways. Congress also occasionally refused to fund or cut programs the executive wished to expand.
One landmark precedent is Bowsher v. Synar (1986), in which the Supreme Court invalidated a mechanism that permitted Congress to retain removal authority over an executive officer (the Comptroller General) in enforcing budget mandates on separation-of-powers grounds. That case reaffirmed that Congress cannot usurp executive functions by embedding itself too deeply in execution.
Another foundational case, United States v. Klein (1871), constrained Congress from legislating rules that interfere with the executive’s constitutional powers or judicial decisions, suggesting that even the power of the purse is not absolute if it encroaches on other branches’ domains.
Judicial Recognition: Spending as Congress’s Domain
Courts have long treated spending authority as one of Congress’s most sacrosanct powers. In modern times, various judicial opinions have emphasized that statutes that purport to give the president line-item control over appropriations (or allow impoundment of funds) conflict with the constitutional design. For example, the Supreme Court struck down a federal law granting the president a line-item veto, ruling that it violated the separation of powers.
When it comes to spending, the Court “has repeatedly held that it’s sacrosanct—it’s controlled by Congress.” That judicial deference underscores the principle that only Congress may decide whether funds can be spent, withheld, or redirected (subject to statutory constraints and limits).
The Erosion Begins: Structural and Political Drivers
Overview
The gradual weakening of congressional control over federal spending did not start with Trump or even the modern polarization in Congress. Over decades, institutional pressures, procedural shortcuts, and political incentives have hollowed out Congress’s ability, and willingness, to assert its fiscal authority. Below are key mechanisms by which that erosion has occurred.
The Rise of Continuing Resolutions and Deferred Appropriations
One of the most persistent signals of congressional abdication is the increasing reliance on continuing resolutions (CRs). CRs are stopgap measures that allow federal agencies to be funded at prior-year levels when Congress fails to enact full appropriations bills by October 1.
By design, CRs forgo the detailed line-by-line decisions that regular appropriations demand; they typically roll forward spending rates, sometimes with minor adjustments, until Congress drafts final funding bills. In recent decades, nearly every fiscal year has seen at least one CR; Congress has passed all required appropriations on time only a handful of times (most recently in FY 1997).
Because CRs lack the explanatory debates, committee reports, and granular choices of full appropriations bills, they implicitly hand discretion to the executive branch in interpreting vague spending authorities. In effect, Congress leaves many judgments to agencies and the OMB. Critics argue CRs expand executive latitude: without rigorous congressional direction, executives can reallocate or reprioritize spending within broad limits.
In some cases, Congress will simply pass a full-year CR, funding the government for the entire fiscal year via the same baseline, sidestepping the normal appropriations process altogether. This shortcut further weakens Congress’s ability to scrutinize or amend funding.
Delegation, Omnibus Bills, and Aggregated Appropriations
Another driver of weakening purse control is the mode in which Congress delegates spending authority to executive agencies. Over the 20th and 21st centuries, Congress has increasingly adopted omnibus spending bills, broad statutory frameworks, and delegated discretion to the executive branch for transfers, reprogramming, or agency-level adjustments.
In the executive budget process, agencies submit funding requests to OMB, which reviews and modifies them before formal submission to Congress, granting the executive pre-eminent influence over the shaping of proposals. Once Congress enacts appropriations, internal mechanisms such as reprogramming (moving funds within an account) or transfers (moving between accounts) give agencies flexibility, sometimes with the acquiescence (or prior authorization) from OMB.
These internal flexibilities can dilute Congress’s original intent: even when Congress imposes conditions or earmarks, agencies can shift funds under broad statutory authority or with minimal oversight. The complexity of modern appropriations means many decisions are buried in technical rules, not high profile votes.
Omnibus packages compound the issue. By bundling many appropriations sections into a single giant bill, Congress forces trade-offs across diverse policy areas. Legislators often vote yes or no on massive, unwieldy packages, rather than evaluating individual line items. This reduces accountability and blurs responsibility for specific funding choices.
Impoundment, Rescissions, and Judicial Limits
Historically, presidents sometimes attempted to impound (i.e. curtail spending of) funds already appropriated by Congress. Recognizing the danger of that practice, Congress enacted the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 as part of the broader Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act. The Act requires that any withholding (deferral) or proposal to cancel funds (rescissions) must be submitted to Congress for approval within 45 days.
In Train v. City of New York (1975), the Supreme Court held that the executive may not refuse to spend Congress-designated funds when Congress has not approved rescission. That decision reinforced that appropriated funds must be spent in accordance with congressional direction, not executive preference.
