He asked for a strengthened navy, coastal fortifications, more artillery and cavalry, but only a provisional army.
By Dr. Charles A. Stevenson
Adjunct Lecturer in American Foreign Policy
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
Johns Hopkins University
Introduction
…if you must have an army I will give it to you, but remember it will make the government more unpopular than all their other acts.
John Adams, 17981
In what both John Adams and Thomas Jefferson later called an atmosphere of “terrorism,” the United States greatly expanded its army, created its navy, re-established the Marine Corps, and imposed tough laws on foreigners and policy critics. In the process, the president and Congress each tried to fashion policies consistent with their institutional and political needs. And the whole issue of military command and control got caught up in a vicious power struggle.
The crisis erupted in the spring and summer of 1798, but it had been brewing at least since 1793. When revolutionary France declared war on Great Britain and other European states, President George Washington proclaimed official neutrality, hoping to avoid involvement in the conflict. His action also postponed a domestic fight between supporters of France, led by Thomas Jefferson, and supporters of Great Britain, led by Alexander Hamilton.2
By the start of Washington’s second term, two distinct political factions were jelling into political parties. On one side were farmers and southerners like Jefferson and James Madison who acknowledged the need for a central government but wanted to keep it limited. They were distrustful of bankers and businessmen, and especially of any standing army. True to their own revolutionary heritage, they admired the French upheaval as an extension and vindication of what they had achieved in North America.
The other faction was led by men from northern cities who favored a central government active and powerful enough to encourage and secure the development of a continental nation, linked by commerce and trade. While they welcomed political independence from Great Britain, they wanted to continue close economic and cultural ties. They also welcomed a national military establishment as a means of protecting the nation and its economic interests.
When the British began seizing US ships carrying goods to or from French ports in 1794, the two countries verged on war. Washington cooled the war fever by naming Chief Justice John Jay to try to negotiate a settlement of outstanding issues. Jay succeeded many months later, but his treaty was a compromise, obtaining some British concessions, such as a promise to evacuate western frontier forts by June 1796, but also granting US concessions limiting trade. The fight over the treaty lasted for many months in 1795, culminating in a Senate vote of 20–10 – just enough to meet the two-thirds requirement – for conditional approval, provided that a section were deleted that limited the size of US ships trading in the West Indies and banned re-export of many tropical products. Washington was so torn over the public controversy that he waited seven weeks before deciding to proceed with ratification of the amended treaty.3
As the leading historians of the Federalist period, Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, have concluded, “The outpouring of popular feeling over the Jay Treaty, as has long been understood, was more directly responsible than anything else for the full emergence of political parties in America, and of clearly recognized Federalist and Republican points of view on all political questions.”4 The split was sharp in the presidential elections of 1796, when Adams bested Jefferson by only three electoral votes, 71–68, thus creating an awkward situation where the legal successor to the president was the head of the opposition.
John Adams began his presidency with the best of intentions, but with two actions that proved significant political blunders. Concerned about deteriorating relations with France, he sought Jefferson’s help in recruiting Madison for a three-man delegation to Paris. Even before Madison declined, as expected, Adams’ own cabinet was in an uproar over both the idea of sending a mission and the fact that they had not been consulted in advance. The new president thought he was demonstrating smooth continuity by asking Washington’s cabinet to stay on, but what he got was internal opposition from men who were personally and politically much closer to Alexander Hamilton. Former Treasury Secretary Hamilton, by then practicing law in New York, had tried to engineer Adams’ defeat by his own Federalist running mate in 1796 and later came to rival the president in power and influence over the Executive Branch. Adams later said that his greatest mistake as president was to retain the Washington cabinet.5
The French Government had been angered by the Jay Treaty and by the extent of American trade with Great Britain. It pointedly decreed in July 1796 that it would seize US vessels attempting to trade with the British in the Caribbean. Several ships were seized in the subsequent months. Meanwhile, the French minister in Philadelphia openly sided with Jefferson in the presidential elections, and the outraged Federalists began calling the Republicans the French Party.6
Adams used his inaugural address on March 4, 1797, to warn of foreign interference in American politics, of votes that “can be obtained by foreign nations by flattery or menaces, by fraud or violence, by terror, intrigue, or venality.” He also listed as the “natural enemies” of the Constitution:
“the spirit of sophistry, the spirit of party, the spirit of intrigue, the profligacy of corruption, and the pestilence of foreign influence, which is the angel of destruction to elective governments.”
