Turkey walks a fine line between NATO commitments and Western alliances and its dependence on Russia.
By Dr. Ozgur Ozkan
Visiting Professor of International Studies
Tufts University
Introduction
From the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Turkey has performed a delicate balancing act, portraying itself as an ally to the warring sides while reaping economic and political benefits from its relationship with both.
Turkey has condemned Russiaโs invasion and extended diplomatic and material assistance to Ukraineโs war efforts. At the same time, the countryโs leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoฤan, has pointedly opted not to join the Western-led sanctions against Russia or cut ties with Moscow.
But Turkeyโs neutrality in the Ukraine conflict is seemingly meeting with growing impatience in Washington and Moscow, and may be difficult to sustain amid a shifting geopolitical landscape.
In September 2023, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on Turkish companies and a businessman accused of helping Russia to circumvent U.S. sanctions. Meanwhile, Erdoฤan has failed to revive a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin that allowed the export of Ukrainian grain shipments via Turkeyโs Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits and eased global food prices.
The developments suggest that both Washington and Moscow are seeking to pressure Turkey into taking a decisive stand. Already there are signs of Erdoฤan bending. On Oct. 25, 2023, Erdoฤan signed Swedenโs NATO accession protocol and sent it to the Parliament for ratification, having earlier refused to endorse the move โ much to the annoyance of Turkeyโs NATO allies.
The move may be interpreted as a sign that Turkeyโs balancing strategy is reaching its limits. But it may also be another tactical move in Erdoฤanโs geopolitical chess game, which has expanded as he seeks to position Turkey as a diplomatic force amid escalating violence in the Middle East.
As an expert on Turkish politics and international affairs, I have watched as Erdoฤan walks a fine line between the countryโs commitments as a longtime NATO member and its reliance on Russia for trade, economic resources and energy imports. But this balancing act is becoming increasingly difficult the longer the war goes on.
The Middleman Strategy
Erdoganโs approach aligns with Turkeyโs historical foreign policy trajectory. Turkey has maintained a balance between Western European powers and Russia since the latter emerged as an ambitious regional player along Turkeyโs northern border in the early 18th century.
The balancing act allowed the Ottoman Empire, Turkeyโs predecessor, to survive the 19th century largely intact despite mounting pressures from the Russian Empire and European powers. Failure to utilize a balancing strategy in the First World War facilitated the empireโs demise. Joining forces with the losing Central Powers, Turkey had to share a catastrophic fate. In contrast, in World War II, a strategy of neutrality helped Turkey to weather the war unscathed.
Against mounting Soviet threat during the Cold War, Turkey took refuge under Western security guarantees, joining NATO in 1952.
Relieved of the Soviet threat in the 1990s, Ankara sought greater foreign policy autonomy. However, it lacked the necessary economic and military resources and domestic political will to fully realize this ambition, leading to alignment with U.S. policies in the Middle East and Balkans until the early 2010s.
Splintered Support
But U.S. support to Kurds in northern Syria, aligned to the militant separatist Kurdistan Workersโ Party, and the 2016 coup attempt against Erdoฤan marked the beginning of a more confrontational relationship between Washington and Ankara.
Blaming the U.S. and its Persian Gulf allies for complicity in the coup, Erdogan began to court Putin, who openly stood behind him during and after the attempted coup. Ankaraโs acquisition of Russian-made S-400 surface-to-air missiles led to its removal from the U.S.โs F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program and a set of U.S. sanctions on Turkeyโs defense industry. Coupled with its repeated military interventions in Syria, Turkeyโs closeness with Russia has, critics say, reduced it to a status of โunreliable partnerโ in the North Atlantic alliance.
But it didnโt take long for Ankaraโs flirtation with Moscow to reach a deadlock. The death of 34 Turkish soldiers in a Russian bombardment in northern Syria in February 2020 prompted a renewed effort to seek reconciliation with the U.S. However, the Biden administration hesitated to reset relations due to concerns over Erdoฤanโs increasingly authoritarian rule.
The Balancing Act and Ukraine
War in Ukraine offered a new boost to Erdoฤanโs balancing act. Turkeyโs control of two major straits and established ties with Ukraine and other states along the Black Sea provided significant leverage for a multifaceted and neutral approach. Erdoฤan seemingly hoped that maintaining trade relations with Russia and arms sales to Ukraine would bolster the struggling Turkish economy and rehabilitate his image in the West.
But Erdoฤanโs early blocking of Swedenโs and Finlandโs entry into NATO stirred resentment in Washington and Brussels.
As the Ukraine conflict continued and Erdoฤanโs domestic popularity dipped in the lead-up to the May 2023 elections, the sustainability of Turkeyโs balancing act seemed uncertain again.
In need of financial and political support, Erdoฤan has turned to the West and Gulf Persian Gulf? countries. He approved Finlandโs NATO accession and forged economic deals with West-friendly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates โ Turkeyโs two bitter rivals in the Middle East.
In summer 2023, Erdoฤan announced a new cabinet that projected a pro-Western outlook. He mended ties with Egypt, another traditional regional rival, aligning with the new balance of power that the U.S. and its regional allies were shaping in the Middle East. And then, at the July 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania Erdoฤan announced the withdrawal of his veto against Swedenโs accession to NATO.
Erdoฤanโs pro-Western moves have prompted a cautiously optimistic approach by Western leaders, using both incentives and punitive measures: extending a US$35 billion World Bank credit to aid Turkeyโs economy, while penalizing Turkish entities for violating U.S. sanctions. The latter has been taken as a not-so-veiled message to Ankara to take a definitive stance in its foreign affairs.
Erdoฤan has received a similar message from Putin. Disappointed in part by Turkeyโs reconciliation with the West, Putin chose not to renew the Ukrainian grain deal despite Erdoฤanโs earlier successful brokerage. It was a considerable blow for Erdoฤan, who sought to position himself as a crucial power broker in the Ukraine-Russia conflict.
Although Erdoฤan faces pushback from the U.S. and Russia, this does not necessarily signal the demise of his middleman strategy. Turkeyโs location on the Europe-Asia boundary and historical ties to neighboring regions provide Erdoฤan opportunities to sustain and even expand a strategy of neutrality among regional and global actors.
Developments in the South Caucasus and the escalating conflict between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip are two recent examples. They add a new layer of complexity for Erdoganโs balancing act, but also more room for him to maneuver. Turkey has been a key backer of Azerbaijanโs military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh โ something that has exposed Russiaโs waning influence in the region and created a major geopolitical setback for Iran. Meanwhile, Erdoฤanโs ties with both Hamas and the Israeli government provide an opportunity for him to play a mediator role there.
Originally published by The Conversation, 10.26.2023, under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution/No derivatives license.
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