Still, in practice, presidents have attempted to stretch the boundaries of rescissions or deferrals. In recent years, some in the Trump orbit have argued the Impoundment Control Act is unconstitutional, a claim that, if accepted, would further shift expenditure power to the executive.
Also worth noting: some legislative attempts to impose constraints, like the Gramm-Rudman deficit enforcement rules, have been struck down. In Bowsher, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that gave Congress the power to force execution of budget cuts by firing a comptroller, as that arrangement violated separation of powers.
These episodes underscore that congressional mechanisms to reassert authority have faced constitutional limits and judicial pushback.
Institutional Weakening, Polarization, and Incentives
Beyond procedural mechanics, Congress’s internal institutional health has suffered. Increasing polarization, shrinking committee control, and leadership dominance have concentrated power in party whips and leadership offices, leaving rank-and-file members with little ability or desire to challenge executive initiatives.
In a hyper-partisan environment, legitimacy often rests on party discipline and alignment with presidential priorities, especially when the president shares party affiliation. Many Republican legislators have prioritized party loyalty and electoral messaging over institutional safeguards, thus passing along authority rather than pushing for stronger checks.
Moreover, the modern media and communications environment reward bold executive action but punish slow legislative process. When crises or scandals emerge, pressure mounts to act decisively, often empowering the executive. Legislators, especially in divided government, frequently accept reduced control as the trade-off for avoiding blame or paralysis.
Lastly, litigation and the courts have increasingly become the last refuge for Congress to assert fiscal control, rather than via budgetary maneuvers. But litigation is costly, slow, and uncertain, leaving Congress less inclined to fight unless a stark constitutional violation arises.
Republican Congresses and the Shift under Trump
Overview
Under Republican control, Congress has increasingly relinquished key oversight and appropriation functions—often in alignment with executive demands. Far from marginal pushes, these are systemic concessions enabling the Trump presidency to wield power well beyond traditional bounds.
The Rescissions Act of 2025: Congressional Abdication in Plain Sight
One of the starkest recent illustrations is the Rescissions Act of 2025, passed by the 119th Congress and signed by Trump. The law rescinded roughly $7.9 billion in international assistance and $1.1 billion in funding for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, funds previously appropriated by Congress.
That the cuts passed by simple majority points to a deeper acquiescence: under the Impoundment Control Act, rescissions must be approved by Congress within 45 days, but in practice presidential proposals are rarely rejected.
When Congress approves rescissions at the president’s behest, it cedes not just specific program funding but the posture of being a co-equal check on the executive.
Granting Trump Line-Item Authority
In a recent move reported by AP, Congress agreed to Trump’s request to rescind $9 billion from programs it had already approved, including cuts to public broadcasting and foreign aid, even when some lawmakers said they lacked clarity on which programs would be affected.
That vote reflects a surrender of fine-grained control. Instead of Congress deciding line-by-line adjustments, it allowed the executive branch heavy discretion in selecting targets. In effect, Congress abdicated its role as budget sculptor and deferred to executive pruning.
Deference on National Security and Foreign Policy
In foreign and national security policy, Congress has long ceded some authority to the executive, but the current Republican majority has been especially passive. The 119th Congress “has revealed itself less as a coequal branch and more as an accomplice in the marginalization of its own constitutional role in foreign and national security policy.”
Rather than asserting budgetary constraints or demanding rigorous oversight, many Republican lawmakers now acquiesce—or even actively cooperate—in Trump’s vision for reordering U.S. global engagement.
Internal Party Dynamics and Leadership Leverage
Why this surrender? One factor is intra-party discipline and alignment. When the president is of the same party, leadership can leverage political loyalty and threaten retaliation against dissent. Legislators often defer rather than challenge, to avoid primary threats or intra-party confrontation.
Moreover, Republicans frequently justify their ceding of power in the name of efficiency, avoiding gridlock, or responding to crises. But in practice, those “emergencies” are marshaled to rationalize broader authority for executive discretion.
The Judicial Wind: Enabling Executive Flexibility
Judicial rulings have further facilitated executive latitude. The Supreme Court has “killed congressional purse power” in a line-item veto decision and in other cases limiting Congress’s ability to constrain executive flexibility over appropriated funds.
Symbolic and Procedural Conformity
Republican Congresses have also in some instances staged symbolic acts underscoring this shift. E.g., in July 2025, House Speaker Mike Johnson handed Trump a gavel during a White House ceremony tied to tax and spending legislation, a gesture laden with symbolic resonance about where real power rests.