While speaking of his “personal esteem for the French nation, formed in a residence of seven years chiefly among them, and a sincere desire to preserve the friendship which has been so much for the honor and interest of both nations,” he pledged to continue Washington’s policy of neutrality.7
Ten days later, the new president learned that the French had spurned Washington’s minister to Paris, Charles C. Pinckney. Officials refused to accept his credentials and ordered him to leave the country. Adams decided to summon Congress to a special session, starting May 15. At that time, Adams told the members of the “indignities” suffered by Pinckney and promised “a fresh attempt at negotiation.” He then asked for several additions to US defenses – a strengthened navy, coastal fortifications, more artillery and cavalry, but only a provisional army, not an expansion of the existing force.8
These recommendations reflected Adams’ considered approach to war and diplomacy. He doubted that a French invasion was likely. As he wrote to Elbridge Gerry,
“Where is it possible for her to get ships to send thirty thousand men here? We are double the number we were in 1775. We have four times the military skill and we have eight times the Munitions of War. What would 30,000 men do here?”
But he believed that a military buildup was necessary to convince France to negotiate.9
He thought that the US coast and commerce could best be protected by a strong navy, a view not shared by his mostly pro-army advisers. A few years later, he noted, “Floating batteries and wooden walls have been my favorite system of warfare and defense for this country for three and twenty years.” But he admitted making few converts to this view.10
Although Adams believed in a strong Executive, he openly deferred to Congress on particular details, asking the legislators to write laws so sailors could defend themselves and to “prevent the resources of the United States from being converted into the means of annoying our trade.” He did not offer specific legislative proposals of his own at that time.11
The Politics of Defense
The Fifth Congress was sharply divided along partisan lines. The Federalists had a 22–10 margin in the Senate, but only a narrow margin in the House, one that fluctuated with member departures and absences. The Republicans were more sensitive to their minority status because they had had effective control of the House during all of Washington’s second term. They were now united in their disdain for Adams and their opposition to anti-French military preparations. They decried Adams’ message as tantamount to declaration of war. But they accepted the idea of a new three-man delegation to Paris and accepted Adams’ nominations once the independent-minded Elbridge Gerry was added.12
When the Congress began debating defense matters, Adams lost control, for his own party thought he had not gone far enough and the opposition considered even modest measures the first step on the road to war. In the ensuing fight, the Secretaries of State and Treasury, encouraged by Hamilton, pushed for such unprecedented steps – a provisional army of 25,000, new taxes, embargo on French trade, and laws allowing expulsion of aliens – that the Republicans succeeded in blocking any augmentations. By the time Congress adjourned on July 8, the only defense measure approved was additional funds to complete the three frigates already under construction under legislation passed in 1794.13
The members of Congress believed that they had the experience as well as the Constitutional duty to make independent judgments on defense matters. Half of the Representatives and 60 percent of the Senators were veterans of military service. The popularly elected House members were slower to approve provocative measures than the Senators, who were chosen by state legislatures – until the furor over the XYZ affair in the spring of 1798. While Federalists tended to support Adams and Republicans to oppose, coastal Republicans joined with the Federalists to support shipbuilding. In the 1797 debates, the House voted to limit presidential authority by forbidding the newly authorized frigates to be used in convoys, but the Federalist-dominated Senate opposed. When the House feared loss of all shipbuilding funds, they agreed to compromise by approving the ships without the restriction.14
The partisan differences on military matters are striking and perhaps surprising 200 years later. The Federalists favored a strong central government and a military force capable of defending US interests on the high seas and against Indians and Europeans in nearby colonies. Many who had served in the Revolutionary War, like Washington and Hamilton, doubted the effectiveness of the state-based militia. The Republicans, remembering Cromwell’s dictatorship in England, feared standing armies as threats to liberty and insisted on Constitutional provisions making it difficult to raise or maintain a national army and giving Congress alone the power to declare war. As Madison argued,
“War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes; and armies and debts and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few.”
Republicans also resented the comparative high cost of military forces, which even in 1796 accounted for over one fourth of total federal expenditures, and for over half the funds spent on items beyond interest on the national debt.15
Given their differing views toward Great Britain and France, the American partisans did not see a common external threat against which to rally. They were happy with neutrality toward European affairs and in agreement with Washington’s advice against entangling alliances. And as political fissures widened, each side increasingly distrusted the motives of its opponents.
As a result, and as the Framers probably intended when they created a government of separated institutions sharing powers, there was gridlock rather than consensus and compromise. Only 718 men were in the US Army in 1789; there was no navy or marine corps, since they had been disestablished after the Revolutionary War. Congress agreed to increase the army to deal with Indian threats on the borders, but military operations were usually supplemented by militia units. Washington pushed for an expanded regular army of 5,000 men for a frontier legion. In 1796, a law was passed setting a regular force, constabulary in nature, of a little over 3,000 men.16
To deal with contingencies, the Federalists in 1794 proposed a provisional army primarily to deter a British attack. The Republicans countered with a plan for a select corps of militia. Neither was approved. What did gain congressional favor, however, was a small program of six frigates to deal with pirates along the Barbary Coast. When news arrived in 1796 of a treaty with Algiers, the Republicans in Congress quickly passed legislation cutting the procurement from six to three and reducing the army’s authorized strength while mandating regiments with small companies. Left in place, however, was basic law providing arsenals, stores, small units manning isolated frontier posts, with artillery and engineers in coastal forts, plus a tiny cavalry for patrol and communications.17
After four months home in Quincy, Adams returned to Philadelphia in November 1797, for the regular session of Congress.18 He used his first annual message, now called the state of the union address, to reiterate his call for defensive measures, arguing that nothing had changed to render them unnecessary:
“… the law of nations has lost so much of its force, while pride, ambition, avarice and violence have been so long unrestrained, there remains no reasonable ground on which to raise an expectation that a commerce without protection or defense will not be plundered.”
He said he was awaiting word from the delegation sent to Paris, but he doubted that “permanent tranquility and order” would soon return to Europe.19
In the subsequent weeks, Congress remained deadlocked over military measures. In February 1798 the House on three occasions voted down Republican attempts to repeal the tax passed earlier to complete the three frigates. Meanwhile in France, the Directory issued a new decree against American shipping and the US delegation received demands for bribes before talks could begin. These developments, when news later reached America, sparked an intense new crisis and transformed political attitudes toward rearmament.20
XYZ Affair
On March 4, Adams received the first of several dispatches from the mission sent months before to France. The American envoys reported that the French had refused to receive them and had demanded bribes as a precondition for any negotiations. The French also insisted that Adams apologize for seeking an increase in US naval strength and that the Americans extend a large loan to France in addition to the bribe of about $250,000.21 Letters also reported the recent decree closing French ports to any ship that had visited an English port and allowing seizure of neutral ships carrying anything produced in Great Britain.22
Once the reports were decoded, Adams consulted his cabinet. Half the members favored a declaration of war. One suggested seizing Louisiana, another urged an alliance with Great Britain. After hearing from Hamilton, who urged an attitude of “calm defiance” along with specific military measures, Secretary of War McHenry passed along a full-scale rearmament proposal. Hamilton suggested arming merchant vessels, building 20 sloops of war and 10 ships of the line, plus an eight-fold increase in the regular army, to 30,000 men, and a provisional army of another 30,000. The former Treasury Secretary prudently insisted that revenues be raised to cover the costs.23
At first Adams agreed with the idea of formally declaring war and began drafting a message for Congress with that recommendation. But he became persuaded that such action might endanger the American envoys. What he sent to Congress on March 19 was a simple report that he had “no ground of expectation” that the commission would succeed. He renewed his plea for increased defensive measures “with promptitude, decision, and unanimity.”24
Congress reacted along party lines, the Federalists pressing ahead with military measures and the Republicans suspecting that Adams was exaggerating the threat. To calm any war fever, Jefferson suggested that Congress adjourn and go home to consult with their constituents, hoping to build support for peace He advised that to “do nothing, & to gain time, is every thing with us.”25
On March 27, Representative Richard Sprigg of Maryland, a Republican, offered a series of resolutions questioning the need for war but supporting “adequate provision” for seacoast protection and internal defense. As debate proceeded, William Branch Giles of Virginia complained that the president was “pursuing hostile measures, and keeping back all information.” Federalist John Allen of Connecticut then proposed that the president be asked to provide the diplomatic papers to Congress. His colleagues agreed, for it was difficult to debate the possibility of war without knowing as much as the president regarding French actions.26 The Republicans were upholding the prerogatives of Congress; they did not expect that Adams would have withheld information so helpful to his argument.