Procedurally, Congress has also revived mechanisms like the Holman Rule (a House rule permitting appropriations cuts targeting specific workers or programs) that blur lines between discretion and micromanagement, giving room for executive interpretation.
Case Studies: Concrete Examples of Power Transfer
Overview
To bring these abstractions to life, here are three illustrative cases in which Congress either implicitly or explicitly surrendered its spending control, and in doing so empowered the executive to act unilaterally or with minimal oversight.
Border Wall Funding and Emergency Declarations
Perhaps the most visible example is the angular dispute over funding for Trump’s southern border wall. In 2019, after Congress declined Trump’s request for ~$5.7 billion in wall funding, he declared a national emergency and sought to redirect funds from Department of Defense appropriations and other accounts to achieve his agenda.
The administration invoked Section 8005 of the DoD appropriations act to transfer funds internally, reprogramming military construction dollars toward the wall. Critics argued that this reprogramming violated the Appropriations Clause because Congress had specifically declined to authorize such spending.
Courts became battlegrounds. In Sierra Club v. Trump (later Biden v. Sierra Club), opponents challenged the constitutionality of the diversion. The Supreme Court ultimately vacated and remanded the case after the change in administration, but the legal questions remain unresolved.
This episode vividly illustrates that when Congress refuses to fund a program, a determined executive, backed by supportive majorities in Congress, can nonetheless operationalize it by exploiting ambiguities in appropriation statutes and emergency powers. The legislative branch loses the ability to decide what gets done when the executive can reshuffle appropriations at will.
Reprogramming Military Construction Funds
Another telling instance involves Trump’s diversion of military construction funding to nonmilitary uses, particularly the border wall. In 2020, the Department of Defense agreed to redirect approximately $3.6 billion originally earmarked for military construction projects toward the president’s border infrastructure priorities.
This move was controversial even among Republicans, as it undermined Congress’s design: appropriations labeled for military construction were being repurposed for civilian policy objectives.
While such reprogramming can be permissible under certain statutory authorities and with oversight (or acquiescence) from OMB or Congress, the fact that such large transfers occur underscores how much discretion the executive branch has accumulated over congressional intent.
OMB Oversight, Transparency, and Frozen Appropriations
A less dramatic but equally worrisome development is the executive’s control over transparency and apportionment, that is, how and when agency funds may be released. In mid-2025, a federal judge ordered the OMB to reinstate its website that publicly listed how Congress had appropriated funds. The court found that withholding such information hampered oversight.
When the executive branch controls not just whether funds are spent, but when and how transparently, it gains additional power over legislative oversight. Blocking public disclosure delays external scrutiny, making real-time accountability more difficult.
More broadly, in 2025 the White House signaled intentions to freeze or defund agency programs in amounts as high as $30 billion, using executive “deferrals” or “rescissions” strategies under the Impoundment Control Act and then placing the burden on Congress to reject them.
In this more diffuse form, the executive shifts the burden of oversight onto Congress; not by direct appropriation, but by constraining how much of an appropriation actually reaches agencies, when, and under what terms.
Together, these case studies show a pattern: funds approved by Congress are either reallocated by the executive (often via emergency or reprogramming authority), or else withheld, delayed, or obfuscated, reducing Congress’s ability to enforce its fiscal intent.
Republican Rationale, Strategy and Justifications
Overview
When Congress (especially Republican majorities) cedes spending authority to the executive, it is rarely framed as “abdicating constitutional control.” Instead, the shift is justified through a series of political and legal arguments, some coherent, some opportunistic. In this section I examine the key rationales, how they align (or conflict) with constitutional theory, and what that exposes about the true balance of power.
Efficiency, Crisis Management, and Gridlock Avoidance
One of the most commonly deployed justifications is procedural expediency: that the executive is better positioned to respond rapidly in crises, emergencies, or volatile economic conditions. Leaders argue that insisting on granular congressional appropriations in every domain would paralyze government action and that delegating more discretion to the executive allows for faster responsiveness.
Linked to this is the claim that congressional gridlock (especially in a polarized polity) prevents timely appropriations, making executive flexibility a necessary fallback. In practice, proponents argue, unless Congress is willing to overhaul its budget process or consistently pass appropriations on time, ceding some discretion is the pragmatic option.