On April 2, the House voted overwhelmingly – 65 to 27 – to demand the papers relating to the mission to France. Adams complied the very next day. After three days of closed-door debate, the Members voted to publish copies of the dispatches. The impact on public opinion was swift and overwhelming. As Elkins and McKitrick wrote, “The opposition in Congress to all intents and purposes collapsed.” Moreover, Federalists would see electoral gains, especially in the South, throughout the rest of 1798 and into 1799.27
America united to defend its honor, support the president, and prepare for possible war. On April 9, Congress began debating the administration program introduced by Samuel Sewall of Massachusetts. It was a comprehensive bill, providing for three new army regiments for a total strength of 3,000 men; a Provisional Army of 20,000; and a direct tax on land, houses, and slaves to pay the costs. Republicans objected even to the first reading of the administration’s bill and managed to prolong debate for a month. Their main target was the idea of a standing army, which they labeled a “system of terror.”28
Hamilton joined the public debate with a series of essays in early April challenging the patriotism of the opposition. He charged the Republicans with
“unremitting efforts to justify or excuse the despots of France, to vilify and discredit our own government … to distract the opinions and to dampen the zeal of our citizens … [and] to divert their affections from their own to a foreign country.”29
Adams surged in popularity. His public appearances were greeted with wild applause, and he began wearing a military uniform and sword. On one occasion a supporter cheered that he had stood up to the “cutthroat, frog-eating, treaty-breaking, grace-fallen, God-defying devils, the French.”30
Climate of Fear and Suspicion
In fact, there were many French sympathizers in America. Many refugees from the revolutionary turmoil lived in coastal cities and were politically active. Foreign Minister Talleyrand himself had lived in exile for two years. George Rogers Clark, renowned Indian fighter, still held a commission as a general in the French army and considered himself more loyal to Paris than to Philadelphia. The XYZ dispatches included a boast by M. Y that the “French party in America” would blame the Federalists for failed negotiations – and the Federalists believed that the Republicans were foreign agents. Prominent people talked of 100,000 Americans joining to support an invading French army. There were reports of a plot by the United Irishmen to aid France in overthrowing the US government as well as rumors of treasonous correspondence between opposition Virginia congressmen and the Directory in Paris. It was only a short logical step to the conclusion that the elimination of Republicans was a necessary measure against France in a time of war.31 These fears spawned the Alien and Sedition Acts that same year.
There is no modern evidence to prove a conspiracy, but Federalists at the time firmly believed it. They argued that France won her battles in Europe by allying with parties in enemy nations. They witnessed pro-French demonstrators in the streets of Philadelphia and heard the revolutionary rhetoric. They were concerned that France might occupy Louisiana and other Spanish colonies and then dismember the United States. Southerners especially feared that France might invade with a black-led army, fresh from the Caribbean, which could incite a slave rebellion.32
The spring of 1798 was a turbulent time in America. Party divisions were deep; suspicion was rampant; fear of violence was widespread and credible. In an exchange of letters in 1813, Jefferson wrote that “the character of the times” that season was “terrorism”, but he claimed that it was “felt by one party only.” Adams cited numerous examples of what he called “Terrorism” against Federalists. In addition to the rebellions by Shay, Whiskey distillers, and Fries, he cited the situation during the XYZ crisis,
“when I myself judged it prudent and necessary to order Chests of Arms from the War Offi ce to be brought through bye Lanes and back Doors … to defend my House.”33
In April, Adams learned of a letter found near his house telling of a plot by émigré Frenchmen and American accomplices to burn down Philadelphia and kill its inhabitants. A second warning letter arrived ten days later, and then a third. In fact, there were four serious fires in Philadelphia between mid-April and June, 1798, with arson strongly suspected in two of them. There was also street rioting in May between pro-French and pro-British groups of young men. Public concern was so widespread that Jefferson wrote Madison that “many weak people packed their most valuable movables to be ready for transportation.”34
The threat of terrorism and domestic subversion was palpable and powerful in 1798, though at this distance it seems grossly exaggerated. Nevertheless, it proved a strong impetus to congressional action to counter the perceived threats, both internal and external. Jefferson noted that feelings ran so high that,
“Men who have been intimate all their lives cross the street to avoid meeting and turn their heads another way, lest they should be obliged to touch hats.”35
This climate of fear triggered support for military rearmament and political repression. By the time it adjourned on July 19, the Fifth Congress had approved legislation quadrupling the size of the army and increasing the navy’s fleet more than tenfold. It also re-established the Marine Corps and created a separate navy department. It authorized a 10,000 man provisional army in case of emergency. While not formally declaring war, Congress voted an end to American treaties with France and a full trade embargo as well as authorizing the navy to attack and seize French ships.36
Congress showed its seriousness of purpose by voting, for the first time, for a direct tax on land, houses, and slaves to raise the needed $2 million to pay for the military buildup. The measure imposed a levy of 50 cents for each slave and a graduated tax on houses – from 40 cents for one valued at $200 to 30 cents per hundred dollars’ valuation for a $500 house.37 This was widely felt among the population and the cause of later blowback. It was a change from previous practice, for the 1794 shipbuilding program had been financed by tariffs, excises on whiskey, snuff and sugar, and a luxury tax on owners of carriages.38
The fi nal bill passed with substantial Republican support, 60–11, thus demonstrating the political pressure for standing up to France. But in recognition of its Constitutional prerogatives, Congress kept tight rein on how the president might use his new authorities. It limited the Provisional Army to only eight months, until the next planned session of Congress, and only in case of war, invasion, or “imminent danger.” Southern Republicans thought it was better to have a fi xed number of regular troops rather than a larger standby force. The president was not given authority to take preliminary steps such as appointing officers for the provisional army. Nor was he allowed to begin licensing privateers.39
In creating the Navy Department, Congress demonstrated its oversight powers. Many members were angry that the War Department had taken three years to build the three frigates first authorized in 1794. A House committee investigated the matter and issued a report charging “enormous expenses and unaccountable delays.” When the opportunity arose in 1798, Congress established a separate Navy Department so that shipbuilding would get a higher priority. And it did. When Benjamin Stoddert became the first secretary at the end of June, there were only three ships in service and none at sea at the time. Within a month, the first US ship, the Ganges, went on patrol against the French. By the end of 1798, the navy had 20 ships, and 33 by the end of 1799.40
In addition to military and diplomatic measures against the French, the Federalists enacted political sanctions against French sympathizers at home. Adams signed the Alien and Sedition Acts into law and tarnished his reputation forever thereby, but the impetus for the laws themselves came from Congress. Adams fueled the firestorm by repeatedly branding his opponents as in league with France, but his legislative allies made it an urgent cause. As Senator Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts said when he first learned of the XYZ dispatches, “It will afford a glorious opportunity to destroy faction.”41
The large number of immigrants coming to the new republic prompted consideration of legislation providing for naturalization. Federalists sought to stop or reduce the fl ow of new people because they seemed predisposed to support the Republicans. They tried to prevent foreign born people from voting or holding offi ce, but lost that provision by a 2–1 vote. In mid-June, 1798, Congress narrowly passed – by a single vote in each house – a new Naturalization Act extending the residency period for naturalization from five to 14 years.42
This set the stage for other legislation dealing with foreigners. On June 25, Congress passed a measure extreme in intent but never invoked in practice. The Alien Act allowed the president “at any time during the continuance of this act” – that is, whether there was peace or war – to deport any aliens “he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the government.” No court hearing or even a specified reason was required for the deportation. The law expired in 1800 without ever having been invoked.43
On July 6, the Alien Enemies Act became law. The original version had called for a vast system of registration, surveillance, and individual permits. The target was the “wild Irish” who had pro-French sympathies and were drawn into Republican politics. Even Federalists recognized that the provisions were excessive, however, so they modified the legislation to limit the expulsions to cases of war or invasion and to permit judicial review. Thus changed, the bill attracted Republican support.44
Even the Sedition Act was modifi ed to little more than the existing common law on sedition, but it was used for politically motivated prosecution. The original House bill made mere threats to defame punishable. The original Senate measure said there could be treason in peacetime, named France as the enemy, and made giving aid and comfort to an enemy punishable by death. Eventually the Senate struck references to treason and France. And the final Senate bill reflected common law practice regarding sedition. The House added provisions requiring proof of malicious intent and allowing truth as a defense. It also permitted juries to determine both facts and law.45
The final version made it unlawful
to combine or conspire together, with intent to oppose any measure or measures of the government … [or to] write, print, utter or publish … any false, scandalous and malicious writing … against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame … or bring them into contempt or disrepute …46
It is arguably significant that the final text prohibited criticism of the President and Congress, but not of the Vice President.47