From a constitutional perspective, however, this rationale is tenuous. The Appropriations Clause insists that “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” (Art. I, Sec. 9, Clause 7) That clause places the burden on Congress to legislate spending, not to offload it to the president for convenience. As the Government Affairs Institute notes, giving Congress an out on timely appropriations gradually surrenders its core power.
Deference to Presidential Expertise and Administrative Capacity
Another justification is institutional deference: that the executive branch (and especially OMB and agency officials) possess the technical knowledge and flexibility to manage shifting budget realities, reallocations, programmatic tradeoffs, and emergent threats. The argument goes: Congress passes broad appropriations, and the executive uses its administrative expertise to fine-tune programs in implementation.
This logic presumes Congress lacks the capacity or information to micromanage every detail, a reasonable claim in a complex modern state. However, the risk is that deference becomes abdication: once Congress cedes its oversight role, it loses leverage to correct, ex post, the executive’s choices.
Legal scholars have long warned about the tension: while delegations are necessary in large, modern government, they must be bounded by clear statutory directives, especially when core powers (like spending) are at stake.
Party Unity, Political Messaging, and Base Alignment
Perhaps the most overt rationale is partisan pressure and political alignment. With a Republican president and Republican Congress, many legislators believe that deferring to executive priorities advances party unity and avoids internal conflict. Dissenters risk primary challenges or being labeled “not with the team.”
Some Republicans have explicitly invoked the power of the purse as a tool to enforce loyalty. For example, Representative Jim Jordan threatened to use funding restrictions to “force the FBI to produce a subpoenaed document” related to investigations of President Biden, arguing “the power of the purse … you can’t use money for certain things.”
In other words, the power of the purse becomes a tool of intra-party discipline, not constitutional restraint—a misuse of what should be a nonpartisan institutional check.
Invoking the Statutory Rescission Process
Some Republicans will say they are not ceding power, but merely operating within the framework of the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which allows the president to propose rescissions (i.e. cancellation of previously appropriated funds), and requires Congress to approve them within 45 days or have the funds released.
By passing rescissions, Republicans argue, they are simply cooperating with the statute as intended. However, critics respond that many of the recent rescission maneuvers are not genuine, narrow-scope adjustments, they are broad cuts driven by executive agenda, and Congress is often on autopilot in approving them (or stymied in rejecting them).
In effect, what was supposed to be a bipartisan check becomes a rubber-stamp lever.
Legal Arguments and Judicial Deference
In addition to political rationales, Republican strategy often turns to judicial and constitutional arguments:
- Line-item flexibility: Some assert that Congress can credibly delegate detailed line-item authority or rescission discretion to the executive without violating separation of powers. They argue that so long as judicial review is available, the courts can police abuses.
- Presidential “inherent authority”: Occasionally, arguments are made that the president has some emergency or implied constitutional authority to act even in tension with statutory limitations, especially in national security or border contexts.
- Judicial deference: Some point to court precedent that gives substantial deference to executive construction of ambiguous appropriation statutes. As the Cato Institute put it, courts sometimes treat the question “how the President chooses to exercise the discretion Congress has granted him” as “beyond review.”
All of these are contestable. The “major questions doctrine,” for instance, cautions courts not to permit agencies (or the executive) to claim sweeping authority based on vague delegations in statutes for matters of vast significance.
The Rhetoric of Consent and Institutional Delegation
Finally, Republicans often frame the shift as one of delegated consent, i.e., Congress is choosing to empower the executive, either via omnibus bills, mandate language, or appropriation riders. The argument is: this isn’t abdication but a deliberate institutional arrangement tailored to modern governance.
Yet the danger is that such consent is one-way and irreversible. Once Congress stops insisting on tight, binding appropriations, it loses the bargaining chips needed to enforce fiscal discipline or correct executive interpretation.
When these justifications are stacked together (efficiency, administrative deference, partisan legibility, statutory process, judicial norms, and voluntary delegation) they form a powerful narrative. But in aggregate, they mask a deeper risk: the erosion of congressional sovereignty over the nation’s purse.
The Risks: Authoritarian Ambitions and Constitutional Crisis
Overview
When Congress cedes control over funding decisions, it hands the keys to governance to an entity less directly accountable to the electorate. In the context of a president with authoritarian leanings, that shift is especially perilous. Below are core risks that emerge when the “purse” slips from Congress to the executive.
Concentration of Power and Erosion of Checks and Balances
The constitutional design of separation of powers anticipates friction: Congress writes the laws and appropriates funds; the president enforces them. The appropriation power is meant to be a disciplining mechanism, Congress can refuse or restrict funding if the executive oversteps.