Hamilton’s views reflected the shifting mood on this bill. At first he said the “spirit of patriotism” could be used to crush the opposition so that “there will shortly be national unanimity.” Later he urged caution: “Let us not be cruel or violent.” And eventually he pleaded, “let us not establish a tyranny”, warning that the sedition act might “endanger civil War.”48
Struggle for Control of the Army
Although Adams had not pressed for expansion of the army, he moved quickly to implement the new law. On June 2, without even consulting his cabinet or the former president, he nominated George Washington as commander, hoping thereby to unify the country and intimidate the French. Enjoying retirement at Mount Vernon and doubting the likelihood of a French invasion, Washington was at first reluctant to accept. When he finally relented on July 8, he insisted that he be allowed to name his chief subordinates.49
This posed a problem for Adams because, even more than a war with France, he feared that Alexander Hamilton would become de facto head of the army and a threat to his administration. His animosity went deep, at one point calling Hamilton an “instrument of hell.”50 While both men were committed Federalists, sharing a common view of executive power and the national interest, they were political rivals. And with three of Adams’ cabinet members routinely seeking and accepting Hamilton’s advice on policy questions, the former Treasury Secretary was the guiding force behind many of the administration’s actions. He remained close to Washington and expected to be named second in command.51
In fact, Hamilton had been Washington’s young adjutant in the Revolutionary War and was a longtime proponent of a national army. He had chaired the Continental Congress’ military committee in 1783 when it reported a plan for peacetime army of 3,000, supplemented by elite reserve in case of war or invasion, much like the later provisional army. While the plan was killed by Gerry and other New Englanders who fiercely opposed the idea of any standing army, Hamilton continued to press similar ideas in subsequent years.52
When Washington accepted Adams’ nomination, he sent a list of proposed general officers with Hamilton’s name first. “Oh no”, Adams declared, “it is not his turn by a great deal.”53 He then engaged in a series of maneuvers to try to avoid making Hamilton Washington’s chief deputy. He argued for restoring all revolutionary war generals to their prior rank, which would have made them senior to Hamilton. Eventually he was pressured into including Hamilton, but then left Philadelphia for Quincy without signing any of the commissions.54
Adams saw these maneuverings by Hamilton and his supporters as a threat to civilian control as well as to his own authority. He called the cabinet intrigue a “combined plot” to “appoint him [Hamilton] general over the president.” And when it was over and Hamilton had prevailed, Adams called his rival “the most restless, impatient, artful, indefatigable and unprincipled Intriguer” in the United States.55
Hamilton and Secretary of War McHenry set to work organizing the new army.56 As Adams had believed, “I have always cried Ships! Ships. Hamilton’s hobby horse was Troops! Troops!” The newly named major general got involved in the minutia of military organization and training. He designed uniforms for Washington and other officers, designed huts for different ranks and even conducted experiments to determine the ideal length and speed of marching steps.57
Since the new army had political as well as military purposes, Hamilton insisted on the ideological purity of senior officers and blocked Adams’ efforts to name some Republicans as generals. The plan for 12 regiments meant that he could pick nearly 400 officers, a potent force of future supporters.58
Adams concluded that he had lost control of the government.
“With all my ministers against me, a great majority of the Senate and other House of Representatives, I was no more at liberty than a man in prison, chained to the floor and bound hand and foot.”59
As a result, he decided to change course – and spent the rest of his term trying to avoid a full-scale war with France. He became more willing to see hopeful signs in the peace overtures emanating from Paris. There were various reports of French willingness to end the crisis. And the French defeat at the Battle of the Nile made it even less likely that France would take on America.60
Despite his proclamation in June that “I will never send another minister to France without assurances that he will be received, respected, and honored as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and independent nation”, he suggested to his cabinet in October that he might announce his intent to nominate a minister to France “in order to keep open the channels of negotiation.” Meeting resistance, he created only a small loophole – that he would not send a new minister “without more determined assurances he would be received.”61
When Congress convened on December 8, Adams appeared with Generals Washington, Hamilton, and Pinckney arrayed behind him. He spoke of “the ultimate failure of the measures which have been taken by the Government of the United States toward an amicable adjustment of differences with” France. But he pointed to evidence that “it is averse to a rupture with this country, and that it has in a qualified manner declared itself willing to receive a minister from the United States for the purpose of restoring a good understanding.” He declared, “It must therefore be left with France (if she is indeed desirous of accommodation) to take the requisite steps.”62