But if executive authorities control or delay spending irrespective of congressional intent (using rescissions, deferrals, or emergency transfers) they can bypass legislative limits. As the Constitution Center explains, “spending in the absence of appropriations is constitutionally prohibited,” except in extreme emergencies. When that constraint is eroded, the president’s margin for unilateral action expands.
Moreover, mechanisms such as deferrals or “pocket rescissions” shift the burden to Congress: unless a chamber acts to block, the executive’s decision takes effect by default. In 2025, the Trump administration’s plan to freeze or rescind over $30 billion in agency spending illustrates this threat: OMB has directed agencies to pause unobligated funds, with the idea that if Congress does not disapprove, the cuts become permanent. That kind of unilateral financial control undermines the very notion of legislative oversight.
In such a regime, Congress becomes reactive rather than pro-active: it must scramble to catch up, pass disapproval resolutions, or litigate, rather than proactively shaping policy. The executive, with control of timing, disclosure, and resource flow, gains superior leverage.
Weakening Institutional Guardrails and Oversight
Once financial control is ceded, other tools Congress could use to restrain executive power become less effective:
- Investigations and subpoena enforcement depend on resources: if funding is delayed or blocked, oversight capacities shrink.
- Committee staff and support depend on appropriated resources, if agencies interfere or freeze grants, Congress’s ability to analyze or monitor executive agencies is undermined.
- Enforcement through litigation is costly and slow; success is uncertain. Congress becomes dependent on courts to correct executive overreach, rather than leading the charge.
- Transparency is curtailed. If the executive controls apportionment schedules, delays or hides the timing or magnitude of obligations, oversight and media attention are blunted. The Government Accountability Office and watchdogs often rely on public disclosures and agency cooperation, both of which can be obstructed.
In short: executive control of money becomes a stranglehold on accountability.
Institutional Capture and State Weakening
As Congress loses fiscal authority, it also loses relevance in policymaking. Over time, legislative institutions atrophy. Committees shrink in influence; individual members defer more; institutional memory fades.
Scholar C. Boyden Gray has described a pattern of “delegation without detail,” where Congress gives broad authority without clear guidance or oversight, yielding confusion, drift, and executive dominance. Similarly, the broader literature on congressional abdication argues that by gradually surrendering power, Congress undercuts its own ability to resist or redirect executive authority later.
In extreme cases, this dynamic parallels historical precedents of eroded legislatures in weak democracies: when the legislature no longer controls budget or appointments, it becomes a rubber stamp. The gradual weakening can lead to a constitutional crisis—as a dominant executive can dispense selectively, reward loyalty, and punish dissenters.
Judicial Alliance and Normative Shifts
The risk is not just raw force but the endorsement of executive supremacy via courts and norms. As courts increasingly defer to executive interpretations of ambiguous statutes or decline to adjudicate disputes over budget transfers, the executive’s latitude grows.
Moreover, under doctrines like the unitary executive, proponents argue the president should control all executive powers free of congressional interference. In 2025, Reuters noted that Trump’s administration seems to be pushing a more expansive version of this theory, which, if validated by the Supreme Court, would further tip the balance toward the executive.
If doctrine shifts to treat the president’s reading as dispositive unless clearly constrained by Congress, then appropriation statutes become afterthoughts, giving the executive final say over how to spend (or not spend) funds.
Distortion of Policy and Accountability
When spending becomes discretionary at the executive’s whim, consequential policy choices may be made behind closed doors. Budget cuts or reallocations could favor political objectives rather than public priorities. Programs not within the executive’s agenda may be suppressed.
Furthermore, because the executive can delay or obfuscate funding decisions, voters may not trace responsibility for unpopular cuts back to Congress. The executive can frame cuts as profligacy or crisis management, insulating it from blame.
Finally, malleable funding undercuts the social contract: if the executive can bypass Congress, then democratic legitimacy deteriorates. The people’s representatives lose their real leverage.
In sum, when Congress relinquishes the purse, governance no longer functions as a collaborative constitutional balance, but increasingly as a hierarchy centered on executive discretion.
Paths to Reassertion: How Congress Could Regain the Purse Power
Overview
If the legislature is to recover its constitutional role, it must move beyond lamenting executive excess and begin rebuilding the tools it has allowed to decay. Reassertion will require procedural reform, political will, and renewed civic understanding of why the Appropriations Clause exists.