With regard to the military measures previously adopted, Adams saw nothing “which ought to change or relax our measures of defense.” He repeated his view that “An efficient preparation for war can alone insure peace.” And he renewed his call for an increased navy “to guard our coast and protect our trade.”63
Congress eventually approved an increase in the navy, but it also agreed to Hamilton’s proposal for restoring and tripling what was called the Eventual Army, since the authority for a Provisional Army had lapsed. The legislature approved a force of 30,000 men in 25 regiments that could be used in case of war or invasion. Meanwhile, Hamilton and McHenry continued recruiting men and appointing officers for the New Army of regulars. Adams tried to slow things down, often sitting on matters requiring his clearance.64
The last straw for Adams was a report from Senator Sedgwick in early February 1799, that the Senate was considering giving Washington the new, never previously used rank of “General.” Adams exploded. “What, are you going to appoint him general over the President?”65 He was concerned about the former president dominating his successor, but even more concerned that Hamilton might succeed to the title and the power. He warned Sedgwick,
“… if you must have an army I will give it to you, but remember it will make the government more unpopular than all their other acts.”66
Two weeks later, without prior notifi cation to his cabinet or Congress, Adams nominated William Vans Murray to be minister to France. Federalists and Republicans alike were “thunderstruck.” He agreed to add two Federalists to the delegation as a concession to Congress, and all three were promptly confirmed. With the old Congress gone, and the sixth not scheduled to meet until December, Adams delayed sending the new envoys to France for eight months, perhaps waiting for the completion of additional navy ships.67 The delegation concluded a treaty with France in September 1800, just before elections ousted Adams and the Federalists in Congress from power.
Support for the military buildup collapsed even before the treaty was signed, a casualty of domestic opposition to the direct tax, the idea of a standing army, and the Alien and Seditions Acts. Congress voted in February 1800 to suspend enlistments for the new army and cancelled the law for a provisional force. In fact, less than half the authorized number ever enlisted in the new army. They spent the summer of 1799 scattered, and the fall constructing winter encampments. They did little serious training. Washington lamented the failure to create the larger standing force several months before his death. “The golden moment is passed”, he said, “and probably will never occur again.”68
This rearmament controversy was repeated several times in later American history. Although the circumstances varied – different enemies, different domestic political dynamics, different degrees of harmony and discord – the underlying institutional forces operated in similar ways. The president always had the initiative, but Congress imposed its own conditions and viewpoints.
Endnotes
- Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 616–7.
- See Charles A. Stevenson, “The Neutrality Proclamation of 1793”, Case study for Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 2002.
- Elkins and McKitrick, pp. 418–9.
- Elkins and McKitrick, p. 415.
- John Ferling, “‘Father and Protector’ President Johns Adams and Congress in the Quasi-War Crisis”, in Kenneth R. Bowling and Donald R. Kennon (eds), Neither Separate Nor Equal: Congress in the 1790s, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2000, pp. 296–7 and 299.
- Ferling, pp. 306–7; Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Beginnings of the Military Establishment in America, New York, NY: Free Press, 1975, p. 203.
- See his inaugural address online at http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres15.html.
- Alexander DeConde, The Quasi-War, New York, NY: Scribner’s, 1966, p. 341; Message to Congress at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/messages/ja97-03.html.
- Elkins and McKitrick, p. 596; Ferling, p. 309.
- Elkins and McKitrick, p. 596.
- Presidential message at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/president/messages/ja97-03.html.
- James Roger Sharp, American Politics in the Early Republic, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993, p. 315 n 2; Ferling, p. 308; DeConde, p. 341.
- Ferling, pp. 309–10.
- Rudolph M. Bell, Party and Faction In American Politics: The House of Representatives, 1789–1801, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973, pp. 150, 151, 160, 166, 172 and 180; William T. Bianco and Jamie Markham, “Vanishing Veterans: The Decline of Military Experience in the US Congress”, ch. 7 in Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (eds), Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil–Military Gap and American National Security, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, p. 278; Abraham, D. Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power: The Origins, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1976, p. 150.
- Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2004, p. 553; Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Washington, DC: Department of Commerce, 1975, p. 1115.
- Elkins and McKitrick, pp. 594–5.
- Kohn, pp. 220, 183, 185 and 186.
- Adams regularly spent several months a year in Quincy when Congress was not in session, thereby making it difficult for his cabinet to consult with him. He returned home both for his own health and to be with his wife Abigail. He spent several months in Massachusetts in the fall of 1798 because Abigail was quite ill. Ferling, pp. 310 and 311.
- Presidential message at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/president/sou/adamsme1.htm.
- Elkins and McKitrick, p. 582; DeConde, p. 342.
- That is about $2.6 million in current dollars. Chernow, p. 549; DeConde, p. 47; Ferling, p. 314.
- Elkins and McKitrick, p. 582.
- Ferling, p. 314; Chernow, p. 550; Elkins and McKitrick, p. 584.
- Presidential message at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/president/messages/ja98-01.htm; Sharp, p. 173; Elkins and McKitrick, pp. 585–6; Ferling, p. 314.
- Elkins and McKitrick, p. 587; Sharp, p. 174.
- Elkins and McKitrick, p. 587.
- Elkins and McKitrick, p. 588; DeConde, p. 343.
- Ferling, p. 318; DeConde, p. 343; Kohn, pp. 224–5.
- Quoted in Sharp, p. 173.
- Quoted in Ferling, pp. 317 and 315.
- Kohn, pp. 216, 212–3 and 218; DeConde, p. 51; James Morton Smith. Freedom’s Fetters, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1956, p. 14.
- Kohn, pp. 212 and 215; Elkins and McKitrick, p. 598.
- Quoted in Kohn, pp. 194 and 193.
- Quoted in Sharp, p. 175; Kohn, p. 213.
- Quoted in Chernow, p. 552.
- Ferling, p. 319; Elkins and McKitrick, pp. 595 and 596.
- DeConde, p. 102. For an approximate current value, multiply by 10. Thus, the tax on slaves would be the equivalent of $5 per person today.
- David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789–1801, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1997, pp. 185, 226 and 227.
- Kohn, p. 226; Ferling, p. 318; Elkins and McKitrick, p. 598.
- Leonard D. White, The Federalists, New York, NY: Free Press, 1948, pp. 160 and 159; DeConde, p. 343.
- Smith, p. 21.
- Elkins and McKitrick, p. 590.
- Elkins and McKitrick, p. 591.
- Elkins and McKitrick, p. 591.
- Elkins and McKitrick, p. 592.
- Public Statutes at Large, fifth Congress, II session, ch. LXXIV, July 14, 1798.
- For comparison, look at the section of the Uniform Code of Military Justice forbidding contemptuous words about many officials: Article 88: “Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department, the Secretary of Transportation, or the Governor or legislature of any State, Territory, Commonwealth, or possession in which he is on duty or present shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.”
- Quotes from Sharp, pp. 176 and 177.
- Kohn, pp. 231–2.
- Quoted in Chernow, p. 559.
- White, p. 240; Ferling, p. 299.
- Elkins and McKitrick, p. 593.
- Quoted in Elkins and McKitrick, p. 603.
- Kohn, pp. 232–7; Elkins and McKitrick, p. 603.
- Ferling, p. 324.
- As Richard Kohn points out (p. 229n) there were five American “armies” at this point – four regiments of the old or western army; 12 regiments of New Army; Volunteer companies taken into federal service under the May, 1798 Provisional Army Law; the 10,000 man “Provisional Army” authorized by that law; and the Eventual Army of 28 regiments authorized in March 1799, but for which the president had only a year to appoint only officers. Only the New Army enlisted soldiers; the others never really organized.
- DeConde, p. 112; Chernow, p. 564.
- Kohn, pp. 239 and 240; Ferling, p. 324.
- Quoted in Kohn, p. 257.
- Ferling, p. 321.
- June presidential message at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/president/messages/ja98-04; Elkins and McKitrick, pp. 605, 610 and 612.
- Presidential message at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/president/sou/adams me2. htm#france; Kohn, p. 258.
- http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/president/sou/adamsme2.htm#france.
- Kohn, p. 247; Elkins and McKitrick, p. 616.
- Elkins and McKitrick, p. 617.
- Elkins and McKitrick, pp. 616–7.
- Ferling, pp. 327 and 328.
- Elkins and McKitrick, p. 615; Kohn, pp. 248 and 249. It is noteworthy that Jefferson, in one of his first official acts as president, pardoned all those convicted under the Sedition Act and freed those still in jail. And 40 years later, Congress voted to repay with interest, all the fines imposed on those convicted under the act. Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime, New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 73.
Chapter 5 (79-92) from Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations under Stress, by Charles A. Stevenson (Routledge, 07.13.2006), published by OAPEN under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.