Rebuild Budget Capacity and Timeliness
The first step is practical: pass budgets on time. According to the Congressional Research Service, Congress has met all appropriations deadlines only four times since. Chronic reliance on continuing resolutions erodes both expertise and leverage. Regular order (hearings, mark-ups, line-item votes) forces legislators to confront trade-offs openly and keeps the executive from filling the void.
Reinvesting in institutional support is essential. The GAO and the CBO already provide non-partisan fiscal data; Congress could expand their analytic staff and restore the now-defunct Office of Technology Assessment to improve oversight of complex spending.
Tighten Delegation and Clarify Statutes
Congress can curb executive discretion through statutory precision. As the Project on Government Oversight notes, many appropriation riders are drafted so vaguely that agencies enjoy “wide latitude to re-program funds.” Narrower language (specifying ceilings, timelines, and purposes) reduces interpretive escape hatches.
Legislation could also codify limits on emergency transfers, requiring affirmative approval by both chambers for any reallocation exceeding a defined percentage of an appropriation. This would neutralize the “act-unless-blocked” dynamic that favors the executive.
Revive the Impoundment Controls and Strengthen Enforcement
The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 remains the statutory backbone of congressional spending power, but enforcement has grown lax. Congress could amend it to create automatic judicial review when the executive withholds funds without approval, giving courts a clear jurisdictional basis to compel disbursement.
Similarly, the GAO could be empowered to trigger expedited legal proceedings when agencies defy appropriations. In 2020, GAO determined that Trump’s OMB violated the Act by freezing Ukrainian aid; yet no penalty followed. Embedding enforcement teeth would deter future deferrals.
Modernize Transparency and Public Access
Sunlight remains one of Congress’s best weapons. Mandating real-time online disclosure of apportionment schedules, rescission requests, and transfer authorities would expose executive maneuvering before funds vanish into opaque accounts.
The Fiscal Transparency Act, introduced in 2023 but stalled, proposed precisely that: requiring OMB to publish every reprogramming decision within 48 hours. Reviving such legislation would allow watchdogs and journalists to scrutinize executive reallocations as they happen.
Reform Judicial Access and Standing
Courts often dismiss congressional suits for lack of standing, leaving budget disputes unresolved. Scholars at the Brookings Institution have argued that Congress should enact a Congressional Standing Act granting explicit authority for either chamber, or a bipartisan group of members, to seek judicial relief when the executive spends or withholds money contrary to statute (brookings.edu).
Such reform would not flood courts with partisan cases but would clarify the remedy for clear violations of appropriation law.
Cultivate Institutional Identity and Civic Pressure
Ultimately, reclaiming the purse is as much cultural as procedural. Members of Congress must recover the sense that their institutional power is not partisan property but constitutional trust. When loyalty to a president outweighs duty to the institution, separation of powers collapses.
Public engagement can reinforce that norm. Transparency reforms, civic education, and media focus on appropriation battles can remind citizens that fiscal control is democracy’s front line, not an accounting technicality.
In short, Congress can recover its constitutional vitality only by doing the hard work of legislating: restoring expertise, specificity, enforcement, and moral courage. Otherwise, each new crisis will justify another round of surrender.
Conclusion
The framers of the Constitution placed the purse in the people’s hands for a reason. They had seen what happens when a single ruler controls the treasury: corruption, patronage, and tyranny cloaked in law. Madison wrote that “this power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people.” It was meant to be Congress’s safeguard against monarchy.
That safeguard is failing. The slow transfer of budgetary power from the legislative to the executive branch, accelerated under the current Republican Congress, has not happened by accident. It is the product of political calculation, partisan loyalty, and institutional decay. Lawmakers have learned that it is easier to yield than to govern, to applaud executive strength than to shoulder accountability.
The consequences are no longer theoretical. Every rescission rubber-stamped by Congress, every “emergency” reallocation, every delay in funding disclosure chips away at the balance of powers that defines American democracy. The constitutional architecture cannot endure if one branch abandons its function.
Reclaiming the purse will not be dramatic. It will mean the unglamorous labor of legislating: marking up budgets, arguing over line items, rejecting vague delegations, enforcing oversight, and confronting a president from one’s own party when necessary. But without that work, the republic drifts further into an executive-dominated system where Congress debates while the president decides.
The United States was founded on a radical idea, that no ruler could spend the people’s money without the people’s consent. If that idea collapses, so does the Republic itself. Congress must remember who holds the purse, or accept that it has chosen, willingly, to give it away.
Originally published by Brewminate, 10.13.2025, under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
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